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ABSTRACT
Various streams of foundational management literatures imply that corporate managers can
play a role in the management of intra-organizational innovation processes. However, management
scholars have largely assumed that corporate managers do not become actively involved in the
management of intra-organizational innovation processes occurring within multidivisional firms.
This assumption contrasts with the importance given in the management literature to innovation
as an enabler of organizational long-term survival. To address this contrast, my dissertation
explores why and how corporate managers adopt an active approach to the management of intraorganizational innovation processes in complex multidivisional firms.
In the first paper, I map extant knowledge of innovation mechanisms onto an evolutionary
multilevel framework. I synthesize uncovered mechanisms into structural, behavioural, and
routinized corporate approaches to innovation management. I conclude this paper by proposing a
comprehensive research agenda for exploring complex interactions between top-down and bottomup innovation processes occurring within a multidivisional firm.
In the second paper, I propose a mid-range theory of corporate innovation activism
elaborating two novel concepts. The corporate innovation synergy concept encapsulates
mechanisms available to corporate managers to increase the efficiency of intra-organizational
innovation processes. The corporate innovation value-added concept concerns mechanisms
available to corporate managers to qualitatively improve intra-organizational innovation processes
in ways unavailable at the business unit level. I organize my arguments into a theoretical model
and discuss limitations of my theory, offering important opportunities for future research.
In the third paper, I explore the genesis of corporate managers’ capability to influence
innovation management in a multidivisional firm; I call this the corporate innovation function. I
combine proprietary narrative data with archival records to study the development of the corporate
innovation function in 20 large multidivisional firms. Based on my observations of 17 corporate
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innovation processes, I develop a corporate innovation function typology comprised of
collaborative, parallel-capability, and sponsorship corporate innovation function models. I link
differences across the corporate innovation function configurations to firm-level innovation
performance.
In the fourth paper, I elaborate on the concept of dynamic corporate innovation capability,
which enables a multidivisional firm to continuously discover, evaluate, and monetize innovations
that are novel to the firm and the markets in which the firm operates. Exploiting further the
proprietary narrative and archival dataset, I first establish the prototypical role of a senior
innovation manager and identify four underlying mechanisms that enable the establishment of a
dynamic corporate innovation capability: senior innovation manager legitimacy, corporate
innovation ambition, corporate innovation processes, and corporate innovation routines. Using a
system dynamics approach, I synthesize my findings in a dynamic model, disentangling the
complex process of maintaining exploration in an organizational environment biased towards
exploitation.

Keywords: Corporate strategy, corporate function, corporate manager, chief innovation officer,
multidivisional firm, innovation management, innovation processes, strategy implementation,
innovation routines, risk management, dynamic innovation capability
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Although determining the optimal balance between exploitation and exploration is not
ordinarily feasible in an organizational setting, it may be possible to anticipate some
of these ways in which adaptive dynamics lead to imbalances. Such awareness is a
basis for timely interventions based on knowledge about risk preferences,
communication, and conflict in organizations.
- James G. March
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 TOPIC AND MOTIVATION
In this dissertation, I study the relationship between interventions by corporate managers
in intra-organizational innovation processes and a multidivisional firm’s capability to continuously
discover, evaluate, and monetize novel ideas. Specifically, I explore the rationale, origins, and
evolution of corporate managers’ motivation and ability to engage in corporate innovation
activism. I define corporate innovation activism as purposeful actions by corporate managers to
manage intra-organizational innovation processes within a multidivisional firm. The key idea is
that in a multidivisional organizational design, corporate managers’ interventions in intraorganizational innovation processes qualitatively differ from interventions occurring at the
business unit level. My core argument, which I support using both theory and evidence, is that
corporate innovation activism increases organizational capability to use novel ideas for continuous
adaptation to environmental changes.
My motivation for writing this dissertation is to advance scholarly understanding of the
complex interactions between top-down and bottom-up innovation processes coexisting in a
multidivisional firm. To achieve my research aim, I relax the dominant assumption held in the
foundational management literature ascribing corporate managers a largely passive role in
innovation management. In doing so, I am able to explore in depth the motivations and
mechanisms surrounding corporate innovation activism.

1.2 THEORETICAL INTEREST
Whether innovation is primarily a bottom-up or top-down process has been an important
topic of debate in the innovation literature. Proponents of the former argue that innovation
principally stems from individual-level creativity, which should not be hindered by top-down
bureaucracy (Amabile, 1983; Damanpour, 1991). This view of innovation as a bottom-up process
1

assumes that the main role of corporate managers in innovation is the establishment of an
organizational environment that does not hamper individual-level creativity. Corporate managers
create such an organizational environment by defining general rules for aligning innovation
activities with corporate strategy, and limit their active interventions to resource allocation
decision making based on inputs by trusted middle managers (Bower, 1970). When individuallevel innovation activities result in value creation at the firm level, corporate managers
retrospectively attribute the innovation success to corporate strategy (Burgelman, 1983).
While the bottom-up view of innovation is firmly established in the management literature,
top-down influences on intra-organizational innovation processes have received less scholarly
attention (Anderson, Potocnik, and Zhou, 2014). Daft (1978) considers a dual core model of
organizational innovation, arguing that top-down influences are limited to organizational settings
marked by low professionalization and concern mainly administrative (as opposed to technical)
innovations. More recently, scholars studying open innovation (Boudreau and Lakhani, 2009;
Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006) have argued that top-down involvement in innovation activities
is necessary for sourcing high-potential novel ideas from outside of organizational boundaries. In
the dynamic capabilities literature, Teece (2007) posits that corporate managers are directly
responsible for the identification of high-potential innovation opportunities. Birkinshaw, Bouquet,
and Barsoux (2011) research innovation management within several multidivisional firms and
propose that active top-down involvement in innovation management is critical to the success of
bottom-up innovation processes.

1.3 RELEVANCE
The above suggestions in the literature that corporate managers can, in fact, play a more
active role in innovation management stem from several limitations inherent in a primarily bottomup innovation process, which can be rectified through top-down interventions. Below I provide
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several examples of how these top-down interventions can address limitations in the bottom-up
innovation process.
First, when novel ideas are distanced from a firm’s core businesses, their vertical ascent
through organizational layers can be hampered by a liability of illegitimacy (Criscuolo, Salter, and
Ter Wal, 2014). Top-down interventions providing temporal sanctuary for nurturing novel ideas
(Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007) can facilitate cognitive recognition of novel ideas’ potential
(Argote, 1999; Levinthal and March 1981; Levitt and March 1988).
Second, bottom-up novel idea transmission processes involve aggregation of information,
reducing the richness of initial ideas and introducing distortions and biases (Csaszar and Eggers,
2013; Kahneman, Lovallo, and Sibony, 2011). Without top-down interventions mitigating the
information transmission noise and decision-making biases, corporate managers are likely to be
presented with a distorted view of the objective innovation opportunities available to the firm
(Vuori and Huy, 2016).
Third, engaging in innovation activities exposes employees to risks which can be difficult
to mitigate at the individual level, reducing individual-level novel idea expression and/or skewing
lower-level decision making towards lower-potential/lower-risk innovation projects (Castañer and
Kavadis, 2013); Rahrovani, Pinsonneault, and Austin, 2018). Corporate managers can introduce
system-level mechanisms to mitigate individual-level innovation risks.
Fourth, corporate innovation activism is likely to increase the emergence of architectural
innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990), as corporate managers have a better overview of
knowledge recombination opportunities (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997) than business unit managers
(Ramachandran, Manikandan, and Pant, 2013).

1.4 STATE-OF-THE-ART LITERATURE
Several recent innovation research streams imply the potential for corporate innovation
activism. Using a small, survey-based data sample, Argyres and Silverman (2004) find that
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innovation processes confined within business units result in more locally and immediately
applicable innovations, whereas innovation processes occurring at the corporate level lead to more
generally applicable innovations relevant across business units. These findings, recently replicated
using a larger data sample (Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014), suggest that corporate innovation
activism can result in the pursuit of more transformational innovation projects compared to the
organizational set-up in which the innovation decision making lies mainly with business unit
managers. Further, corporate managers can play an important role in continuously calibrating the
proportion between more general innovations consuming organizational resources for extended
periods of time before generating value and more local innovations with quicker conversion of
resources into tangible outcomes.
Balancing exploitation with exploration is generally a complex process (March, 1991). Its
complexity is increased further when a firm navigates challenging environmental conditions,
increasing the managerial inclination to take actions that yield immediate results. Lim, Celly,
Morse, and Rowe (2013) study the relationship between cost retrenchment and a firm’s postretrenchment performance. They find that in industries marked by high levels of exploration
(Teece and Pisano, 1994), cost retrenchment significantly reduces a firm’s later performance. This
effect is exacerbated when the focal firm itself follows a highly exploratory strategy marked by
the continuous pursuit of transformative innovations. This finding highlights the role of corporate
managers in times of crises requiring downsizing and/or downscoping (Hitt et al., 2009), as they
possess better agency than business-level managers to reconfigure resources to mitigate the
negative effects of cost retrenchment on their firms’ innovation ability.
The pursuit of higher-risk exploratory activities increases a firm’s chances of finding and
extracting value from transformative innovations to support its long-term competitive advantages.
Austin, Devin, and Sullivan (2012) inductively study 20 cases of innovation processes in various
settings, and find evidence of innovators deliberately incorporating accidents into their innovation
activities. The authors note that while some accidents can be beneficial for generating variation of
4

knowledge, key challenges of an accident-seeking approach to innovation include the low yield of
beneficial accidents and the generation of potentially destructive outcomes. Thus, the potential
role of corporate managers is to create an organizational climate that allows accidental innovation
to occur, while mitigating the resource waste and the contagion of system-level risks that endanger
the organizational core (Thompson, 1967).
Relatedly, Criscuolo, Salter, and Ter Wal (2014) study how researchers in mature
organizations challenge research project formalization to carve out autonomy for their unofficial
innovation research activities. They find that scientists take their research underground (i.e.,
engage in bootlegging) to escape normative organizational pressures and allow their inventions to
develop to a stage that facilitates legitimization and the provision of further organizational
resources. Their study shows that this bootlegging activity is positively related to organizational
acceptance of norm-deviant behaviour, and to the proportion of researchers engaged in bootlegging
activities (compared to the overall organizational research community). The challenge for
corporate managers is to increase organizational tolerance towards norm-deviant behaviour
without relaxing the organizational discipline needed for efficient and effective exploitation of
extant knowledge (March, 1991).
Both of the above-mentioned studies involve corporate managers potentially creating
dysfunctional situations within their firms in the pursuit of exploration. Corporate managers can
outsource some of this dysfunctionality to other firms by vicariously learning from external
innovation failures (Maslach, 2016). Maslach, Branzei, Rerup, and Zbaracki (2018) explore this
type of learning by analyzing failure data from the medical device industry. Using qualitative
analysis, Maslach et al. (2018: 7) find that firms use public failure data to “identify aspects of
experience that they had not seen in their own experience, to find more ways of seeing these
adverse events, and to learn from events that would not have happened with their own products.”
This research stream demonstrates that firms can generate variation of knowledge by studying
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aversive counterfactuals documented in public repositories, thereby drawing on experiential
learning from other firms without directly experiencing the negative consequences of failure.

1.5 THE FOUR PAPERS

1.5.1 PAPER #1
In my first dissertation paper, I survey extant literature on the active involvement of
corporate managers in innovation. In particular, I aim to uncover, synthesize, and critique extant
knowledge on innovation mechanisms operating in a multidivisional firm. First, I map this
knowledge onto a multilevel evolutionary framework. The resultant “Variation-SelectionRetention X Individual Inventor-Team-Business Manager-Corporate Manager” matrix organizes
the extant knowledge on innovation mechanisms. For each mechanism, I briefly discuss the
potential role of corporate managers. Second, I synthesize uncovered innovation mechanisms into
structuring, nudging, and routinizing activities. Third, I identify relevant knowledge gaps and
tensions in the literature. I conclude by proposing a comprehensive research agenda for pushing
the boundaries of innovation scholarship by exploring the complexity of interactions between topdown and bottom-up innovation processes operating in a multidivisional firm.
1.5.2 PAPER #2
In my second dissertation paper, I develop a theory explaining why innovation is being
increasingly elevated into the corporate domain and made into a distinct corporate function in the
world’s largest multidivisional firms. Specifically, I argue that the active involvement of corporate
managers in innovation is driven by the search for innovation synergies across business units and
additional innovation value that is inaccessible to single-business organizational designs.
I propose that corporate managers seek to achieve the former aim of innovation synergies
by incentivizing employees’ deeper involvement in the variation stage of the innovation process,
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reducing selection biases that exist at the business unit manager level, and adopting a non-rigid
approach to the innovation implementation process. I call this process “corporate innovation
synergy.”
I argue that corporate managers pursue the latter aim of additional innovation value by
attracting novel ideas from external actors unwilling to deal with business unit managers due to
trust issues; engaging in temporal and cross-business unit idea recombination; leveraging their
higher capacity to absorb innovation losses/flops to incentivize high-risk/high-reward innovation
projects; and supporting innovation projects which transcend short-term/individual business unit
utility. I call this process “corporate innovation value-added.”
1.5.3 PAPER #3
In my third dissertation chapter, I explore top-down influences on innovation management
in large multidivisional firms to advance scholarly understanding of the genesis of organizational
capabilities. I respond to several recent calls in the literature for considering corporate managers
as active, rather than passive, actors in intra-organizational innovation management in the context
of a multidivisional firm.
To that effect, I have assembled a novel dataset combining narrative and archival data,
allowing me to trace the origins of active involvement of corporate managers in innovation
management (i.e., corporate innovation function, or CIF) in 20 large multidivisional firms.
Through an inductive analysis of the dataset using a case-ordered predictor-outcome matrix, I find
17 innovation processes initiated by corporate managers which operate at both corporate and
business unit levels.
Based on these findings, I propose a corporate innovation function typology comprised of
the collaborative CIF model, the parallel-capability CIF model, and the sponsorship CIF model. I
explain how these different CIF configurations have a differential effect on the likelihood of type
I innovation errors (i.e., selection of low-value innovation projects) and type II innovation errors
7

(i.e., rejection of high-value innovation projects). I synthesize my arguments by introducing the
concept of the “innovation efficiency frontier,” which highlights the trade-offs that corporate
managers must make when deciding whether to focus on minimizing the incidence of innovation
failures or maximizing the likelihood of scoring innovation home runs.
1.5.4 PAPER #4
In the concluding chapter of my dissertation, I explore how actions of corporate managers
in large multidivisional firms lead to the establishment of innovation routines conducive to
continuous discovery, evaluation, and monetization of distant innovations (i.e., dynamic corporate
innovation capability).
Given that knowledge about the involvement of corporate managers in innovation
management is limited (Garud, Tuertscher, and Van de Ven, 2013), I use an inductive multi-case
research design (Eisenhardt, 1989). Large multidivisional firms provide a suitable research context
for studying how dynamic corporate innovation capability is developed given the inherent
complexity of managing various innovation maturity models across multiple markets embedded
in different environments (McGahan and Silverman, 2001; Utterback, 1971). In total, I developed
14 in-depth case studies, providing a longitudinal and multilevel overview of the work of senior
innovation managers.
The data shows how senior innovation managers foster distant innovations by establishing
legitimacy for their role, building corporate-level innovation ambition, and designing corporate
innovation processes, which gradually lead to the establishment of corporate innovation routines.
Intriguingly, to establish corporate innovation routines, senior innovation managers combine well
established mechanistic innovation processes with autocratic, resource-scaling, and experimental
approaches to managing innovation from the top of the organization. Senior innovation managers
use this corporate innovation process palette to leverage, bypass, and disrupt formal organizational
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structures and associated behavioural manifestations as they work on transforming corporate
innovation routines into a dynamic corporate innovation capability.
I synthesize my findings across cases in a grounded theoretical process model, explaining
how senior innovation managers develop a dynamic corporate innovation capability without
redirecting all exploration resources away from local innovations supporting core businesses. In
my model, I conceptualize the work of senior innovation mangers as consisting of three phases:
(1) connecting past to present, (2) managing risk, and (3) connecting future to present. I use a
system dynamics approach to disentangle complex interrelationships among these phases, and
propose a holistic model linking actions by senior innovation managers with the development and
maintenance of a dynamic corporate innovation capability.
The results of the study increase scholarly understanding of the interrelatedness between
top-down and bottom-up innovation processes in two ways. First, while my findings confirm that
the use of external knowledge (Chesbrough, 2003; Teece, 2007) is an important element of
multidivisional firms’ strategy for generating distant innovations, I find that the use of open
innovation is hindered by its costs and long investment-benefit conversion cycles. As a result,
senior innovation managers initially rely on leveraging internal bottom-up sources of knowledge,
using open innovation as a weak complement to—rather than a strong substitute for—sourcing
novel knowledge internally. Over time, as actions of senior innovation managers increase the
internal capability to absorb external knowledge, the use of open innovation increases as well.
Second, I show how senior innovation managers’ regulation of innovation risk across
individual, business unit, and organizational levels of analysis weakens formal hindrances to selforganized grassroots innovation initiatives aimed at generating distant innovations. This result
complements centralized research and development (R&D) innovation literature (Argyres and
Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014), as it shows that the decoupling of innovation
activities from the needs of core businesses can be induced at the business unit level, thereby
reducing the need for innovation centralization.
9

1.6 PAPER INTERCONNECTEDNESS
Taken together, the four papers in my dissertation generate a comprehensive understanding
of corporate innovation activism through a rigorous research program comprised of an in-depth
literature review, a deductive theory, and two inductive empirical papers. In the first paper, I map
the extant knowledge on intra-organizational processes in a multidivisional firm onto an
evolutionary multilevel framework. Through this structured mapping exercise, I establish what is
already known, and identify important tensions and knowledge gaps that guide the rest of my
dissertation. The second paper uses the elaboration of two novel concepts – corporate innovation
synergy and corporate innovation value-added – to deductively establish the rationale for
corporate innovation activism. The third paper leverages a hand-collected dataset to open the black
box of corporate innovation activism. It presents the concept of corporate innovation function,
inductively examining the genesis of corporate managers’ ability to engage in corporate innovation
activism. While the third paper is predominantly descriptive in nature, the fourth paper considers
the system-level aspects of corporate innovation activism through the concept of dynamic
corporate innovation capability. Understanding how corporate managers can use their agency to
continuously calibrate the flow of various types of innovation generates important new knowledge
about the organizational ability to use novel ideas to increase organizations’ chances of long-term
survival.
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CHAPTER 2

INNOVATION MECHANISMS IN A MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRM:
MAPPING, SYNTHESIS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA

2.1 INTRODUCTION
A firm’s resource endowment is a major source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1986;
Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984), especially in industries with high innovation ferment (Jacobson,
1992; Schumpeter, 1934; Shilling, 2008). One key resource is a firm’s capability to vary its
knowledge base to gain access to novel ideas, enabling the firm to maintain or increase its
environmental fitness (Teece, 2007). Firms can develop novel knowledge internally (Amabile,
1988) or acquire it externally (Chesbrough, 2006); however, the former option is slow (Gold, 1987)
and risky (Shi, 2003), while the latter approach is expensive (Katila, Rosenberger, and Eisenhardt,
2008) and does not guarantee novel knowledge availability, as it can take several decades of
fundamental research before novel knowledge is commercially exploitable (Van de Ven and
Garud, 1994).
Regardless of the source of the novel knowledge, once it becomes available to a firm, its
suitability for further development needs to be evaluated (Reitzig and Sorenson, 2013), as most
firms do not have access to unlimited resources for innovation (Weiss, Hoegl, and Gibbert, 2011).
The evaluation of novel ideas in a multidivisional firm is a complex multi-role and multilevel
selection process. Its objectivity can be distorted by individual self-interest (Bower, 1970; Guth
and MacMillan, 1986), political agendas (Burgelman, 1983a, 1983b), decision-making biases
(Kahneman, Lovallo, and Sibony, 2011), inter-business unit rivalry (Galunic and Eisenhardt,
1996), and the divergence of innovation interests between the organization as a whole and
individual business units (Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014).
The retention of selected novel ideas within a multidivisional firm is another complex
process marked by uncertainty and non-linearity (Klein and Sorra, 1996). The implementation
phase for a specific selected innovation project is often delegated to a concrete business unit, which
may disrupt its ongoing exploitation activities (March, 1991). In addition, resources which are
14

initially allocated to selected innovation projects through the formal budgeting cycle (Bower,
1970) may prove to be insufficient (Noda and Bower, 1996). Even when the implementation of an
innovation project is initially successful, its diffusion and adaptation throughout the organization
is far from certain (Klein and Knight, 2005). When the implementation of an innovation project
fails, the repercussions of the failure can endanger core businesses (Austin, Devin, and Sullivan,
2012; Thompson, 1967).
Despite the criticality of innovation for a firm’s long-term survival (Teece, 2007), the
management of variation, selection, and retention of novel knowledge in a multidivisional firm
remains poorly understood as scholars have mainly focused on studying bottom-up innovation
processes (Anderson, Potocnik, and Zhou, 2014). Further, interactions among the variation,
selection, and retention processes in a multidivisional firm result in a multilevel process; yet most
extant literature studying innovation processes is single-level focused (Garud, Tuertscher, and Van
de Ven, 2013). In consequence, our understanding of top-down interventions in innovation
processes in a multidivisional firm remains largely undeveloped (Birkinshaw, Bouquet, and
Barsoux, 2011). Gupta, Tesluk, and Taylor (2007: 886) comment that, “Many studies have sought
to understand the innovation process (albeit not very often through a multilevel lens), but scholars
have not yet been able to identify a clear prototypical process for the management of innovation.”1
Given this lack of top-down multilevel focus in the management scholarship, three aims
motivate this paper. The first objective is to map existing knowledge on innovation processes
occurring within a multidivisional firm onto a multilevel evolutionary framework. The second
objective is to conduct cross-level synthesis of uncovered innovation processes from the top-down

Clemens Thornquist (2005) argues that the management of innovation is less about finding a generalized innovation
process and more about continuously finding ways to harbour spontaneous acts of innovation as they occur within the
organization and enable these innovation acts to find their own paths. I thank Rob Austin for bringing to my attention
Clemens Thornquist’s work on the management of innovation processes.
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perspective. The third objective is to identify important tensions and knowledge gaps to guide
future research on the involvement of corporate managers in innovation management.
To achieve both depth and executability in my review, I adopted four complementary
approaches to identify extant knowledge on innovation processes relevant to the management of
innovation in a multidivisional firm. First, I reviewed references included in two recent reviews
on the management of innovation (i.e., Anderson, Potocnik, and Zhou, 2014; Garud, Tuertscher,
and Van de Ven, 2013). Second, I searched the Google Scholar interface for the following key
words: “innovation routines,” “innovation processes,” “innovation capabilities,” “innovation
management,” “corporate innovation,” and “corporate R&D.” Third, I created a secondary reading
list based on references I encountered in the first and second approaches. Fourth, as a confirmatory
check to ensure that no foundational literature has been left out of my review, I cross-checked
reviewed literature against relevant reading lists from my doctoral studies at INSEAD, University
of Pennsylvania, and University of Toronto.
My search yielded knowledge on 39 innovation processes. To organize these innovation
processes from the perspective of top-down influences on innovation in a multidivisional firm, I
used an evolutionary multilevel framework. Following the tradition of evolutionary thought in the
management literature (e.g., Burgelman, 1983a, 1983b; Dosi, 1982; Levinthal, 1998; Nelson and
Winter, 1982), one organizing dimension consists of three distinct evolutionary phases: variation
processes (i.e., novel idea pool generation), selection processes (i.e., novel idea prioritization), and
retention processes (i.e., implementation of selected novel ideas). Considering that the
organizational context for this review is a multidivisional firm, the other organizing dimension
consists of four levels of analysis: individual, team, middle manager, and corporate manager. My
organizing approach is consistent with the accepted view in the literature that the intra-firm
innovation process consists of stages (Amabile, 1988) and is multilevel in nature (Crossan and
Apaydin, 2010).
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The paper proceeds as follows. First, I map the uncovered 39 innovation processes onto the
evolutionary multilevel framework. Second, I synthesize uncovered innovation processes into
higher-order constructs operating across evolutionary phases and levels of analysis. Third, I
conclude my review by proposing a comprehensive future research agenda.

2.2 MAPPING INNOVATION MECHANISMS IN A MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRM

2.2.1 VARIATION OF KNOWLEDGE
Variation of knowledge in the context of a multidivisional firm involves gaining access to
knowledge that is novel to the firm. The process of sourcing of this knowledge generates a pool of
novel ideas from which the firm can draw in its quest to pursue innovation. Novel knowledge
exists both inside and outside of organizational boundaries. The intra-organizational novel
knowledge can be sourced through the extraction of novel ideas residing in employees’ minds
(Nonaka, 1994) and/or the recombination of extant intra-organizational knowledge (Clark and
Henderson, 1990). External knowledge can be bought through M&A or borrowed using
partnerships (Capron and Mitchell, 2012). In the following paragraphs, I map various variation
mechanisms operating in a multidivisional firm onto different levels of analysis.
2.2.1.1

Individual Level

2.2.1.1.1 Unstructured Exploration Worktime
Intrinsic motivation is the key driver of individual-level innovation pursuits (Amabile,
1988). Some firms (e.g., Google, 3M) support intrinsic motivation on a continuous basis by
allowing employees to dedicate a portion of their worktime to unstructured, explorative activities
based on their own interests (Steiber and Alänge, 2013). Unstructured exploration worktime results
in conceptually richer innovations when compared to structured exploration activities (Davis,
Davis, and Hoisl, 2013). In addition, unstructured exploration worktime has the potential to break
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path dependencies that are detrimental to a firm’s innovation capability (Hannan and Freeman,
1984; Levitt and March, 1988), and increases the causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982)
of intra-organizational innovation activities, delaying imitation by rivals (Reed and DeFillippi,
1990). One limitation for using this mechanism is the constrained ability of employees to make
temporal mental transitions between structured and unstructured work environments (Jonassen and
Henning, 1996). Another limitation is the varying responsiveness to unstructured work
environments of different employee types (Rahrovani, Pinsonneault, and Austin, 2018). Thus, the
challenge for corporate managers is to provide unstructured innovation worktime opportunities to
employees who are capable of this mental switching, while customizing, to a certain degree,
unstructured exploration environments to specific employee types.
2.2.1.1.2 Bootlegging
Bootlegging involves covert engagement by employees in innovation activities outside of
the realm of officially sanctioned innovation projects and without access to official R&D resources
(Augsdorfer, 1996). It is similar to unstructured exploration worktime activities in that bootleggers
are intrinsically motivated to pursue an interesting idea. The main difference between the two is
the illicitness of bootlegging activities, which can expose bootleggers to potential sanctions.
Augsdorfer, (2005: 1) argues that bootlegging’s “incremental trial-and-error learning” nature
results in similarly valuable innovation outcomes when compared to officially sanctioned R&D
innovation projects. In line with this reasoning, Criscuolo, Salter, and Ter Wal (2014: 1301) find
that bootlegging “enables individuals to gain both explorative advantage over colleagues and more
time and space to nurture and substantiate embryonic ideas before organizational assessment.” As
Criscuolo et al. (2014) further note, the challenge for corporate managers is to maintain an
organizational culture within which bootleggers can pursue their activities without being
constrained by high demands on behavioural conformity. On the other hand, an abundance of
bootlegging is likely to decrease organizational exploitative capability as resources are detoured
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for ad hoc exploration activities (March, 1991). Moreover, bootlegging activities result in the
creation of social bonds among like-minded bootleggers, which can lead to an overall increase in
organizational innovation capability (Courpasson and Younes, 2018), yet which may also
undermine formal organizational structures established by corporate managers.
2.2.1.1.3 Innovation Awards
Innovation awards aim at inducing individual-level variation of knowledge, specifically
targeting employees for whom variation of knowledge is not a formal requirement. Innovation
awards vary along the monetary component spectrum depending on what type of motivational
mechanisms they are intended to activate. Non-monetary innovation awards aim at eliciting
employees’ intrinsic motivation to pursue their innovation interests without the expectation of any
rewards (Amabile, 1988). Monetary innovation awards act predominantly upon employees’
extrinsic motivation, triggered by the expectation of a material reward in exchange for their
innovation efforts (Amabile, 1997). The design of an effective innovation awards program is a
non-trivial task due to the potentially conflicting interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivational factors (Benabou and Tirole, 2003).
2.2.1.1.4 Accidental Innovation
In their theory of organizational choice and control, Cyert and March (1963) assume that
organizations aim at mitigating uncertainty. Similarly, Thompson (1967) argues that a firm’s core
businesses need to be insulated from random variation. Yet, early organizational theorists also
allow for novel knowledge to originate from “accidental encounters with opportunities” (March
and Simon, 1958: 204). To explore the origins of this accidental variation, Austin, Devin, and
Sullivan (2012) inductively study 20 cases of innovation processes in various settings, and find
evidence of innovators deliberately incorporating accidents into their innovation activities. The
authors note that while some accidents can be beneficial for generating variation of knowledge,
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the key challenges of such an approach to innovation include the low yield of beneficial accidents
and the generation of potentially destructive outcomes. Thus, the role of corporate managers in
accidental innovation is to create an organizational climate that allows accidental innovation to
occur, while mitigating resource waste and the contagion of system-level risks that endanger the
organizational core (Thompson, 1967).
2.2.1.2

Team Level

2.2.1.2.1 Mitigation of Ideation Inhibitors
Ideation researchers have studied team-level inhibitors reducing the variation of knowledge
and searched for ways to mitigate the effect of these inhibitors. Production blocking refers to the
air time for individual idea expression being blocked by other team members (Diehl and Stroebe,
1991). Free riding occurs when individuals can mask their intellectual laziness by hiding within
the collective output. Evaluation apprehension can prevent individuals from expressing their ideas
due to the fear of negative evaluation of their idea by peers and/or superiors (Diehl and Stroebe,
1987). Given that multiple ideation inhibitors that can supress the expression of divergent thinkers
operate at the team level (Guilford, 1962), the role of corporate managers is to become aware of
these inhibitors and introduce mitigating mechanisms. Production blocking can be reduced by
using a sequential variation process, allowing ideas to germinate in individual minds first
(Valacich, Dennis, and Connoly, 1994). Free riding can be mitigated by incentives balancing
appreciation of individual and group performance (Toubia, 2006). Interestingly, evaluation
apprehension has not been found to be a strong ideation inhibitor within the context of a
multidivisional firm (Reitzig and Maciejovsky, 2015).
2.2.1.2.2 Skunk Works Projects
“Skunk works” projects involve small teams with limited resources working on exploratory
projects, often within an operating unit focused on exploitation (Capron and Mitchell, 2012: 57).
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Skunk works projects are effectively moderately resourced unstructured exploration worktimes.
Skunk works teams can be officially sanctioned by managers or they can sometimes emerge
informally, drawing on organizational resources without formal approval, especially when they
start as a bootlegging activity which gets exposed to the wider organization. The variation of
knowledge occurring within skunk works project activities is more likely to result in radical, as
opposed to incremental, innovations (Fosfuri and Rønde, 2009). The challenge for corporate
managers is to manage an organization within their firm’s boundaries which operates in a highly
unstructured manner, potentially creating conflict with other areas of the organization when skunk
works activities require additional resource infusions (Rosneau, 1988). Such tension arises from
the coexistence of highly resource-intensive innovation teams working alongside organizational
functions focused on resource efficiency (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992). Essentially, a firm’s
ability to concurrently harbour skunk works activities alongside more formalized R&D activities,
as well as exploitation activities, can enable its ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004).
2.2.1.2.3 Hackathons
The Oxford dictionary defines a “hackathon” as “[a]n event, typically lasting several days,
in which a large number of people meet to engage in collaborative computer programming.”2
Hackathons involve typically short-term collaboration among computer experts and other
professionals who are brought together to solve a particular problem using digital technologies
(Briscoe and Mulligan, 2018). While initially hackathons were the domain of start-ups, large
organizations have increasingly adopted the hackathon approach to lessen built-up rigidities and
drive innovation (Grijpink, Lau, and Vara, 2015). The three main differences between hackathons
and skunk works projects are hackathons’ shorter temporal bracketing, focus on solving a concrete
predefined problem, and the fluidity of the team composition. In the process of solving a concrete

2

https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/hackathon, accessed on April 22, 2018.
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problem, the hackathons’ creative and experimental environment (Briscoe and Mulligan, 2018: 1)
may lead to the discovery of novel ideas, which can then be further developed within the skunk
works type of explorative environment.
2.2.1.3

Middle Manager Level

2.2.1.3.1 Explorative Key Performance Indicators
The focus of middle managers is on maintaining the continuity of operations within their
business units (Huy, 2002). The continuity of operations within a business unit requires mostly
incremental variation of knowledge (Huy, 2001). Yet, in times of ferment, more radical variation
of knowledge may be required to sustain a business unit’s market relevance (Burgelman, 1983b).
Given middle managers’ role as guarantors of predictability of outcomes at the business unit level,
their support for more radical variation of knowledge is contingent on the type of incentives they
receive from corporate managers. When middle managers’ key performance indicators (KPIs)
incentivize primarily exploitation-related outcomes, middle managers are less likely to support the
diversion of resources from exploitation to exploration (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra, 2002).
While corporate managers possess the agency to refocus middle managers’ KPIs towards variation
of knowledge, doing so may lessen middle managers’ capability to deliver steady results. Further,
as most middle managers are naturally inclined towards exploitation (Huy, 2001), introducing
innovation-focused KPIs at the middle manager level may not be the most effective way for
generating variation of knowledge. That possibility does not preclude that some middle managers
may be highly capable individual-level innovators.
2.2.1.4

Corporate Manager Level

2.2.1.4.1 Founders’ Imprinting
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Many multidivisional firms trace their origins to the innovation genius of their founders.
Through the process of founders’ imprinting (Stinchcombe, 1965), the initial innovation impetus
continues beyond the founders’ tenure. The challenge for subsequent generations of corporate
managers is to leverage founders’ innovation imprint to continuously generate variation of
knowledge within and across business units. Further complications arise when multiple founders’
innovation imprints coexist within a single multidivisional firm due to non-organic growth modes
(Capron and Mitchell, 2012). Such plurality of founders’ innovation imprints can potentially lead
to clashes among orthogonal innovation cultures (Van den Steen, 2010). In addition, in times of
corporate downscoping (Hitt et al., 2009), a firm can be stripped of business units harbouring a
strong founders’ innovation imprint.3
2.2.1.4.2 Problemistic Search
Cyert and March (1963: 169) postulate that the act of searching is “problem-directed,”
coining the term problemistic search. Problemistic search starts when managers identify an
existing or emerging performance gap vis-à-vis an organizational goal. Problemistic search stops
when a solution is found to increase the performance to attain the goal, or when the performance
gap is closed by lowering the aspiration level related to the goal. Search is typically triggered by
significant crises (e.g., a competitor’s innovation breakthrough (Cyert and March, 1963: 170)).
Problemistic search is marked by initially confining the search effort to the immediate
neighbourhood of the problem. If this local search fails to address the problem, managers can either
expand it to more distant search spaces or leverage organizational slack. The challenge faced by
corporate managers is that the widening performance gap does not guarantee the triggering of a
more distant search (Greve, 1998), as problemistic search is subject to individual- and
organizational-level biases. Thus, a possible task for corporate managers is the introduction of

A recent example of such downscoping stripping a multidivisional firm of its historical innovation engine is General
Electric’s ongoing attempt to divest of its lighting businesses, founded by Thomas Edison in 1890.
https://www.ge.com/about-us/history/thomas-edison accessed on June 15, 2018.
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mechanisms which decrease the detection time of the widening performance gap and increase
organizational focus on the more distant search by managing individual and organizational biases.
2.2.1.4.3 Intra-Organizational Experiential Learning
A multidivisional firm typically possesses a rich repository of past experiences acquired
during its transformation from a single business unit enterprise into a multidivisional enterprise.
As the history of a multidivisional firm is charted, activities generating positive outcomes are given
further impetus by senior managers, while activities resulting in negative outcomes are supressed
(Levitt and March, 1988). Over time, this trial-and-error-based process leads to the establishment
of intra-organizational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). As a stable set of intra-organizational
routines can give rise to competency rigidity (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1992;
Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Teece, 2007), which impacts a firm’s innovation capability
(Atuahene-Gima, 2005), the challenge for corporate managers is to recognize when intraorganizational routines are no longer aligned with environmental shifts, and to decide on corrective
actions.
2.2.1.4.4 Extra-Organizational Experiential Learning
Experiential learning can also involve past experiences which occurred outside of a firm’s
organizational boundaries. Firms can learn by observing, absorbing (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990),
and imitating (Greve, 2005) successful innovations introduced by rivals. Firms can also learn from
competitors’ innovation failures (Maslach, 2016). Maslach, Branzei, Rerup, and Zbaracki (2018)
explore this type of learning by analyzing failure data from the medical device industry. Using
qualitative analysis, Maslach et al. (2018: 7) find that firms use public failure data to “identify
aspects of experience that they had not seen in their own experience, to find more ways of seeing
these adverse events, and to learn from events that would not have happened with their own
products.” Employing quantitative analysis, the authors confirm the reliability of vicarious
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learning. Overall, this pioneering research stream demonstrates that firms can generate variation
of knowledge by studying aversive counterfactuals documented in public repositories, drawing on
the experiential learning of other firms without directly experiencing the negative consequences
of failure.
2.2.1.4.5 Cognitive Learning
As stewards of their organizations, senior managers must constantly evaluate the
opportunity landscape surrounding their organizations (Teece, 2007). Yet, senior managers’
bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1979) mitigates their capability to continuously and reliably
identify and pursue the best opportunities. Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) use a computer simulation
to explore cognition-based learning and its relationship with experiential-based learning. Their
main finding is that cognition allows managers to identify new high-potential areas within the
opportunity landscape, enlarging the pool of possible applications of experiential learning. Further,
they find that while flexibility in managerial cognition increases organizational adaptation, new
cognitive mental models can cause experiential wisdom obsolescence. Thus, a key challenge for
corporate managers is to manage this trade-off between the introduction into the organization of
vastly better opportunity sets and their negative impact on the exploitability of accumulated
knowledge.
2.2.1.4.6

R&D Centralization

R&D centralization shifts the locus of some R&D activities from business units into the
corporate realm. Scholars studying the effects of R&D centralization (Argyres and Silverman,
2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014) find that centralized R&D activities result in more general
innovation outcomes, while business unit-level R&D activities generate innovations with narrower
and more immediate applications. In this way, R&D centralization can be a useful tool for
corporate managers to create conditions allowing for the concurrent pursuit of heterogeneous
innovation outcomes (i.e., incremental, modular, architectural, and radical innovations). In doing
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so, corporate managers create parallel innovation structures, potentially leading to tensions among
various groups of researchers. Another issue is the difficulty of the intra-firm knowledge transfer
(Szulanski, 1996), as the variation of knowledge achieved at the corporate level needs to be
codified and transmitted (Zollo, 1998) to areas of the organization earmarked for further
development of the new knowledge.
2.2.1.4.7 Corporate Entrepreneurship
Corporate entrepreneurship is another mechanism available to corporate managers for the
discovery of new opportunity sets through “activities that enhance a company’s ability to innovate,
take risk, and seize opportunities in the markets” (Zahra, 1991: 259). Using data from the chemical
industry, Ahuja and Lampert (2001: 540) find that “the pursuit of novel, emerging, and pioneering
technologies leads to breakthrough inventions.” They further suggest the existence of a “virtuous
circle of corporate entrepreneurship,” whereby breakthrough innovations create slack resources
(Penrose, 1959), supporting the next cycle of intra-organizational innovation experimentation with
the aim to generate additional breakthrough innovations. Once the corporate entrepreneurship
capability is developed, scaling it down can significantly reduce firm-level performance (Lim,
Celly, Morse, and Rowe, 2013). Thus, corporate managers must continuously support corporate
entrepreneurship, even during periods of challenging economic conditions—though this may
prove difficult as funding for exploration can be vulnerable to budget cuts in times of crisis
(Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011).
2.2.1.4.8 Innovation Jams
“Innovation Jams” are large-scale ideation events conducted using online networking
platforms with the aim of generating many novel ideas over a short time period (Bjelland and
Wood, 2008). The “IBM’s 2006 InnovationJam®” (IBM, 2018) provided a major impetus for other
firms to employ Innovation Jams. Innovation Jams can involve multiple internal and external
stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, and clients. The key challenge with Innovation Jams
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is that these large-scale innovation events mass produce innovation ideas which vary greatly in
quality and potential. This mass production of heterogeneous innovation ideas requires substantial
deployment of resources to conduct the post-Innovation Jam selection process. This selection
process, which aims to separate innovation idea “unicorns” from low-potential ideas, is a nontrivial undertaking (Reitzig, 2011).
2.2.1.4.9 Open Innovation
Corporate entrepreneurship often takes the form of open innovation when a firm sources
knowledge located outside of its boundaries (Chesbrough, 2006). Sources of external knowledge
include consumers, individual inventors, other firms, or public institutions. A case of corporate
entrepreneurship employing the open innovation approach is corporate venturing, whereby a firm
acquires a start-up to gain access to its technological knowledge (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). A
firm can also buy non-controlling equity stakes in multiple start-ups to spread its bets on numerous
emerging technologies (Puranam and Vanneste, 2016). There are several issues corporate
managers face when they seek knowledge through open innovation. The knowledge sought by a
firm may not yet exist externally. When it is available, external knowledge may be fully priced in
the resource markets, lowering a firm’s capability to use it to gain a competitive advantage over
its rivals. In cases when the external knowledge is available and can be sourced at an attractive
valuation, the receiving firm may not have a suitable internal environment for developing the
knowledge further. For instance, Puranam, Singh, and Zollo (2006) find that novel knowledge
sourced through a start-up acquisition can be destroyed by an acquirer’s lack of capability to
nurture an emerging technology prior to its commercialization.
2.2.2 SELECTION OF KNOWLEDGE
A key managerial task is to continuously optimize the ratio between exploration for novel
knowledge (i.e., variation) and exploitation of novel knowledge (i.e., selection and
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implementation) to ensure the most effective use of organizational resources from the perspective
of a firm’s long-term survival. Variation of knowledge activities generate novel knowledge,
which needs to be prioritized for several reasons. First, firms are resource-constrained systems
(Kornai, 1979), requiring resource allocation prioritization (Bower, 1970). Second, some novel
knowledge is not exploitable in the short term due to lack of immediate consumer interest. Third,
some variation of knowledge with the potential for disrupting the organizational status quo may
not be politically acceptable. Fourth, some novel knowledge may lead to innovation outcomes
that are not socially acceptable.4 Finally, some novel knowledge can simply be too costly to
implement. Overall, “we have tended to treat the problem of evaluation as trivial or self-evident”
(Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007: 51). In the following paragraphs, I review extant knowledge on
the selection of novel knowledge at different levels of analysis.
2.2.2.1

Individual Level

2.2.2.1.1 Temporal Sheltering of Novel Ideas
The organizational form of a multidivisional firm tends to be characterized by high levels
of hierarchy and the limited ability of employees possessing formal power to evaluate objectively
novel ideas. Using a simulation, Knudsen and Levinthal (2007) find that such selection
environments tend to be cautious, which increases the likelihood of the elimination of superior
novel ideas (i.e., Type I selection error). Thus, corporate managers can support a temporal
sheltering of novel ideas, delaying their exposure to the hierarchical/imprecise selection process.
During this sheltering period, individual innovators can work on developing their novel ideas into
more defensible projects, which are then harder to reject based purely on caution.

A recent example of such constraint is Facebook’s decision to patent software allowing it to use a phone’s
microphone to record users’ reactions to advertisements, but not commercialize it.
https://www.engadget.com/2018/06/28/facebook-patent-turns-phone-mics-on-to-record-reactions-to-ads/ accessed
on August 12, 2018.
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2.2.2.1.2 Legitimization of Bootlegging Outputs
Building on insights by Knudsen and Levinthal (2007), Criscuolo, Salter, and Ter Wal
(2014) study how researchers in mature organizations carve out autonomy for their nonmainstream innovation research activities. They find that scientists routinely take their research
underground (i.e., bootlegging) to escape normative organizational pressures and allow their novel
ideas to develop to a stage that facilitates legitimization and the provision of further organizational
resources. The challenge for corporate managers is to ensure that these bootlegging activities are
eventually exposed to the formal selection process, as opposed to just fizzling out either due to a
lack of resources or due to being spun outside of organizational boundaries.
2.2.2.2

Team Level

2.2.2.2.1 Openness to External Ideas
Intra-organizational teams are biased towards the promotion of ideas generated within the
team at the expense of ideas from external sources (Katz and Allen, 1982). Internal sources of
extra-team knowledge include teams operating in different functional, geographical, or cultural
contexts. External sources of extra-team knowledge include suppliers, other firms, independent
inventors, and public entities. The rejection of external knowledge stems from psychological
biases resulting in the erroneous assessment of the utility of external knowledge (Antons and
Piller, 2015). Even when biases causing the “not invented here” (NIH) syndrome (Katz and
Allen, 1982) are overcome and a team actively seeks external knowledge, the tacit nature of
novel knowledge makes its transmission, comprehension, and utilization by the recipient
difficult (Szulanski, 1996).
2.2.2.2.2 Hybrid Ideation Process
Brainstorming refers to the generation and selection of novel ideas in a group setting
(Osborn, 1963). Osborn’s initial argument suggesting that brainstorming is superior to individual
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ideation has been subjected to several experiments in the psychology literature that suggest the
contrary (Diehl and Stroebe, 1987). In innovation management scholarship, Girotra, Terwiesch,
and Ulrich (2010) test the effects of temporal bifurcation of ideation into individual and collective
components. They find that when the individual-level ideation precedes the team ideation, more
novel ideas are generated which are, on average, of better quality compared to the brainstorming
scenario. They further find that sequencing individual and group ideation processes results in
higher idea-selection ability at the team level. Corporate managers face the challenge of creating
organizational environments conducive to this hybrid (Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2010: 1)
ideation process in order to allow for temporal separation between individual and collective
ideation processes without separating them completely.
2.2.2.2.3 Rapid Prototyping
The idea that a mature organization should incorporate start-up like environments into its
organizational design has recently gained increasing popularity (Ries, 2011). One mechanism that
can approximate a start-up like environment is rapid prototyping rooted in the trial-and-error type
of experimentation (Thomke, 2001). The rapid prototyping capability allows innovators to quickly
transition from the initial ideation stage into the proof of concept phase, while minimizing the use
of resources. Rapid prototyping has become cheaper to execute due to the increased accessibility
of simulation methods testing the “what-if” scenarios approximating laboratory settings (Thomke,
2003). When the proof of concept phase is unsuccessful, rapid prototyping allows an innovation
project to fail fast, thereby mitigating the resource waste and failure risk contagion. One challenge
with using rapid prototyping is the assumption that the ideal outcome is already known, and the
novel idea is merely evaluated against a known desired state.5 Yet, Austin and Devin (2003) find
that creative thinkers search for emerging ideas which are truly original, as opposed to simply
evaluating a possibly original idea against extant knowledge.
5

I thank Rob Austin for pointing this out.
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2.2.2.2.4

Customer Feedback

Ultimately, an innovation should create value for the end user, either internally or
externally. A prototype solution can be subjected to feedback by end users to test its potential to
generate value (Slater and Mohr, 2006). Products can be also tested in limited geographical
markets (Fortune, 2015) and/or limited areas of a firm’s operations; this way, should the novel
idea prove to be a flop, the potential damage to a firm’s core businesses is contained (Thompson,
1967).
2.2.2.3

Middle Manager Level

2.2.2.3.1 Strategic Context
Strategic context refers to “the political mechanisms through which middle managers
question the current concept of strategy, and provide the top management with the opportunity to
rationalize, retroactively, successful autonomous strategic behaviour” (Burgelman, 1983b: 1352).
Through the process of strategic context, middle managers risk their reputations by pitching
bottom-up novel ideas to corporate managers (Burgelman, 1983a; Noda and Bower, 1996). Thus,
middle managers act as selection agents, evaluating the merit of ideas originating at lower
organizational levels. Corporate managers can manage the strategic context selection environment
by influencing decision-making biases operating at the middle manager level. Middle managers’
decision-making biases include risk aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), self-interest
(Bower, 1970), evaluation apprehension, and perceived lack of control (Reitzig and Maciejovsky,
2015: 1979). From the corporate managers’ perspective, the challenge is to become aware of
possible biases operating at the middle manager level and design effective mitigating mechanisms.
2.2.2.3.2 Hierarchical Layering
Sah and Stigliz (1986) argue that middle managers’ willingness to submit an innovation
project for further evaluation by their superiors is positively related with the number of hierarchical
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layers installed above them. However, Reitzig and Maciejovsky (2015) test this prediction using
simulation and experimental data and find the opposite result; the steeper the hierarchy above
them, the less likely middle managers are to pass up novel ideas. Interestingly, they note that
middle managers do not appear to be overly concerned about the quality of their selection skills
(i.e., the risk of committing an error of commission damaging their reputation). Instead, Reitzig
and Maciejovsky (2015) find that middle managers’ behaviour can be explained by their fear of
superiors giving them additional evaluation work. Based on this result, corporate managers face
the challenge of designing incentive programs for middle managers to lessen their concern about
unnecessarily generating additional work for themselves. Alternatively, corporate managers could
reroute bottom-up idea flows so that they largely bypass middle managers.
2.2.2.3.3 Emotions
In his study of the role of emotions in a large multidivisional firm, Huy (2011) shows that
by regulating middle managers’ group-focused emotions, elicited by middle managers’ perceived
belonging to an identifiable group within the firm, corporate managers can steer middle managers’
selection decision making. On the other hand, middle managers’ emotions can distort the bottomup information flow. By qualitatively studying the factors which led to the demise of Nokia, Vuori,
and Huy (2016) find that middle managers’ fear of peers and corporate managers reduced the
amount of unfavourable information that they were transmitting to corporate managers.
Consequently, corporate managers formed an overly positive view of the firm’s performance,
which reduced their focus on the need to sustain innovation activities.
2.2.2.4

Corporate Manager Level

2.2.2.4.1 Structural Context
Structural context is set by corporate managers and encapsulates administrative rules as
well as the creation and staffing of formal roles within the organizational hierarchy to guide the
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behaviour of lower-level employees without the need for continuous corporate-level managerial
involvement (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983a). The aim of corporate managers in determining
the structural context is to align employees’ activities towards the fulfilment of corporate strategy.
As Burgelman remarks (1983c: 66), the contingency of structural context on corporate strategy
supports Chandler’s (1962) observation that structure follows strategy. Over time, corporate
managers can adjust specific elements of the structural context (e.g., appointment of middle
managers, changes to KPIs) to influence the selection of novel ideas (Bower, 1970). This gradual
adjustment of the corporate context increases the likelihood that novel ideas deviating from the
corporate strategy will be selected by middle managers and brought to the attention of corporate
managers (Burgelman, 1983c).
2.2.2.4.2 Direct Exposure to Innovation Activities
Given that corporate managers are primarily focused on high-level decision making, they
are unlikely to become involved in the origination of novel ideas on a continuous basis. Yet, their
senior role does not preclude them from coming into proximity with innovation activities, and
providing their endorsement or skepticism of novel ideas at early stages of their development. For
instance, 3M’s top executives regularly visit the company’s research labs and engage in
discussions with lab researchers (Berger et al., 2008). Another mechanism for reducing the
distance between corporate managers and innovation activities is hierarchical flattening, whereby
the number of layers of middle managers is reduced (Lerner and Wulf, 2007; Teece, 1996).
Further, Teece (2007: 1335) argues that organizational decentralization “brings top management
closer to new technologies, the customer, and the market.” In line with Teece’s (2007) argument,
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004: 223) note that in business units in which exploitation and
exploration activities coexist, “senior executives [play] a more interventionist role, focused on
recognizing and promoting new ideas and building energy for those ideas throughout the
business.”
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2.2.3 RETENTION OF KNOWLEDGE
Retention of novel knowledge involves implementation of selected innovation projects.
Retention of novel ideas necessitates the allocation of different types of knowledge retention
resources over varying time periods. Knowledge retention resources include managerial attention,
employee time, physical materials, tools and machinery, physical space, and software. These
resources ultimately consume a firm’s financial resources, which puts a time limit on how long a
specific knowledge retention activity can be pursued without generating any value. In the
following paragraphs, I review the existing scholarship related to retention of novel knowledge at
different levels of analysis.
2.2.3.1

Individual Level

2.2.3.1.1 Individual-Level Failure Management
Most innovation projects fail (Carr, Hard, and Trahant, 1996; Cozijnsen, Vrakking, and
van Ijzerloo, 2000). Failed innovation projects can be potentially detrimental for firm-level
performance (Austin, Devin, and Sullivan, 2012). Yet, corporate managers themselves are mostly
shielded from the negative impact of innovation failures on their careers, unlike employees who
engage directly in innovation activities (Birkinshaw, Hamel, and Mol, 2008). Thus, corporate
managers face the challenge of creating an organizational climate which encourages individuallevel explorative behaviour and concurrently mitigates innovation risks at the individual level. The
creation of such an organizational climate is a non-trivial undertaking as most employees avoid
situations which could associate them with a failed project (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005).
2.2.3.1.2 Explorative Human Resource Management
Human resource management systems can be configured to support explorative behaviour
past the generation of a novel idea on the individual level. Drawing on human resource
management systems in 3M and Motorola, Gupta and Singhal (1993: 41) identify human resources
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planning, performance appraisal, reward systems, and career management as key pillars which
could be used by managers to encourage individual employees to continuously engage in
explorative behaviour. The tension arises when the top-down encouragement of exploration at the
individual level conflicts with an employee’s formal role focused on exploitation. Such tension is
likely to be exacerbated when an employee’s immediate superior perceives this employee’s pursuit
of explorative activities as a diversion of resources under his/her control. Corporate managers can
protect emerging innovators from exploitative pressures by establishing a network of innovation
mentors to nurture emerging innovation talent (Cohn, Katzenbach, and Vlak, 2008).
2.2.3.2

Team Level

2.2.3.2.1 Iterated Resource Allocation
Resources that are released in large discrete amounts within the annual budgeting cycle
exercise are typically earmarked for induced innovation projects which were given impetus by
corporate managers (Bower, 1970). Yet, the implementation of innovation projects rarely
follows a linear path as new obstacles are discovered, projected paths reach impasses, and
internal frictions derail the implementation progress (Klein and Sorra, 1996). Further,
autonomous innovation activities give rise to innovation projects for which no resource
allocation was made in the backward-looking annual budgeting exercise. These factors combine
to generate unplanned resource demands. In a qualitative study examining strategy making in
the telecommunication industry, Noda and Bower (1996) find that corporate managers are more
likely to respond to these unplanned resource demands—which the authors call “iterated
resource allocation”—when they are informed of a specific innovation project’s intermediary
milestone attainments. Corporate managers face the challenge of receiving distorted milestone
signals when these signals must pass through multiple hierarchical layers, as well as the
challenge of noticing and overcoming their own signal interpretation constraints (Simon, 1955,
1979).
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2.2.3.2.2 Innovation Team Composition
The development of each innovation project is likely to require a unique set of human
resources (Tushman and Nadler, 1986). Thus, it is unlikely that a firm can optimize its innovation
implementation process solely by relying upon a dedicated innovation implementation team
without recourse to human resources scattered across the organization. A more realistic scenario
is a tailored assembly of a team best suited for the development of a specific innovation project.
Such a team can include dedicated innovation implementers, novel idea originators, subject matter
experts, engineers, software developers, testers, project managers, and those in other roles. The
challenge with this approach is that the assembly of such project-specific teams is likely to require
pulling employees from their formal roles and temporally assigning them to these ad hoc
innovation projects. Such an approach can generate tensions with employees’ superiors, who may
not be willing to relinquish (even on a temporary basis) control over these human resources.
Further, managers run the risk of losing these employees permanently if the innovation project
creates conditions for employees’ permanent reassignment.
2.2.3.3

Middle Manager Level

2.2.3.3.1 Sponsorship of Innovation
The need for corporate managers to find sponsors for an innovation project hinges on the
type of project. Incremental innovation projects are likely to already have a home within an
existing business unit, whereas more radical innovation projects may need to be pitched to business
units, or a new organizational structure may need to be set up for their development (McDermott
and O’Connor, 2002). Yet, as the development of an innovation project often requires the
dedication of resources initially earmarked for exploitation, middle managers may be reluctant to
sponsor innovation projects. The NIH syndrome can be another factor biasing middle managers
against the sponsorship of innovation projects that did not originate within their business unit.
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2.2.3.3.2 Managerial Style
The primary role of middle managers is to ensure the efficient utilization of organizational
resources to meet short-term performance targets (Huy, 2001). Aside from their role in
exploitation, middle managers can also play a crucial role in ensuring that their organization adapts
to environmental changes (Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra, 2002). To increase the support at the
middle manager level for explorative projects, corporate managers can purposefully appoint
middle managers inclined to support innovations. Kanter (1982: 96) studies 165 middle managers
across five firms and finds that managers who are open to change, adopt a long-term orientation,
can navigate internal politics, and are agreeable yet persistent are more likely to be open to novel
ideas and proactively transmit information about bottom-up innovation activities to corporate
managers.
2.2.3.3.3 Promotion of Innovators
Another mechanism operating at the middle manager level that can be enacted by corporate
managers is the promotion of successful innovators into the middle management rank. Cohn,
Katzenbach, and Vlak (2008) study innovation processes in 25 firms across industries and find
that the promotion of internal or external innovators into the middle management rank gives rise
to innovation networks. These innovation networks counterbalance the tendency of middle
managers to support exploitation over exploration (March, 1991). The challenge for corporate
managers in this regard is related to the difficulty of identifying employees who can successfully
assume both innovation and managerial roles.
2.2.3.4

Corporate Manager Level

2.2.3.4.1 Resource Allocation
The implementation of selected innovation projects requires the allocation of resources.
Initially, corporate strategy scholarship assumed that corporate managers are “allocating the
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resources that are expected to be available to the programs and organizational units that will require
them” as part of a top-down budgeting process (Ackoff, 1970: 66). Based on several detailed field
studies, Bower (1970) finds that resource allocation is a convoluted, multi-hierarchical, and
longitudinal process infused by organizational politics. According to Bower (1970), corporate
managers identify resource allocation needs, develop policies for governing the resource allocation
process, and establish monitoring and reward systems to align the resource allocation process with
the overall corporate strategy. The difficulty for corporate managers arises from the non-linear
nature of innovation implementation (Klein and Sorra, 1996), which generates ad hoc resourcing
needs outside of the formal resource allocation process studied by Bower (1970).
2.2.3.4.2 Variation Control Technologies6
Several approaches aimed at controlling the variation of process outcomes have influenced
intra-organizational innovation processes. For instance, the Six Sigma approach “measures the
degree to which any business process deviates from its goal” (Harry, 1998: 60). Many firms well
known for their innovative products (e.g., 3M, Boeing, GE, and Motorola7) have adopted the Six
Sigma approach when implementing innovation projects (Benner and Tushman, 2003). Six Sigma
innovation implementation requires a certain degree of efficiency. Yet, that efficiency can also
limit innovation activities. Therefore, the main challenge for corporate managers is not to stifle
innovation by overemphasizing the Six Sigma approach, given that riskier projects are especially
unlikely to follow a predictable path. George Buckley, CEO of 3M, commented, “There has to be
a sprinkle of ‘magic dust’ to produce great products, or whatever it is you wish to call the
inspiration that is the mother of invention. Serendipity, accidents, blind luck, and other things all
play a part. You can’t put that into a can or a Six Sigma process.” (Berger et al., 2009: 66).

I thank Rob Austin for suggesting this more general label for approaches used to reduce variation of outcomes in
innovation activities.
7 The Six Sigma approach to process efficiency was elaborated by scientists working at Motorola (Harry, 1998).
6
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2.2.3.4.3 Stage‐Gate® System
A Stage‐Gate® approach to innovation management aims to structure the new product
development process into distinctive phases (Cooper, 1990). In this approach, managers determine
a prototypical development trajectory consisting of various stages. As a novel idea passes through
these stages, its fitness for being commercialized into a viable new product is being systematically
evaluated. Thus, the Stage‐Gate® approach concerns both the selection and retention of novel
ideas. The key challenge for corporate managers is to prevent the transformation of the Stage‐
Gate® system into a rigid project management tool that reduces the selection of, and/or retention
support for, novel ideas which do not follow the expected developmental path (Benner and
Tushman, 2003; Cooper, 2008). Another challenge is that the Stage‐Gate® system focuses on the
process of idea flow within an organization and neglects the complex emergence and development
of an idea itself, which may not always follow prescribed trajectories nor conform to
predetermined developmental expectations (Thornquist, 2005).8
2.2.3.4.4 Innovation Pipeline
Many multidivisional firms aim at achieving a predetermined percentage of revenues and
profitability by selling products and services introduced over a set period of time (Schilling, 2008).
Accordingly, a vital issue for corporate managers is the management of the innovation
implementation flow (i.e., the innovation pipeline) in terms of its distribution across different
innovation types, degree of innovation novelty, and market and time diffusion. For instance, 3M’s
innovation pipeline is comprised of five innovation classes, which are monitored and resourced by
corporate managers based on market demand and technological advancements available to 3M
(Berger et al., 2009).
2.2.3.4.5 Codification of Knowledge

8

I thank Rob Austin for pointing this out.
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A key concern for corporate managers is the diffusion of innovation into other parts of their
firms beyond the immediate area in which the initial implementation took place. The intra-firm
diffusion of innovation knowledge is a non-trivial process (Klein and Knight, 2005), marked by
knowledge tacitness (Polanyi, 1967) and stickiness (Szulanski, 1996). An important enabler of
intra-organizational innovation diffusion is codification of knowledge pertaining to the
implemented innovation (Zollo, 1998). Codification of knowledge is “the process of conversion
of knowledge into messages which can be then processed as information” (Cowan and Foray,
1997: 596). Codification of knowledge enables both contemporaneous and temporal innovation
diffusion, especially when members of the implementation team possessing the tacit knowledge
can no longer be consulted (Kim, 1993). Corporate managers face the dilemma of codification of
knowledge being both an enabler of its diffusion and a source of potential knowledge rigidity due
to the path-dependent nature of the knowledge codification process (Cowan and Foray, 1997;
Nelson and Winter, 1982).

2.3 SYNTHESIS ACROSS LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
From the perspective of corporate managers, what are the main managerial approaches they
can deploy to manage innovation activities within their firms? The above overview is somewhat
limited by its discreteness because in a real-world multidivisional firm, most of the uncovered
mechanisms operate across evolutionary phases and levels of analysis. Further, the uncovered
mechanisms are unlikely to be deployed in isolation without managers considering intermechanism interactions. To reflect this complexity of the organizational reality, I synthesize the
uncovered mechanisms into three higher-order classes of corporate interventions in innovation
activities: the first class is comprised of structured approaches; the second class consists of
psychological interventions; and the third class encapsulates interventions aimed at separating selfreplicating behaviours.
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2.3.1 STRUCTURING INNOVATION ACTIVITIES
2.3.1.1

Letting Innovation Follow Organizational Design

A specific organizational design choice by corporate managers can increase the probability
of the generation of a certain type of innovation. For example, organizational design of a skunk
works project aims specifically at generating radical, as opposed to incremental, innovations
(Fosfuri and Rønde, 2009). Similarly, centralization of innovation activities is likely to result in
more general innovations, while the delegation of innovation decision making to business unit
heads often leads to incremental innovations centred around the core businesses (Argyres and
Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014). Corporate managers can also vary the use of
temporal organizational designs. When corporate managers aim at producing a large pool of novel
ideas, they can organize an innovation jam (Bjelland and Wood, 2008). When they need creative
solutions to a specific problem, they can sponsor a hackathon (Briscoe and Mulligan, 2018). Thus,
while a specific organizational design choice does not guarantee a desired innovation outcome,
organizational design choice can increase the probability of a desired innovation outcome.
2.3.1.2

Adopting Organizational Design to Innovation

In some cases, structure follows innovation. For instance, when an external innovation is
introduced into a multidivisional firm from an acquired start-up, the multidivisional firm’s rigid
formal organizational structures can suffocate the acquired innovation before it develops into a
viable innovation project (Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2006). Accordingly, when a novel idea
emerges and/or is introduced into the organization, corporate managers often need to create a
specific organizational design that is best suited for the development of the novel idea. More
generally, after deciding on preferred types of innovations, corporate managers can adjust the
structuring of the selection process along the hierarchy-polyarchy spectrum to manage the tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors (Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007).
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2.3.1.3

Pursuing Organizational Design Plurality

Given the multitude of available ideation modes and the constantly evolving external
environment, it is unlikely that corporate managers can decide on a specific structuring approach
without constantly adjusting it. One solution lies in the coexistence of a variety of organizational
designs within the boundaries of a single firm to enable the simultaneous pursuit of various
innovation types. Corporate managers pursuing such organizational design plurality are in fact
aiming to achieve innovation type ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004).
One hurdle to achieving innovation type ambidexterity is the cost of maintaining
organizational design plurality due to duplicity of resourcing (McAdam and Galloway, 2005),
rivalry among various innovation units, or the cost of intra-organizational transmission of
innovation knowledge related to complex coordination requirements. Another issue is the fact that
variation presents itself sequentially and often unexpectedly. This sequential and ad hoc nature of
the variation process can be addressed through organizational design sequential ambidexterity
(Venkatraman, Lee, and Iyer, 2007). Further, creative employees are prone to identity crises when
they are required to switch between creative and execution-focused roles (Gotsi, Andriopoulos,
Lewis, and Ingram, 2010), which again highlights the value of organizational design plurality as a
way to manage innovation identity transitions.
2.3.2 NUDGING INNOVATION ACTIVITIES
Corporate managers can influence the behaviour of employees by acting on employees’
psychology across evolutionary phases and levels of analysis. “Nudging” innovation activities
refers to subtle, purposeful psychological interventions by corporate managers to induce a specific
innovation behaviour from employees. Some forms of nudging are open and known to employees,
while others take the form of covert manipulations without employees’ direct awareness of such
manipulation taking place.
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2.3.2.1

Stimulating Intrinsic Motivation

Intrinsic motivation has been found to be a powerful individual-level driving force that
induces employees to pursue innovation activities (Zhang and Bartol, 2010). Corporate managers
can induce intrinsic motivation in several ways. While intrinsic motivation stems from an
employee’s personal interest in an activity (Amabile, 1988), it can be increased by setting general
achievement targets in the form of milestones which employees pursuing innovation activities
through their personal interest are expected to achieve through individual-level effort. These
general achievement targets further stimulate the self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982) of ideating
employees who are capable of reaching them (Cameron, Banko, and Pierce, 2001).
Such general achievement targets can involve various degrees of complexity depending on
the general level of employees’ sophistication and capability, based on the organization type. For
instance, employees working in a repetitive task environment may be asked for a one page
summary of the innovation project, whereas in organizations comprised mainly of employees with
advanced STEM degrees, employees may be required to produce a working prototype. Intrinsic
motivation is associated with individual employees and the variation stage of the innovation
process.
2.3.2.2

Managing Fear of Innovation

Innovation activities produce uncertain outcomes (Levine, 1980). Uncertainty of outcomes
generates fear (Lee and Kelley, 2008). As Lee and Kelley (2008: 163) note in their study of
innovation project leaders, this fear effect, in and of itself, is not necessarily undesirable as “fear
of failure [tends] to weed out those lacking the drive to engage in high-risk activity.” Further, the
authors find that expertise acts as an insulator from the inhibiting effect of fear on innovation
activities, which naturally draws employees with sufficient levels of self-efficacy to specific
innovation projects (Bandura, 1982), which in turn increases their intrinsic motivation (as
discussed in the above paragraph). Thus, from the corporate management perspective, maintaining
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a certain level of fear of innovation within the organization may help this self-selection for
innovation projects occur naturally.
Yet, fear can also reduce intra-organizational information flows, which can bias corporate
managers’ innovation-related decision making. In their study of the factors leading to the demise
of Finnish mobile handset maker Nokia, Vuori and Huy (2016) identify middle managers’ fear as
a strong inhibitor of the information flow that is critical for allowing corporate managers to form
an accurate picture of organizational needs. In this way, corporate managers face the challenge of
designing an open information exchange climate within the organization to reduce their
subordinates’ evaluation apprehension (Cottrell, 1972) in cases where the transmitted information
contains negative signals about the firm’s performance.
2.3.2.3

Influencing Innovation Behaviour

Corporate managers can influence employees’ innovation behaviour by acting on
employees’ psychology through direct motivators and indirect environmental factors. One of the
key issues in a multidivisional firm is knowledge stickiness (Szulanski, 1996). Knowledge
stickiness prevents the intra-organizational diffusion of knowledge that already exists within the
organization, often within minds of individual employees as opposed to being codified in easy-totransfer blueprints (Zolo, 1998). To examine factors which increase employees’ willingness to
share their knowledge, Bock et al. (2005) surveyed managers at South Korean firms. The authors
find that several aspects of organizational climate within corporate managers’ realm are conducive
to employees’ willingness to share knowledge. These organizational climate aspects (Bock et al.,
2005: 107) involve the establishment of fair and stable intra-organizational practices, the
encouragement of individual-level exploration of frontier knowledge areas, and the generation of
the common belief that the organization as a whole values individual-level innovation-related risk
taking.
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Just as corporate managers can influence innovation behaviour through the manipulation
of the organizational climate, they can also influence innovation behaviour by manipulating interemployee social interactions. Huy (2011) studies how corporate managers influence middle
managers’ support for innovation projects through social identity manipulation. He finds that
corporate managers can induce group-focused emotions to generate support for an innovation
activity, even in cases when the supporting middle managers did not have a vested interest in
supporting such innovation activity. Based on this finding, it can be inferred that corporate
managers can purposefully create social groups of employees to support innovation activities. Such
group social engineering by corporate managers can involve the creation of innovation-friendly
networks.
2.3.3 ROUTINIZING INNOVATION ACTIVITIES
Corporate managers’ ability to actively manage innovation is bounded by their cognitive
limitations (Simon, 1955, 1979), attention spans (Ocasio, 1997), and hierarchical distance from
market-facing employees (Lerner and Wulf, 2007). This finding implies that some actions by
corporate managers aim at routinizing some of the intra-organizational innovation processes
occurring at lower hierarchical levels. Thus, routinization of innovation activities refers to the
transformation of ad hoc approaches to innovation into reliable and replicable innovation
behaviour across the organization and across time, without the need for continuous involvement
by corporate managers.
2.3.3.1

Increasing the Reliability of Innovation-Driven Value Generation

As a resource constraint system, a multidivisional firm cannot sustain long periods of
resource allocation to innovation projects which do not create value above and beyond resources
dedicated to exploration. While it is inherently difficult to reliably govern variation processes,
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corporate managers have at their disposal several mechanisms for improving the reliability of
selection and retention processes.
In terms of the selection process, corporate managers can focus on mitigating various kinds
of biases to ultimately shift the nature of the selection process towards a rules-based process to
increase the objectivity of evaluation of novel ideas. One such rule could aim at decreasing the
power of formal hierarchy to shut down innovation voices (Diehl and Stroebe, 1991). Corporate
managers can create virtual and physical spaces supporting individual ideation so that novel
ideas can develop at the level of individual minds before facing the initial selection environment
(Girotra et al., 2010; Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007). Such innovation behaviour can be
institutionalized through top-down creation and promotion of these innovation spaces
earmarked for individual ideation. Another rule related to the selection can concern the bias selfawareness routine (Kahneman, Lovallo, and Sibony, 2011) mandatory for employees involved
in the selection of novel ideas. Similar to a take-off check list used by airplane pilots, corporate
managers can create a “bias beware” checklist for evaluators across hierarchical levels.
In terms of the retention process, corporate managers can introduce innovation-related
components into KPIs across hierarchical levels and business units. While individual-level
innovation-related performance goals can vary significantly as a function of the main formal
role an employee occupies, KPIs at the managerial level can more uniformly include innovationrelated performance targets. Such managerial innovation-related components of KPIs are likely
to incentivize managers to search for opportunities to convert the implementation of innovation
projects within their realm of influence into tangible results. Another routine corporate managers
can use is to set the minimum threshold criteria that an innovation project must meet or exceed
before being granted further funding (Noda and Bower, 1996). This type of progress threshold
criteria can incorporate financial metrics, availability of a functional prototype (Von Hippel,
1994), or qualitative assessments. Such an approach would automatically flag problematic
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innovation projects running into implementation hurdles, bringing them to the attention of
corporate managers (Ocasio, 1997).
Ultimately, this routinization of selection and variation processes allows corporate
managers to channel their attention to innovation activities requiring more of a hands-on
approach (i.e., structuring innovation activities, nudging innovation activities). Further,
managers can manage the innovation pipeline (Schilling, 2008) by periodically recalibrating the
rules’ parameters.
2.3.3.2

Creating and Evolving Corporate Innovation Capability

Over time, corporate managers can transform the portfolio of routinized top-down
innovation activities into a corporate innovation capability (Atuahene-Gima, 2005). Corporate
managers’ role then shifts from the micromanagement of specific innovation activities to the
orchestration of a portfolio of routinized innovation activities. Corporate managers can focus on
adjusting innovation activities already present in the portfolio, deleting innovation activities that
prove to be unnecessary and/or detrimental to the achievement of organizational innovation
objectives, and adding new innovation activities which can be successfully routinized after
corporate managers become more experienced with them through an initial, hands-on approach.
Gradually, such a corporate innovation capability can become increasingly independent of specific
sets of corporate managers as routinized innovation activities become embedded in the
organizational culture (Barney, 1986).

2.4 AN AGENDA FOR EXTENDING RESEARCH ON CORPORATE INNOVATION MECHANISMS

2.4.1 UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE MANAGERS’ RATIONALE FOR THE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT
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Why would corporate managers actively participate in innovation management? While my
survey uncovered multiple ways in which corporate managers can get actively involved in
innovation management across hierarchical levels and evolutionary phases, it is unclear why
corporate managers would not simply delegate innovation management to individual business
units and concentrate on the more traditional corporate-level focal areas, such as management of
the business portfolio (Hitt et al., 2009), organizational legitimacy vis-à-vis the external
environment (Collis, Young, and Goold, 2007), and/or resource allocation (Bower, 1970).
Several possible motives emerge in my survey. Findings by Argyres and Silverman (2004)
and Arora, Belenzon, and Rios (2014) suggest that delegation of innovation responsibility to
business units skews the composition of the innovation pipeline (Shilling, 2008) towards less
radical and more incremental innovation projects. Thus, corporate managers may need to become
involved in innovation management to gain greater agency over the types of innovation projects
pursued in their firms. Another issue with the delegation of innovation management to business
units is the existence of multiple innovation-related decision-making biases at the business unit
level, such as the NIH syndrome (Katz and Allen, 1982), middle managers’ personal agendas
(Bower, 1970), and/or middle managers political agendas (Burgelman, 1983a, 1983b). Therefore,
corporate managers may want to get involved in innovation management in order to mitigate
these decision-making biases. Other motives can be discerned in my survey. However, future
research can consider more holistically why it makes sense for corporate managers to get actively
involved in innovation management, as opposed to just delegating innovation management to
business units.

2.4.2 TRACING THE ORIGIN OF CORPORATE MANAGERS’ AGENCY TO MANAGE INNOVATION
Considering it can be established that it makes sense for corporate managers to become
involved in innovation management, how do corporate managers gain the agency to actively
manage innovation? Given the complexities of intra-organizational innovation processes in a
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multidivisional firm, it seems unlikely that such agency can be established by simply declaring
the existence of a new role at the corporate level and attaching some resources to that role.
Assuming resource constraint at the firm level, a corporate innovation function is likely to be
diverting resources from other corporate-level and business unit-level activities earmarked for
non-innovation-related activities. Thus, the establishment of a corporate innovation function is
likely to be a highly political process. Once the political pressures get resolved and some
resources are allocated to the corporate innovation function, how are top-down innovation actions
prioritized? Is the focus largely on fixing broken bottom-up innovation processes, designing new
innovation processes, or a combination of both? At which levels of analysis, in which
evolutionary phases, and in which sequence should these top-down actions be deployed?
Answering these and related questions will likely require a detailed study examining the process
of establishing agency of corporate managers to meaningfully influence how innovation occurs
across hierarchical levels and evolutionary phases.
2.4.3 MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN A MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRM
Many of the reviewed mechanisms aim to increase certainty of outcomes in what is an
inherently uncertain process. The pursuit of innovation activities is uncertain at the individual
level, as personal careers can be derailed by an innovation project’s failure. Dedication of teams
to innovation projects ties up significant resources with no guarantees of future returns. At the
middle manager level, promoting innovation projects that ultimately fail can cast doubt on middle
managers’ judgment and ability to effectively and efficiently govern resources under their
control. Corporate managers can endanger the future of the whole organization when they overallocate resources to innovation activities that consume resources at a rate above that of the
organizational resource replenishment.
Given these innovation-related risks in multidivisional firms, which cross several levels of
analysis, what is the role of corporate managers in addressing different types of innovation-related
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risks? At one extreme, corporate managers can channel most of their agency, attention, and
resources to minimize innovation-related risks across hierarchical levels. Individual employees
can be told to limit their innovation activities to those projects that build substantially on existing
knowledge. Innovation teams can dedicate their effort to innovation projects that are likely to
succeed. Middle managers’ risks are then reduced as well, given the certainty of outcomes at the
team level. Finally, at the corporate level, resource allocation can prioritize those innovation
projects that have already shown significant promise.
The likely outcome in such a limit scenario is an organization which is successful at
avoiding costly innovation mistakes (Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007), even as its innovation output
remains highly incremental in nature (Henderson and Clark, 1990). The opposite extreme
scenario, in which corporate managers maximize uncertainty in the pursuit of breakthrough
innovations, can deplete organizational resources prior to the discovery and commercialization
of such breakthrough innovations. Hence, corporate managers must balance the need to mitigate
risk taking with the need for controlled uncertainty, allowing their firm to maintain environmental
fitness (Teece, 2007). While some of the surveyed mechanisms can be helpful in terms of
managing innovation-related risk at discrete levels of analysis and specific evolutionary phases,
further research should consider developing models of innovation uncertainty management at the
system level.
2.4.4 ENABLING THE COEXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE APPROACHES TO INNOVATION
How does an organization create innovation ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004),
allowing for the simultaneous pursuit of different approaches to innovation? The coexistence of
legal and illegal innovation activities within the same organizational boundaries is likely to create
tensions. Employees working on legal, officially approved innovation projects are likely to view
illegal bootlegging activities (Augsdorfer, 1996, 2005) with suspicion. Further, middle managers
may view bootlegging as misuse of resources. On the other hand, employees engaged in
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bootlegging are likely to envy their official counterparts their resource access and official status.
Similarly, innovators actively incorporating accidents (Austin, Devin, and Sullivan, 2012) into
their approaches to innovation may be viewed as potential disruptors of the organizational status
quo and/or as outright dangerous to the organization and their fellow employees. Yet, as Austin,
Devin, and Sullivan (2012) show, a highly experimental approach to innovation can be a source
of major innovation breakthroughs. How corporate managers address these tensions appears to be
an interesting research avenue. In addition, future research can build on work on micro-level
innovation ambidexterity (Austin, Hjorth, and Hessel 2017) to explore how corporate managers
manage innovation-related conflicts at the innovation front line.
2.4.1 BALANCING CREATIVITY/EXPLORATION VERSUS EFFICIENCY/EXPLOITATION
Within the key managerial task of managing the trade-off between exploitation and
exploration (March, 1991), my survey shows that a similar tension exists even within exploration
activities. Some of the surveyed mechanisms aim at increasing the efficiency of the innovation
process (e.g., rapid prototyping, Stage‐Gate® process, Six Sigma). The problem with introducing
efficiency into innovation processes is that the efficiency can become the goal in itself, reducing
the chance for a firm to discover and develop innovations that generate significant value. On the
other hand, exploration activities need to transition at some point from the phase of pure
exploration for novel knowledge into the phase of exploiting this new knowledge. Issues
surrounding the management of this tension within exploration activities warrant further research.
2.4.2 UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL IDEATION AND OPEN
INNOVATION
The pursuit of open innovation (Boudreau and Lakhani, 2009; Chesbrough and Crowther,
2006) has become a mantra among scholars and practitioners alike. The argument regarding the
limits to knowledge variation at an individual firm level is sound. But how should the sourcing of
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open innovation be managed in the case of a multidivisional firm, and what should be the role of
corporate managers in this process? Should open innovation be delegated to the team, business
unit, and/or corporate level? What is the process of finding and negotiating the acquisition of
external knowledge? Given that a specific external knowledge is likely to be available to several
potential bidders, and is therefore likely to command a full market price, how does a company
create a competitive advantage through open innovation? Once an open innovation is acquired,
what is the process of absorbing it? Further, what is the relationship between internal knowledge
generation and open innovation? Does one complement the other, are they substitutes, or should
they be managed in parallel? Another issue is the management of intellectual property issues. All
of these questions can be partially addressed through research efforts delving into previous
research opportunities, but the holistic understanding of the complex relationship between external
and internal knowledge sourcing in the context of a multidivisional firm is likely to require a
comprehensive research program.
2.4.3 THE ROLE OF A FIRM’S HISTORY IN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT
What role does founders’ imprinting play in the involvement of corporate managers in
innovation management? Is there such a mechanism as innovation founders’ imprinting operating
similarly to organizational imprinting (Stinchcombe, 1965)? More generally, what role does
organizational innovation history play in the degree of corporate managers’ involvement in
innovation management? These questions relate to the organizational capability to retain
knowledge about past innovation activities and utilize this knowledge for present innovation
endeavours. On another related note, how does a history of divestment of once highly innovative
business units affect the parent company’s present and future innovation capability? Given the
dispersion of knowledge across business units forming a multidivisional firm and intraorganizational stickiness of knowledge (Szulanski, 1996), corporate managers are likely to play
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an important role in linking past, present, and future innovation exploits, projects, and
opportunities; this concept offers another promising research stream.

2.4.4 ETHICAL BOUNDARIES OF TOP-DOWN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT
Under which conditions can corporate managers drive their innovation agenda by
manipulating the behaviour of individual employees with or without their consent? My survey
uncovered several mechanisms which can be used by corporate managers to induce an employee’s
desire to pursue innovation activities. It may be beneficial for the firm to have a particular
employee concentrate more on explorative activities as opposed to pursuing an exploitative role.
Yet, given the inherent riskiness of an explorative career, this may not be in the best interest of the
specific employee. From the organizational perspective, an employee whose explorative career
ended in failure is not a significant loss, as a new employee can be hired to fulfil the original
exploitative role. In a sense, the organization can consider each employee as a cheap option (as the
employee is already working for the firm) to gain access to novel knowledge. From the employee
perspective, the switch from an exploitive to explorative career within the firm can significantly
increase the risk of a career failure—a risk that can be difficult to hedge against on an individual
level. This ethical conflict between an organization’s interest in innovation and the interests of
individual employees can be a fruitful avenue for future research.
Relatedly, under which conditions can corporate managers support innovation activities by
manipulating the behaviour of end users without their consent? For instance, social media
companies have used knowledge about human psychology and factors increasing addiction to
make their products highly addictive. More recently, Facebook patented software for tracking end
users’ reactions to advertisements.9 Such innovations are likely to be driven from the top down,
with full consent and awareness of corporate managers. Given that some large multidivisional

https://www.engadget.com/2018/06/28/facebook-patent-turns-phone-mics-on-to-record-reactions-to-ads/ accessed
on August 12, 2018.
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firms are capable of innovating well ahead of governmental attempts to regulate the outcomes of
their innovations, the ethical considerations surrounding the involvement of corporate managers
in driving innovations that impact and/or exploit human behaviour comprise another interesting
research opportunity.
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CHAPTER 3

A MID-RANGE THEORY OF CORPORATE INNOVATION
ACTIVISM

3.1 INTRODUCTION
Does it make sense for corporate managers to actively influence how innovation occurs in
their firms? In a multidivisional firm, corporate managers exert control over several business units
operating in distinct markets under the stewardship of middle managers (Chandler, 1962). Through
this agency, corporate managers have a significant impact on a firm’s performance (McGahan and
Porter, 1997, 2002).
Scholars suggest several roles of corporate managers to provide partial explanations for the
existence of this link between the actions of corporate managers and firm-level performance.
Several scholars have proposed that corporate managers substitute for market mechanisms of
capital allocation through intra-organizational coordination and resource allocation decision
making (Bower, 1970; Chandler, 1962; Williamson, 1975). Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that
corporate managers reduce agency costs by better aligning the interests of shareholders and middle
managers in charge of running individual business units. Collis, Young, and Goold (2007) argue
that corporate managers provide legitimacy function to satisfy regulatory demands and drive
efficiencies by providing centralized back-office services to business units.
None of these roles of corporate managers assume “corporate innovation activism” (CIA),
defined as purposeful actions by corporate managers to actively manage intra-organizational
innovation processes. Proposed top-down mechanisms influence intra-organizational innovation
processes indirectly through organizational structure (Chandler, 1962), organizational purpose
(Selznick, 1957), organizational slack (Penrose, 1959), rules and procedures (Allison, 1971;
Bower, 1970; Cyert and March, 1963), or organizational identity (Kogut and Zander, 1996).
Recent empirical findings on the ignorance of corporate managers about business unit-level
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innovation activities lends support to this assumption about corporate managers’ passivity in
innovation management (Ciabuschi, Forsgren, and Martin, 2012).
Yet, the assumption of corporate managers’ passivity in innovation management is
incongruent with the importance given to innovation in foundational strategy literatures such as
organizational learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991), resource-based view (Barney,
1991; Rumelt, 1984; Teece, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984), and dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and
Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007). Further, there is mounting evidence
from strategy consulting firms as well as scholars publishing in practitioner journals (e.g.,
Birkinshaw, Bouquet, and Barsoux, 2011) that suggests that corporate managers do actively
influence intra-organizational innovation processes through direct top-down mechanisms.
This dissonance in the literature is reflected in the recent call to rethink the role that
corporate managers play in innovation management. Gupta, Tesluk, and Taylor (2007: 886)
observe, “Many studies have sought to understand the innovation process (albeit not very often
through a multilevel lens), but scholars have not yet been able to identify a clear prototypical
process for the management of innovation.” Similarly, recent innovation literature surveys note
that mechanisms through which corporate managers influence how innovation occurs in their firms
are largely unknown (Anderson, Potocnik, and Zhou, 2014; Garud, Tuertscher, and Van de Ven,
2013). Given this tension in extant scholarship, the main purpose of this paper is to develop a midrange theory explaining why it makes sense for corporate managers to engage in CIA.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. First, I review foundational management
literatures to uncover different perspectives on the roles that corporate managers can have in
innovation management. Second, I combine insights from these foundational building blocks with
the innovation, decision making, psychology, and finance literatures to theoretically elaborate two
novel concepts: corporate innovation synergy and corporate innovation value-added. I frame my
theorizing within the evolutionary model of innovation, decomposing intra-organizational
innovation processes into variation, selection, and retention stages (e.g., Burgelman, 1983; Dosi,
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1982; Levinthal, 1998; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Third, I discuss the generalizability of the
developed theory together with its boundary conditions. I conclude with implications for theory
and practice, as well as several suggestions for testing and extending the CIA theory.

3.2

FOUNDATIONAL

PERSPECTIVES ON THE

ROLE

OF

CORPORATE MANAGERS

IN

INNOVATION
In the following paragraphs, I review foundational perspectives in the management
literature on the role of corporate managers in innovation. Foundational management scholarship
which does not specifically address the role of corporate managers in innovation is not within the
scope of this literature review (e.g., the positioning school). As most of these management
literatures are contextualized within the realm of complex organizations, I consider the terms
“senior managers” and “corporate managers” as synonymous. In addition, by “the role of corporate
managers in innovation,” I mean actions taken by corporate managers to influence intraorganizational innovation processes.
3.2.1 INCREASING MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY
Barnard (1938) draws insights about the role of senior managers from an empirical study
conducted at Western Electric on worker motivation. He defines organizations as systems of interemployee cooperation which allow employees to overcome their individual limitations. These
limitations make it necessary for employees to cooperate to reach goals unattainable by individual
action. Pondering the ephemeral nature of organizations, Barnard (1938) argues that the main
conditions for organizational survival include cooperation readiness, communication capacity, and
the existence of purpose. These survival conditions define the functions of a senior manager as the
creation and conservation of the sense of organizational purpose encapsulated within an
organizational moral code, the establishment of formal and informal communication channels, and
the inducement of organizational members to cooperation. In order to fulfil their functions in an
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efficient way, Barnard (1938) proposes that senior managers must continuously leverage
innovations.

3.2.2 RECOGNIZING AND MITIGATING MANAGERIAL COGNITIVE CONSTRAINTS
Building on work by Barnard (1938), Simon (1945/1997) posits that senior managers’
bounded rationality limits their ability to solve complex problems. Simon (1945/1997) suggests
that the consequence of bounded rationality is that senior managers’ decision making leads to
satisficing as opposed to maximizing outcomes. Once senior managers decide on the course of
action, their decisions need to be communicated downwards so that the process of administration
can take place. For that purpose, senior managers employ organizational influences such as
authority, organizational loyalties, and advice. The combination of senior managers’ bounded
rationality and the process of administration can hinder the intra-organizational transfer of ideas,
without which, “nothing will happen” (Simon, 1945/1997: 235) in terms of the development of
new products. Thus, from the bounded rationality perspective, the role of senior managers is to
design mechanisms to recognize and mitigate their cognitive limitations hindering intraorganizational knowledge flows.
3.2.3 CREATING AND UTILIZING ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK
Penrose (1959) moves the theory of the firm discussion away from prices and quantities to
consider a firm as a portfolio of resources functioning within an administrative framework
delineating firm boundaries. According to Penrose (1959), a firm’s growth is related to managers’
desire to transform human and other resources controlled by the firm into productive uses.
Consequently, a firm’s rate of growth is a function of a firm’s growth of knowledge and of the
ability to manage the associated change process with current (i.e., efficient, but fully allocated)
and new (i.e., initially underutilized resources creating organizational slack) human resources.
Therefore, from this perspective, senior managers’ implied role in innovation is to create an
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administrative framework that allows for the emergence of organizational slack and its
transformation into productive use.
3.2.4 MAINTAINING INNOVATION IN PERIODS OF OVERPERFORMANCE10
In resonance with Simon’s (1945/1997) and Penrose’s (1959) arguments, Cyert and March
(1963) reject the classic economic theory of the firm and examine the actual behaviour of business
organizations, drawing on ideas of bounded rationality, imperfect environmental matching, and
unresolved conflict. Cyert and March (1963) argue that a firm can be viewed as a coalition having
a series of independent goals which exhibit a certain degree of inconsistency. Goals represent
constraints imposed in the short term by bargaining among potential coalition members. Goals
evolve in the long term due to changes in coalition structures. The decentralization of decision
making, the consecutive attention to goals, and the modification of organizational slack permit a
firm to tolerate perpetual conflict and respond to environmental variations despite the
inconsistency of goals. Organizational choice is embedded in standard operating procedures
(SOPs) that reflect organizational learning and determine short-term decisions employing
concrete but inaccurate estimates. Thus, implicitly, corporate managers influence intraorganizational innovation processes indirectly by setting organizational goals. When a
performance discrepancy materializes between organizational goals and organizational
performance, innovation occurs through problemistic search. The role of corporate managers in
innovation is then to design mechanisms which can alert them to the need for conducting search
even in periods absent of triggers inducing the problemistic search.
3.2.5 DETERMINING THE IMPORTANCE OF INNOVATION WITHIN THE ORGANIZATIONAL PURPOSE

This paragraph is based on the seminar discussion within Dr. Harbir Singh’s Corporate Strategy class held at the
Wharton School in 2014 and in particular on insights expressed by Andrea Contigiani.

10
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Selznick (1957) analyzes organizations through the theoretical lens of institutional
leadership. He examines the process of organizational transformation from a rational into a social
system defined by distinct competencies and character, arguing that the overemphasis on
efficiency obscures the process by which available resources lead to organizational goals. Whereas
the concept of efficiency applies to individual business units having well defined purpose and
position within the organization, it does not fully account for the role of organizational leadership.
Selznick identifies leadership as a key concept that allows goal setting and resource mobilization
and alignment for reaching these goals. Leadership creates an organizational structure capable of
linking organizational purpose to daily activities by providing a long-term sense of purpose
through organizational myths. According to Selznick, senior managers’ main function as leaders
is to exemplify the organizational purpose, guard institutional integrity, and manage internal
differences. Hence, from Selznick’s perspective, senior managers influence innovation activities
indirectly by regulating the importance of innovation within the process of determining the
organizational purpose.
3.2.6 DESIGNING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES CONDUCIVE TO INNOVATION
Chandler (1962) studies the interconnections in modern corporations between structure and
strategy. In the 1930s, the multidivisional form of organization (M-form) started to be employed
by U.S. corporations as a response to top management’s overload caused by increased complexity
of decision making. This increased complexity was due not simply to the increase in a firm’s size,
but to the broadening of the scope of a firm’s activities requiring diverse managerial knowledge.
Thus, business unit managers became responsible for the market share related profits, whereas
corporate managers focused on monitoring, planning, and resource allocation processes. In general
terms, adjustments to organizational structure were made to support a strategy of growth into new
product and geographical markets, making structure follow strategy. In terms of innovation,
Chandler (1962: 287) notes that within the M-form, research is confined into “functional
68

departments.” Therefore, from Chandler’s (1962) perspective, corporate managers are responsible
for the creation of appropriate organizational structures within which innovation can take place in
support of strategic goals.
3.2.7 SIMULTANEOUSLY PROTECTING AND NOURISHING THE ORGANIZATIONAL CORE
Thompson (1967) considers how organizations handle uncertainty stemming from
technologies and environments. Rational firms aim at protecting their technology core from
environmental influences by enveloping it with input and output components. The residual
variation which firms cannot control is handled by smoothing of input and output transactions and
by preparation for anticipated changes, thereby achieving a degree of self-control and reducing
dependency on the environment. The result is an organizational design that seeks to place
boundaries around activities which may become crucial contingencies if exposed to environmental
influences and that reflects interdependencies of the organization with the environment and its
technology. From the perspective of Thompson (1967), the role of senior managers is to manage
the degree of organizational openness so that the technological core is protected from being
maligned by environmental influences, yet nourished sufficiently to withstand environmental
shocks from which a firm cannot be completely insulated.
3.2.8 GUIDING ENVIRONMENTAL ADAPTATION
Andrews (1971) builds on arguments put forward by Barnard (1938) in his discussion on
the role of senior managers. He argues that a senior manager’s main function is to lead the
perpetual process that defines the nature of an organization and ensures that the organizational
purpose is meaningful and fulfilled. Senior managers are therefore responsible not only for the
formulation of the overall business strategy, but also for its successful implementation by creating
appropriate organizational structures and providing leadership. Andrews (1971) distinguishes
two strategy activities. Business strategy is concerned with a business unit’s competitive strategy
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in the context of the competitive environment enclosing the business unit. Corporate strategy
determines organizational purpose. Through organizational purpose, senior managers define
organizational identity and character, formulate actions to be undertaken, mobilize resources, and
guide adaptation to environmental variations. Implicitly, Andrews (1971) assumes that senior
managers have a good understanding of future innovation opportunities relevant to maintaining
their firm’s environmental fitness.

3.2.9 UPDATING PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING NEW INFORMATION
Allison (1971) describes decision making during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, drawing
on the rational actor model (i.e., national interest is defended by government), organizational
behaviour model (i.e., security apparatus follows routines), and governmental politics model (i.e.,
an agreement is possible through bargaining and compromise among actors) to fully explain
decision making during the crisis. The deadlock was reached as adversary organizations stuck to
their codified routines prescribed for dealing with crisis situations. On a general level, the Cuban
crisis provides an example of organizations ending up in deadlock due to slow adaptation to an
environmental variation. This adaptation rigidity stems from the processing of new information by
unchanged procedures and routines. Based on Allison’s (1971) findings, the role of corporate
managers in innovation is to constantly update SOPs (Cyert and March, 1963) to keep them current
with information processing demands stemming from environmental evolution. In doing so,
corporate managers need to make decisions regarding the degree of local versus global
optimization of SOPs, as well as the degree of divisionality versus centralization of intraorganizational authority flows.
3.2.10 COUNTERING DECISION-MAKING BIASES INHIBITING INNOVATION
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose the prospect theory, which is concerned with
decision making under risk as an alternative to the utility theory, which is concerned with rational
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benefit maximization. The key difference between these theories concerns carriers of value being
changes in wealth (i.e., gains and losses) as opposed to being final asset states. Further, decision
weights are replaced by probabilities. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) note that empirical evidence
is inconsistent with axioms of utility theory; specifically, people exhibit a tendency to underweight
uncertain outcomes when having the option of a certain outcome, resulting in the “certainty effect.”
Moreover, people tend to not consider elements shared by all prospects under assessment, resulting
in the “isolation effect.” These two effects influence decision making in real-life situations. The
resulting value function is habitually concave for gains and usually convex and steeper for losses
(i.e., people perceive less utility in gain than in loss avoidance). Failure to update the positioning
of the reference point can induce incremental risk seeking. Given the inherent riskiness of
innovation pursuits, prospect theory implies that the main role of corporate managers in innovation
is to identify biases negatively impacting decision making related to innovation and design
mechanisms to lessen the impact of these biases (Kahneman, Lovallo, and Sibony, 2011).
3.2.11KEEPING ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY CONDUCIVE TO INNOVATION
Kogut and Zander (1996) argue that the integration of activities through a firm drives
coordination and learning from which a firm’s shared identity— constituted by shared norms and
language—emerges. A firm is demarcated from the market as learning, communication, and
coordination are not only physically integrated, but also get imprinted in the shared identity. Over
time, a firm’s shared identity creates distinct boundaries between its businesses and markets. The
key function of a firm’s shared identity is the decrease in the costs of coordination and
communication. Yet, this shared identity may also instil rules limiting organizational search as it
may be reinforcing established SOPs (Cyert and March, 1963) and legitimizing employees’
tendency to reject outside influences (Katz and Allen, 1982). Thus, from Kogut and Zander’s
(1996) perspective, the role of corporate managers in innovation is to continuously identify and
weaken elements of a firm’s shared identity which may inhibit the pursuit of innovation.
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3.2.12 MAINTAINING ENVIRONMENTAL FITNESS THROUGH INNOVATION
Building on foundations laid out by scholars investigating value creation through
organizational-level efficiency (e.g., Rumelt, 1984; Teece, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984) and those
examining organizational responses to changing environments (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1976), scholars in favour of the dynamic capabilities framework argue that
a firm’s competitive advantage stems from unique processes, specific asset positions, and
inherited path dependency (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen,
1997). A firm’s capacity to maintain its competitive positioning hinges on the permanence of the
market demand, the easiness of expansion through internal replication, and the difficulty of
imitation of its activities by rivals. As such, the dynamic capabilities framework suggests that the
maintenance of competitive positioning is contingent mainly on a firm’s ability to identify and
exploit new profitable ventures, allowing it to maintain environmental fitness. In resonance with
Andrews (1971), Teece (2007) proposes that senior managers are directly responsible for the
identification of innovation opportunities that sustain their firm’s environmental fitness.
3.3

CORPORATE INNOVATION SYNERGY
As shown, a review of the foundational literature uncovers several arguments supporting

the notion that the active involvement of corporate managers in innovation can render intraorganizational innovation processes more efficient. In the following paragraphs, I build upon the
foundational corporate strategy scholarship, the scholarship on managerial decision making, and
the innovation scholarship to propose several sources of efficiency gains within intraorganizational innovation processes achieved by CIA.
3.3.1 VARIATION
3.3.1.1

Reduction of Voice Suppression by Formal Power
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Diversity in the pool of novel ideas increases a firm’s chances of gaining access to
impactful novel ideas (Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2010). The key obstacle to obtaining
diversity from intra-organizational ideation sources is the domination of the idea generation
process by a few opinion leaders, causing the groupthink effect (Coser, 1956). Superiors can use
their power rooted in hierarchy to silence innovation voices which steer too far from extant core
businesses and/or commonly held beliefs about what would work and what would fail (Van de
Ven, 1986).
To reduce instances of voice suppression by formal power, corporate managers can deploy
pan-organizational technological platforms enabling idea sharing and networking among
spatially and hierarchically distributed employees. The introduction of such idea-sharing
platforms is likely to be more efficient when it is spearheaded from the corporate level as
opposed to consisting of discrete initiatives occurring at the business unit level. For instance,
IBM used its intranet infrastructure to facilitate novel idea exchange on a continuous basis even
before conducting its inaugural “IBM’s 2006 InnovationJam®” (IBM, 2018).

Proposition 1: The pan-organizational deployment of idea-sharing platforms reduces voice
suppression by formal power.

3.3.1.2

Increase in the Expression of Grassroots Novel Ideas

Another hurdle to obtaining diversity from intra-organizational ideation sources is
employees’ perception that their voices do not count, resulting in the mind-level suppression of
novel ideas (Reitzig and Maciejovsky, 2015). From the ideating employees’ perspective, the higher
the likelihood that their ideas will be given attention by their superiors, the more likely they are to
express their ideas (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986).
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The active involvement by corporate managers in the facilitation of grassroots ideation can
increase employees’ perception that their idea has a chance of getting noticed and appreciated, as
opposed to being dismissed by their immediate supervisors. For instance, IBM CEO Samuel J.
Palmisano actively participated in IBM’s 2006 InnovationJam® involving more than 150,000
internal and external contributors (IBM, 2018). Bjelland and Wood (2008: 39), who researched
IBM’s 2006 InnovationJam®, described the event: “Cartoon-like avatars of IBMers from all over
the world, meeting in Second Life, created the IBM Virtual Universe Community, and even
Palmisano joined the conversations. (You could recognize his avatar right away: While most
avatars are funky or outrageous, Palmisano’s was a cartoon man wearing a conservative blue suit,
the kind for which IBM salesmen were once famous.)”

Proposition 2: The perception by employees of corporate managers’ direct engagement in the
variation process increases employees’ grassroots novel ideas expression.

3.3.1.3

Increase in the Generation of High-Potential Grassroots Novel Ideas

An increase in grassroots novel ideas is not of great value to a firm unless the grassroots
novel idea pool contains a few high-potential innovative ideas over many mediocre ones (Girotra,
Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2010). This organizational preference is well demonstrated across different
industries. In the area of pharmaceutical research, novel drugs need to have significant potential
in the marketplace to offset the mostly invariable costs related to the drug discovery and
commercialization processes. In academic research, emphasis is given to producing a few articles
with high citation runs over many poorly cited papers. Similarly, private equity firms strive to
uncover a few exceptionally high-return investments as merely average returns would not justify
the risks taken by fund providers.
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The likelihood that the grassroots ideation process generates a few high-potential ideas can
be increased when corporate managers provide employees with high-level clues about challenges
and opportunities relevant to their firm. This assertion is based on the seminal study by Ward
(1994) on the role of cognitive structures in the individual ideation process. Using a series of
experiments, Ward (1994) found that without any direction, experimental subjects resorted to
known knowledge frameworks when imagining novel ideas. Yet, instructions and task constraints
increased subjects’ willingness to depart from current cognitive schemas and employ expansive
knowledge frameworks, leading to more original novel ideas in Ward’s (1994) case animal species.
Corporate managers can achieve such ideation nudging by suggesting high-level topics for ideation
centred on the maintenance of existing core technologies (Thompson, 1967) or the exploration of
emerging technologies (Teece, 2007).

Proposition 3: The transmission from corporate managers to employees of information about
key challenges and opportunities facing the organization increases the likelihood of the
grassroots novel idea generation process periodically producing a high-potential novel idea.

3.3.2 SELECTION
3.3.2.1

Reduction of Middle Managers’ Selection Biases

Middle managers have considerable agency in deciding which grassroots ideas get
endorsement and attention from corporate managers (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983). As middle
managers engage in the selection of grassroots ideas, their selection process has been found to be
distorted by several selection biases. One such bias is the tendency to eliminate ideas which may
be harmful to their personal interests (Bower, 1970; Guth and MacMillan, 1986). At a more
aggregate level, middle managers can exhibit the tendency to the promote interests of their own
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business unit without taking into consideration a novel idea’s potential benefit for the whole
organization (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996; Guth and MacMillan,
1986; Rietzig and Soreson, 2013). Such biases are particularly harmful to the innovation output in
a diverse multidivisional firm in which corporate managers lack the attention span to continuously
monitor innovation activities occurring at lower hierarchical levels (Ocasio, 1997). To counter
these biases, corporate managers can deploy several mechanisms.
First, corporate managers can increase the novel idea dismissal threshold by establishing a
curatorial approach to managing grassroots innovativeness (Litchfield and Gilson, 2013). Similar
to a museum managing a collection of artworks, generated grassroots ideas can be catalogued
through an online interface, tagged with key attributes, and retained within a central registry.
Registration access can be made available to all employees without the involvement of middle
managers. Registered ideas are initially sponsored by their originators, who pitch them to their
superiors. When superiors dismiss a novel idea, they would be required to comment on their
decision within the registry. This paper trail linking a middle manager’s selection decision to a
specific novel idea not only increases the likelihood that a middle manager’s selection decision
can be scrutinized, but also creates a firm-level knowledge database. Corporate managers can
appoint a curator of grassroots novel ideas whose role would be to periodically review the content
of the knowledge database as well as the selection decisions made by middle managers.
Second, corporate managers may introduce a set of objective selection criteria (Cooper,
Edgett, and Kleinschmidt, 1999) to be used by middle managers in their selection process to
decrease the likelihood that a novel idea is dismissed due to personal preferences, inter-employee
relationships, or business unit-specific agendas detrimental to the whole organization. Such criteria
can include financial analyses of the novel idea’s potential (e.g., net present value, payback time,
investment intensity) or qualitative assessments (e.g., fit with existing capabilities, relevance to
present and anticipated client needs, degree of novelty, and degree of replicability across the
organization).
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Third, corporate managers can introduce an appeals process allowing employees who had
their ideas dismissed to have their rejected ideas evaluated by an independent referee panel (March,
1994).

Proposition 4: The creation of a grassroots novel idea registry, the introduction of a set of
objective selection criteria, and the establishment of an appeals process for dismissed ideas
all reduce the chances that middle managers’ selection biases will prevent a high-potential
grassroots novel idea from reaching corporate managers.
3.3.3 RETENTION
3.3.3.1

Reduction of Implementation Derailments Due to Incremental Resource Scarcity

Once a novel idea is selected, the duration and path of its implementation are hard to
estimate (Klein and Sorra, 1996). When additional innovation funds are required, managers at
business units tasked with the implementation of selected innovation projects may be reluctant
to accommodate an implementation extension and provide additional resource funds due to
resource constraints and rigidities embedded in the budgeting process (Bower, 1970). Thus,
when decision making regarding the resourcing of the implementation phase is confined to the
business unit level only, promising innovation projects may be at risk of being cancelled due to
the lack of incremental resourcing required by unexpected implementation hurdles (Mattes,
2014).
The bifurcation of implementation resourcing between the business unit and corporate
levels can reduce this risk. Once the implementation of an innovative project is allocated to a
specific business unit, managers from that business unit make an implementation budget
estimate and the initial implementation resource funds are allocated. If this initial resource
allocation proves to be insufficient, corporate managers can establish a procedure for the
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allocation of incremental implementation resources subject to a formal review of a project’s
progress (Noda and Bower, 1996). If the need to allocate incremental resources gets approved,
corporate managers are in a better position than business unit managers to procure these
additional resources from general purpose funds located at the corporate level, raise additional
capital, or reshuffle resources among business units (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993).

Proposition 5: The bifurcation of the implementation resourcing decision-making processes
into business unit-level initial resourcing request and corporate-level incremental resourcing
evaluation and provision reduces the chances that a high-potential innovation project will be
cancelled due to incremental resource scarcity.

3.3.3.2

Reduction of Innovation Failure Contagion to Core Businesses

Most innovations fail (Levine, 1980). When the failure of an innovation is confined to an
economic loss in the form of wasted resources earmarked in advance for the failed project, the
organization is likely to withstand the failure as the organizational resource allocation process
accounts for the high innovation failure rate (Klingebiel and Rammer, 2014). Yet, an innovation
failure can have repercussions beyond the failed innovation project itself, and even beyond
organizational boundaries, when it negatively impacts the organization’s core businesses
(Thompson, 1967). For instance, several in-flight failures of Rolls-Royce’s innovative Trent
1000 engine (used by Boeing to power its Dreamliner 787 aircraft) caused Rolls-Royce to
reallocate significant organizational resources to fix the faulty design (BBC, 2018). Similarly,
information about an innovation failure involving a major financial institution can rapidly erode
clients’ trust in the organization’s long-term stability. For this reason, traditional banks have
been reluctant supporters of the fintech revolution in the finance industry (Forbes, 2017). In the
agile software development movement, while it is beneficial to continuously rethink potential
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new uses of an extant software code, such explorative activity generates reconfiguration costs
as well as exploration costs in the form of potentially undesirable outcomes (Austin and Devin,
2009).
Corporate managers can deploy several mechanisms to reduce the risk of innovation failure
contagion beyond the innovation project itself. First, they can temporally structurally ring-fence
the innovation failure contagion risk by establishing specialized organizational units dedicated
exclusively to the pursuit of innovations (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003). An innovation is then
diffused into the rest of the organization only after it passes a certain threshold of reliability.
Any innovation flops can be fully contained within these separate organizational structures, with
legal barriers preventing innovation failure spillovers from affecting core businesses. Second,
corporate managers can constrain the initial implementation of risky innovation projects to
markets of lesser importance (Klompmaker, Hughes, and Haley, 1976), even when this is
initially a suboptimal solution from the perspective of a single business unit. For example, global
firms often test their new products in Australia before introducing them in other markets
(Fortune, 2015). Third, when an innovation failure occurs, corporate managers have a better
overview than middle managers of how the innovation failure contagion can impact core
businesses across the organization, and are therefore in a better position to enact a panorganizational containment plan (Tufano, 1996).

Proposition 6: Corporate managers are in a better position than middle managers to reduce
the risk of innovation failure contagion to core businesses.

3.3.3.3

Reduction of the Number of Late-Stage Innovation Flops

The outright failure of an innovation project is easier to recognize and deal with early in
the innovation implementation stage. However, many innovation projects keep showing some
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promise, but on the balance of probabilities, their value creation within a reasonable timeframe
becomes unclear. The decision to push on with a failed project by managers and employees who
have championed it is due to several decision-making biases. The confirmation bias (Nickerson,
1998) reduces the innovation implementation team’s search for information which would
undermine its project’s continued viability. The availability bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973)
reduces the innovation implementation team’s effort to update fundamental premises upon
which the project was selected. The anchoring bias (Northcraft and Neale, 1987) reduces the
innovation implementation team’s willingness to consider the feasibility of its innovation from
new angles.
Corporate managers are not immune to letting these biases cloud their own decision
making, even when they are aware of the existence of these biases (Kahneman, Lovallo, and
Sibony, 2011). Yet, several factors stemming from their position within the organizational
hierarchy reduces their susceptibility to these biases relative to middle managers. First, corporate
managers oversee a large number of innovation implementations across the organization,
making it easier for them to let go of any one of these projects. Second, corporate managers are
less personally invested in the innovation implementation projects, reducing the likelihood that
they will favour one over another due to their own personal agendas (Bower, 1970). Third, given
their position at the top of the organizational hierarchy, corporate managers possess the ultimate
authority to stop a particular project (Cyert and March, 1963; Finkelstein, 1992; Thompson,
1967). Further, the decision to abandon an innovation implementation may be harder to make at
the business unit level due to the sunken cost effect increasing the implementation team’s
reluctance to terminate the project (Garland, 1990).

Proposition 7: Corporate managers are in a better position than middle managers to
reduce the number of late-stage innovation flops.
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3.3.3.4

Reduction of Innovation Duplicity

Innovation duplicity refers to the simultaneous pursuit of similar innovation projects within
the same organization (McAdam and Galloway, 2005). Innovation duplicity can occur
geographically, among spatially distributed business units; structurally, among distinct
functional areas; or temporally, when an innovation project which recently failed is attempted
again without an increased probability of success. Innovation duplicity not only wastes
organizational resources, but can also give rise to destructive rivalry among innovation teams
(De Clercq, Thongpapanl, and Dimov, 2009).
Corporate managers are in a better position than business unit managers to reduce
innovation duplicity. First, corporate managers can use their helicopter overview of innovation
projects to detect innovation duplicity occurring across business units, geographies, and/or
functional areas. Second, corporate managers are likely to have better insight into whether a
specific innovation duplicity is desirable or wasteful. In some situations, innovation duplicity
can be desirable when several innovation teams work concurrently, yet independently, on an
innovation project crucial for the organization’s long-term survival.

Proposition 8: Corporate managers are in a better position than middle managers to
reduce innovation duplicity when it is wasteful.

3.4 CORPORATE INNOVATION VALUE-ADDED
When the innovation function is elevated to the corporate level in a multidivisional firm,
is the organization better able to add unique elements to the variation, selection, and retention
innovation processes than when the innovation function is delegated to individual business units
only? The difference between the corporate innovation synergy concept and the corporate
innovation value-added concept is that without the active involvement of corporate managers in
innovation, corporate innovation value-added is unlikely to manifest itself as it is generated by the
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unique position occupied by corporate managers within a multidivisional firm. In contrast, some
elements constituting corporate innovation synergy are likely to occur to a certain degree even
when corporate managers are not actively involved in intra-organizational innovation processes.
3.4.1 VARIATION
3.4.1.1

Generation of Architectural Innovation

The concepts of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1979), experiential learning (Levitt and
March, 1988), and cognitive learning (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) are closely related to the
managerial capability needed to recombine knowledge already existing within organizations.
Henderson and Clark (1990: 10) term such recombination of existing knowledge “architectural
innovation.” According to Henderson and Clark (1990), architectural knowledge differs from the
component knowledge about a product’s various parts required for its functioning. Specifically,
architectural knowledge refers to knowledge about how these different components work together
as a system.
The identification of architectural innovation opportunities requires a holistic overview of
different component knowledge bases that may be scattered structurally, geographically, and
temporally across the entire organization. Corporate managers have, on average, longer tenure than
middle managers and can connect past, present, and emerging knowledge available to the
organization. For instance, innovations that failed in the past can be a source of inspiration for
future innovations (Drucker, 2008). Corporate managers are also continuously concerned about
emerging technologies that may disrupt their core businesses (Teece, 2007). Further, corporate
managers have the formal power to change the way things are done and overcome the pathdependent nature of experiential learning (Levitt and March, 1988) that increases the rigidity of
organizational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). In addition, corporate managers can facilitate
intra-organizational information flows, enabling the discovery of architectural innovation
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opportunities. Such intra-organizational information flows are less likely to occur at the business
unit level due to the stickiness of knowledge (Szulanski, 1996).

Proposition 9: Corporate managers can generate architectural innovations by leveraging
their holistic overview of organizational knowledge, using their formal power to lessen
organizational rigidities, and facilitating intra-organizational information flows.

3.4.1.2

Sourcing of External Novel Ideas

External knowledge sourcing is an important source of variation (Chesbrough, 2006). Yet,
external knowledge holders may be reluctant to share their knowledge because they worry about
a disproportionate economic value appropriation by the knowledge seeker (Chatain and Zemsky,
2011). Another issue arises when the external knowledge holder is reluctant to share the
knowledge out of fear of disrupting established business relationships (Birkinshaw, Bouquet,
and Barsoux, 2011). For example, suppliers may be concerned that their asset-specific
investments may be devalued by revealing that novel ways of cooperation in the buyer-supplier
relationship exist. Even when external knowledge holders are willing to share their knowledge,
the “not invented here” (NIH) syndrome (Katz and Allen, 1982)—whereby the value of external
knowledge is discounted in favour of internally generated ideas (Katz and Allen, 1982)—may
prevent external knowledge from gaining acceptance at the business unit level.
Corporate-level managers can mitigate external knowledge holders’ concerns by
establishing trust between their organization and the external knowledge holders at the corporate
level (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995), as opposed to letting business units negotiate with
external knowledge holders directly. Establishing trust at the corporate level can mitigate
external knowledge holders’ fear that middle managers may disseminate the acquired external
knowledge to other organizations, especially in industries marked by high middle management
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turnover (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990). Similarly, corporate managers can extend the
corporate-level trust to address the concerns of existing external partners about the protection of
their asset-specific investments to encourage them to express their innovative ideas. The
establishment of trusting relationships with external knowledge holders is likely to motivate
corporate managers to push the utilization of the acquired external knowledge, countering the
NIH bias (Katz and Allen, 1982).

Proposition 10: The establishment of trusting relationships with external knowledge
holders at the corporate level generates external novel idea sourcing and increases the
acceptance of external knowledge at lower hierarchical levels.
3.4.2 SELECTION
3.4.2.1

Selection of Riskier Innovation Projects

An innovation project’s failure can negatively impact the careers of the involved
employees at the business unit level as they have limited project diversification options (Hitt et
al., 1996). Consequently, middle managers involved in the selection of innovation projects tend
to select less risky projects over projects with higher value creation potential, but also higher
likelihood of failure (Castañer and Kavadis, 2013).
Corporate managers benefit from several mechanisms that decrease their risk aversion
towards high-potential/high-risk innovation projects. First, corporate managers can spread their
bets over multiple innovation projects, thereby diversifying away their individual-level risk.
Second, the nature of corporate managers’ employment contracts often provides them with a
safety net should a failure of a particular innovation project negatively impact their own personal
career. Third, given their position within the organizational hierarchy, corporate managers are
less likely to be subjected to hierarchical checking (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986), which increases
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their ability to infuse analytical decision making based on available data with intuitive decision
making rooted in their experiences (Barnard, 1938) and gut feeling (Dane and Pratt, 2007).

Proposition 11: The involvement of corporate managers in the selection of innovation
projects will increase the proportion of riskier innovation projects in a firm’s selected
innovation pool.

3.4.3 RETENTION
3.4.3.1

Creation of Organizational Innovation Memory

As successful innovation projects are implemented and diffused across the organization,
innovations become increasingly routinized (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Once innovations
become implemented and routinized, the tacit knowledge about their origins erodes through
employee turnover (Massingham, 2008) and downsizing (Schmitt, Borzillo, and Probst, 2012).
Gradually, organizations forget knowledge they once generated internally or acquired externally
(Argote, Beckman, and Epple, 1990; Darr, Argote, and Epple, 1995). Even when the tacit
knowledge still exists within the organization, the process of accessing it, understanding it, and
reusing it is non-trivial (Alavi and Leidner, 2001).
As corporate managers become actively involved in intra-organizational innovation
processes, the innovation knowledge involved across the innovation pipeline gets centralized at
the corporate level. The centralization of various innovation knowledge bases at the corporate
level is likely to trigger the need for innovation knowledge codification (Zollo and Winter,
2002). Continuous innovation knowledge codification at a centralized corporate location
triggers the need for a more systematic way to archive codified knowledge to make it useful for
existing innovation projects as well as future innovation endeavours. Over time, in conjunction
with the curatorial approach to managing grassroots innovativeness (Litchfield and Gilson,
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2013), a knowledge management system gets established, within which codified and catalogued
innovation knowledge resides. This knowledge management system sets the foundation for the
creation of organizational innovation memory, making innovation knowledge across the full
spectrum of outcomes accessible across the organization in the present and future (Hargadon
and Sutton, 1997).
While useful for present and future innovation endeavours, such organizational memory is,
by definition, comprised of knowledge that has been generated in the past about undertaken
innovation activities. For instance, this kind of codifiable information can relate to tested and/or
deployed processes, tools, materials, shapes, and innovation organizational set-ups.11

Proposition 12: The active involvement of corporate managers in innovation creates
organizational innovation memory.

3.4.3.2

Generation of Architectural Innovation Implementation

Architectural innovation implementation builds upon the concept of architectural
innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990) and refers to the active optimization of ongoing
innovation implementation processes across the organization. Ideally, managers continuously
evaluate and periodically reconfigure distributed innovation modules constituting various
innovation implementation projects to gain efficiencies and generate value. These are non-trivial
tasks as different elements of innovation knowledge are often distributed temporally,
geographically, and structurally (i.e., among separate business units and/or among functions).
Benefiting from their centralized overview of all innovation projects across the
organization, corporate managers can often connect the dots and generate architectural innovation

I thank Rob Austin for pointing out the backward-looking nature of the organizational innovation memory and
suggesting its content.

11

86

implementation. Ramachandran, Manikandan, and Pant (2013: 114) provide the following
example from Tata Group: “Although household water purifiers were widely available in India for
many years, they were unaffordable to the poor, who didn’t have access to clean drinking water.
Then in 2009, Tata Swach, a low-cost water purifier, was launched. (…) The company developed
an early prototype but declared it unviable and not a fit with its software business, and shelved the
project. In 2006, R. Gopalakrishnan, a senior member of Tata’s group executive office, stumbled
across the prototype (…). He revived the project, suggesting that Tata Chemicals, with its expertise
in chemical-processing technologies, take the lead.” This example demonstrates how
organizational innovation memory—in this case, enacted by an individual corporate manager—
can generate instances of architectural innovation implementation.

Proposition 13: Organizational innovation memory enables architectural innovation
implementation.

3.5 DISCUSSION AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
I have developed two novel concepts: corporate innovation synergy and corporate
innovation value-added. Corporate innovation synergy refers to mechanisms that can be deployed
by corporate managers to make existing intra-organizational innovation processes more efficient.
Corporate innovation value-added concerns mechanisms that can be deployed by corporate
managers to improve intra-organizational processes in ways which are hard to achieve at the
business unit level. I have synthesized my propositions into a theoretical model which depicts the
interdependencies among these mechanisms as their deployment increases a firm’s innovation
output. I conclude by discussing important boundary conditions of the CIA theoretical model and
suggesting several areas for future investigation.

3.5.1 CIA BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
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The CIA theory is mid-range in nature. Several important boundary conditions apply, and
are discussed below.
3.5.1.1

Degree of Diversification

The need for CIA is likely to be contingent on a firm’s degree of diversification. Less
diversified firms tend to have flatter organizational designs (Rajan and Wulf, 2006), reducing
innovation decision-making distortions caused by hierarchical layering (Reitzig and Maciejovsky,
2015), and in turn reducing the need for CIA. Further, in a less diversified firm there is less need
for specialized corporate-level roles as the administrative complexity decreases and the roles of
corporate and business managers overlap.
On the other hand, in an excessively diversified firm, several factors are likely to lessen
the effectiveness of CIA. First, due to the increased organizational complexity of an excessively
diversified firm, less managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997) at the corporate level will be available
for innovation related matters. Second, the cognitive limitations (Simon, 1955, 1979) of corporate
managers limit their ability to comprehend innovation issues, needs, and opportunities across many
diverse industries. Third, the cause of excessive diversification is often an aggressive M&A
program stemming from managerial motivation to reduce employment risk (Amihud and Lev,
1981), as opposed to internal growth through deployment of organizational slack (Penrose, 1959).
The resulting portfolio of businesses each having their unique innovation cultures makes the
deployment of CIA difficult due to strong path dependencies of innovation trajectories at the
business unit level.
In sum, CIA is likely to be most effective in firms in which the degree of diversification is
congruent with owners’ interests (as opposed to with the interests of managers exercising their
managerial discretion) (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990).
3.5.1.2

Turnover Differential of Corporate Managers versus Middle Managers
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One of the premises on which the theory of CIA rests is the turnover differential between
corporate and business unit managers. I assume that corporate managers have significantly lower
turnover rates than business unit managers. I argue that the lower turnover of corporate managers
versus business unit managers enables corporate managers to create organizational innovation
memory and build trusting relationships with external idea holders, among other effects. In
companies in which the turnover of corporate managers is high, some of the CIA model’s
propositions are likely to be weakened.
3.5.1.3

CIA in Crisis Periods

When organizations encounter a period of financial turmoil, placing them under the purview
of stakeholders providing financial backing, corporate managers are likely to refocus their
attention away from CIA to manage more pressing tasks required for their firm’s short-term
survival. Paradoxically, corporate managers’ abandonment of CIA in times of crisis may provide
short-term relief, but may also set the stage for a gradual erosion of a firm’s capability to remain
competitive in the long term (Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011; Lim, Celly, Morse, and Rowe, 2013).

3.5.2 POSITIONING OF CIA MECHANISMS WITHIN THE EVOLUTIONARY FRAMEWORK
Most of the propositions concern the variation and retention phases of intra-organizational
innovation processes. This CIA focus suggests that corporate managers have multiple avenues for
shaping novel idea generation and supporting implementation of selected ideas, while being more
limited in intervening in the selection process.
This imbalance in the CIA model is consistent with recent observations in the literature
(Reitzig and Maceijovsky, 2015; Reitzig and Sorensen, 2013) regarding the lack of knowledge
about the sub-processes that shape the selection decision making in a multidivisional firm. I argue
that corporate managers can play an important role in reducing middle managers’ selection biases
and increasing the selection of riskier projects with higher expected returns.
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Future research can test these propositions using randomized control trials in companies
which have not yet experienced CIA. Further, future studies might employ recent advances in the
understanding of a neurobiological basis for decision-making biases (e.g., De Martino et al., 2006)
and apply these insights from neuroscience to theoretically and empirically push the boundaries of
knowledge on influences shaping the selection of novel ideas.
3.5.3 TYPE OF INNOVATIONS SUPPORTED BY CIA
Corporate managers are likely to be effective in enhancing organizational capability for
architectural innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990), as they possess a holistic overview of all
innovation projects. Given corporate managers’ lesser risk aversion compared to middle managers
(Castañer and Kavadis, 2013), CIA is also likely to contribute to the generation of radical
innovations. On the other hand, corporate managers are less likely to contribute to innovations at
the component level, given their lack of detailed expertise-level knowledge. Similarly, employees
closest to core businesses (Thompson, 1967) are better equipped at ideating on incremental
improvements than are corporate managers, who are often separated by several hierarchical levels
from the underlying business processes run by lower-level managers and/or market-facing
employees. Thus, an interesting empirical research question relates to the effect that CIA has on
changing the representation of different innovation types post CIA’s deployment.
3.5.4 CIA INTENSITY
Is it always beneficial for organizations to pursue increased innovation output? Wouldn’t
corporate managers’ energy and attention be better spent on other activities? When too many
resources are diverted to exploration/innovation that does not yield economic rents in the short
term, the organization’s long-term survival prospects can decline due to insufficient generation of
funds to support ongoing operations. This point brings us back to the issue of
exploration/exploitation balance (March, 1991). Under the assumption of resource constraints at
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the firm level, exploration diverts resources from exploitation, which can undermine
organizational ability to survive as the pursuit of innovation depletes resources at a higher rate than
the rate at which innovations generate new resources (i.e., negative resource replenishment rate
due to investments in exploration/innovation pursuits).
During periods with a negative replenishment rate, resource providers can turn away from
a firm. A case in point is the satiation of IBM, which has been struggling to transition into cloud
computing while its traditional business has been declining. Investors responded by selling IBM’s
stock, which limited IBM’s access to public markets. The case of GE is even more striking. The
company was deselected from the Dow Index, its last original constituent, and had to fire-sell
assets to pay off debt and shrink itself. Yet, its debt load remains high while its ability to generate
profits to service/pay off its debt greatly diminished. This example leads to an important research
question: how do firms sustain CIA during negative resource replenishment periods due to major
restructuring efforts involving heavy resource allocation to exploration?
3.5.5 THE DARK SIDE OF CIA
Limited periods of increased CIA intensity causing a temporal negative replenishment rate,
especially during organizational restructuring, are unlikely to cause a firm to become structurally
biased towards exploration at the expense of exploitation. Yet, CIA continuously applied across
various hierarchical levels could potentially give rise to a structural negative replenishment rate.
Over time, a structural negative replenishment rate can deplete organizational ability to support
exploration through exploitation of core businesses (March, 1991; Thompson, 1967). Another
potentially negative aspect of sustained high levels of CIA is the generation of intra-organizational
conflicts among different organizational charters (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996). In the following
paragraphs, I discuss this possible dark side of CIA across hierarchical levels.
3.5.5.1

Individual Employees
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At the individual employee level, CIA is likely to increase the provision of unstructured
exploration worktime (Steiber and Alänge, 2013) by supporting the allocation of a portion of
employees’ time towards intrinsically motivated exploration pursuits (Amabile, 1988). An
overemphasis on the importance of unstructured exploration worktime could dilute employees’
focus on their formal responsibilities, negatively affecting a firm’s capacity for exploitation of its
core businesses. Further, overprovision of unstructured exploration worktime could disrupt
employees’ cognitive focus on generating incremental innovations related to core businesses,
leading to an accelerated depreciation of core businesses’ value-generating potential (Thompson,
1967).
Another potential issue with sustained high levels of CIA intensity at the employee level
is the erosion of negative perceptions of failure. Destigmatization of innovation-related failure
could lower employees’ focus on ultimately generating valuable and replicable outcomes of their
innovation efforts and decrease the overall productivity of employee-level innovation efforts. At
the extreme, CIA could encourage employees to engage in exploration activities that endanger
core businesses (Austin, Devin, and Sullivan, 2012).
The over-application of CIA at the employee level could also generate conflict between
employees for whom it is natural to engage in exploration and employees who require more
structured working environments in order to be productive. CIA could furnish exploration-oriented
employees with a licence to decrease their collaboration on projects related to exploitation under
the pretense of needing to focus their efforts on innovation projects harboured within their minds.
Such uncollaborative behaviour legitimized by CIA could prove to be difficult for the explorationminded employees’ immediate superiors to rectify.
3.5.5.2

Teams

The over-application of CIA could lead to the emergence of a multitude of semi- to fully
autonomous teams operating outside of the realm of formal organizational authority structures.
92

CIA could facilitate the emergence of such teams by providing them with ad hoc resources and a
degree of legitimacy for their independent pursuits. Given the lack of formal approval of actions
undertaken by these semi-autonomous innovation teams, these teams could tie up valuable
organizational resources without accountability for meaningful outcomes. At the extreme, such
teams could disrupt formal command and control structures.
Sustained high levels of CIA intensity could also lead to the emergence of competing
innovation teams. Such team-level competition could be conducive to finding valuable innovation
outcomes faster, yet it could also become counterproductive if the inter-team rivalry were to
diminish the ability and willingness of teams to collaborate and leverage knowledge and outcomes.
Instead, the over-application of CIA could generate more innovation-related behaviour that is
rewarded from the CIA perspective reducing the motivation at the team level to collaborate and
build upon the efforts of other teams. Still another potential CIA-related conflict could arise if a
rivalry emerged between CIA-sponsored innovation teams operating at the corporate level and
innovation teams embedded within business units.
3.5.5.3

Middle Managers

The main issue with the over-application of CIA at the middle manager level relates to
incentives. Middle managers’ role has been traditionally understood in the literature as being
closely related to exploitation (Huy, 2002). CIA could skew middle managers’ incentives towards
innovation, which could hamper efficient and effective exploitation of core businesses. Further, as
middle managers play an important role in evaluating the merit of innovation projects originating
within their business units (Bower, 1970; Reitzig and Sorenson, 2013), tilting middle managers’
incentives more towards exploration could increase the riskiness of innovation projects earmarked
for implementation.
3.5.5.4

Corporate Managers
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CIA has the potential to create a conflict within the C-suite as corporate managers start to
fight over control of the innovation voice and direction. Multiple corporate-level managers (e.g.,
the chief marketing officer, chief innovation officer, chief strategy officer, and even the CEO)
could consider top-down innovation decision making as belonging to their sphere of influence and
decision making.
Another issue related to sustained, high-level intensity of CIA is corporate long-term
support for projects which may never have commercial application, and/or their commercialization
is only possible in the distant future. Given that these innovation projects would enjoy endorsement
and resourcing from the very top of the organization, they could become a significant drag on
organizational resources.

Limited periods of increased CIA intensity causing temporal negative replenishment rate,
especially during organizational restructuring, are unlikely to cause a firm to become structurally
biased towards exploration at the expense of exploitation. Yet, CIA continuously applied across
various hierarchical levels could potentially give rise to structural negative replenishment rate.
Structural negative replenishment rate can over time deplete organizational ability to support
exploration through exploitation of core businesses (March, 1991; Thompson, 1967). Another
potentially negative aspect of sustained high levels of CIA is the generation of intra-organizational
conflicts among various organizational charters (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996). In the following
paragraphs, I discuss this potentially dark side of CIA across hierarchical levels.
3.5.5.5

Individual employees

At the individual employee level, CIA is likely to increase the provision of unstructured
exploration worktime (Steiber and Alänge, 2013) by supporting allocation of a portion of
employee’s time towards intrinsically motivated exploration pursuits (Amabile, 1988). An
overemphasis on the importance of unstructured exploration worktime could dilute employees’
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focus on their formal responsibilities negatively affecting a firm’s capacity for exploitation of its
core businesses. Further, overprovision of unstructured exploration worktime could disrupt
employees’ cognitive focus on generating incremental innovations related to core businesses,
leading to an accelerated depreciation of core businesses’ value generating potential (Thompson,
1967).
Another potential issue with sustained high levels of CIA intensity at the employee level
is the erosion of negative perception related to failure. De-stigmatization of innovation related
failure could lower employees’ focus on ultimately generating valuable and replicable outcomes
of their innovation efforts and decrease the overall productivity of employee level innovation
efforts. At the extreme, CIA could encourage employees to engage in exploration activities
endangering core businesses (Austin, Devin, and Sullivan, 2012).
The overapplication of CIA at the employee level could also generate conflict between
employees for whom it is natural to engage in exploration and employees who require more
structured working environment in order to be productive. CIA could furnish exploration-oriented
employees with a licence to decrease their collaboration on projects related to exploitation under
the pretense of needing to focus their efforts on innovation projects harboured within their minds.
Such uncollaborative behavior legitimized by CIA could prove to be difficult to rectify by
exploration minded employees’ immediate superiors.
3.5.5.6

Teams

The overapplication of CIA could lead to the emergence of a multitude of semi- to fully
autonomous teams operating outside of the realm of formal organizational authority structures.
CIA could facilitate the emergence of such teams by providing them with ad-hoc resources and a
degree of legitimacy for their independent pursuits. Given the lack of formal approval of actions
undertaken by these semi-autonomous innovation teams, these teams could tie valuable
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organizational resources without accountability for meaningful outcomes. At the extreme, such
teams could disrupt formal command and control structures.
The sustained high levels of CIA intensity could also lead to the emergence of competing
innovation teams. Such team-level competition could be conducive to finding valuable innovation
outcomes faster, yet it could also become counterproductive when the inter-team rivalry would
diminish the ability and wiliness of teams to collaborate and leverage knowledge and outcomes of
aim becomes to generate more innovative related behavior rewarded from the CIA perspective
without collaborating and building upon efforts of other teams. Another potential CIA related
conflict could arise when a rivalry would emerge between CIA sponsored innovation teams and
innovation teams embedded within business units.
3.5.5.7

Middle managers

The main issue related to the overapplication of CIA at the middle manager level is related
to incentives. Middle managers’ role has been traditionally understood in the literature as being
closely related to exploitation (Huy, 2002). CIA could skew middle managers’ incentives towards
innovation which could hamper efficient and effective exploitation of core businesses. Further, as
middle managers play an important role in evaluating the merit of innovation projects originating
within their business units (Bower, 1970; Reitzig and Sorenson, 2013), tilting middle managers’
incentives more towards exploration could increase the riskiness of innovation projects earmarked
for implementation.
3.5.5.8

Corporate managers

CIA has the potential to create a conflict within the C-suite as corporate managers start to
fight over the control of the innovation voice and direction. Multiple corporate level managers,
such as Chief Marketing Officer, Chief Innovation Officer, Chief Strategy Officer, and even the
CEO herself, could consider top-down innovation decision making as belonging to their sphere of
influence and decision making.
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Another issue arises related to a sustained high-level intensity of CIA is corporate longterm support for projects which may never have commercial application and/or their
commercialization is only possible in the distant future. Given that these innovation projects would
enjoy endorsement and resourcing from the very top of the organization, they could become a
significant drag on organizational resources.
3.5.6 CIA GOVERNANCE
A key factor when considering the role of CIA during negative resource replenishment
periods is the conversion rate of innovation effort into economic rents. The determination of the
optimal conversion rate of innovation effort into economic rents is ultimately a managerial task as
managers make resource allocation decisions (Bower, 1970) among lower-risk/lowerpotential/faster-conversion-rate innovation projects and innovation projects that take longer to
generate economic rents. Rowe (2001) argues that visionary leaders (who are much more likely
than managerial leaders to fund innovations) are more likely to cause a firm to go bankrupt if they
will not allow themselves to be supported by a managerial leader. Rowe’s (2001) insight leads to
another interesting research question: how should CIA be governed in terms of managerial styles?
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CHAPTER 4

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE INNOVATION
FUNCTION IN MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRMS

4.1 INTRODUCTION
A firm’s innovation capability consists of sourcing of novel ideas (Hamel, 2006), selection
from among the novel ideas of the best ones (Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2010), and the
implementation of the selected ideas (Klein & Sorra, 1996). The concept of innovation capability
is particularly relevant to strategy scholars since innovation is often associated with competitive
advantage (McGrath, Tsai, Venkataraman, and MacMillan, 1996; Van de Ven, 1986). Hitt,
Hoskisson, and Kim (1997) argued that, due to increasingly globalized markets, failure to innovate
can lead to a sudden reversal of fortunes of well-established firms.
Little is known about the role that corporate managers, who exert control over separate
business units in a multidivisional firm (Miller, Fern, and Cardinal, 2007; Rumelt, 1974), have in
influencing intra-organizational innovation processes (Anderson, Potočnik, and Zhou, 2014;
Garud, Tuertscher, and Van de Ven, 2013). In his seminal research on the resource allocation
process, Bower (1970) portrayed corporate managers as passive influencers of innovation
processes occurring at the business unit level through the establishment of corporate context.
Bower (1970) defined corporate context as a static system of reporting structures, performance
metrics, and monitoring procedures aligning bottom-up innovation initiatives with corporate
strategy. Corporate managers approve bottom-up innovation initiatives based not on their detailed
knowledge of each initiative, but on their trust in the judgment of middle managers responsible for
the performance of individual business units (Bower, 1970). Corporate managers are thus
dependent on middle managers’ sensemaking of innovation initiatives and selection choices,
which constitute the strategic context (Burgelman (1983a).
The strategic context can be a source of type I and II innovation errors. Type I innovation
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errors occur when an approved innovation initiative turns out to be a failure, whereas type II
innovation errors occur when an innovation initiative is rejected, yet turns out to be a success
elsewhere (Garud, Nayyar, and Shapira, 1997). Middle managers’ bias toward innovation
initiatives presenting low risk for their own careers (Bower, 1970) increases the incidence of type
I innovation errors when a low-value innovation initiative is selected, even though it does not earn
sufficient return on the deployed resources necessary for its implementation. More recently,
Reitzig and Maciejovsky (2015) found that middle managers are prone to eliminating promising
yet high-risk innovation initiatives when they sense that their selection capability could be
questioned by their superiors. Middle managers’ cognitive constraints (Simon, 1955, 1979),
limiting their ability to comprehend innovations that transcend their areas of expertise (Bower,
1970), contribute to the incidence of type II innovation errors. A further source of type II
innovation errors occur when middle managers resist the introduction of external ideas seeking to
protect their sphere of influence, authority, and relevance (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008;
Chesbrough, 2006).
Type I and II innovation errors can occur even before innovation initiatives reach the
selection process. Burgelman (1983b) distinguished between autonomous and induced innovation
initiatives. Induced innovation initiatives follow corporate strategy formulated by corporate
managers. When corporate managers lack foresight about future high-impact innovation
opportunities, induced innovation initiatives are likely to have low success potential (Noda &
Bower, 1996). Even when high-value innovation opportunities are identified by corporate
managers, lack of codification of the corporate strategy in a comprehensive manner can hinder its
diffusion among employees with the potential to contribute to innovation (i.e., individual
innovators) located several hierarchical levels below corporate managers (Zollo, 1998). Both of
these limitations stemming from ignorance or inaction by corporate managers are likely to increase
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the incidence of type I innovation errors at the individual innovator level. Autonomous innovation
initiatives are driven by individual innovators’ intrinsic motivation, as opposed to being induced
by corporate strategy. This increases the hurdle rate that autonomous innovators face to get
resources to further develop their novel ideas into defensible projects (Knudsen & Levinthal,
2007), which increases the incidence of type II innovation errors, again at the individual inventor
level.
Some researchers have started to recognize that corporate managers can influence the
incidence of type I and II innovation errors. For example, Noda and Bower (1996) extended the
original Bower-Burgelman model by suggesting a more active role for corporate managers through
repeated resource allocation process. More recently, Birkinshaw, Bouquet, and Barsoux (2011)
suggested that proactive corporate intervention in innovation is complimentary to bottom-up
innovation processes, as corporate managers are well-positioned for managing the penetrability of
the strategic context for bottom-up innovation initiatives. For instance, innovators in one business
unit could attempt to transfer and use knowledge resources that already exist in a different business
unit to achieve a certain innovative outcome (Birkinshaw & Lingblad, 2005; Galunic & Eisenhardt,
1996). While middle managers responsible for the financial performance of the business unit may
consider such activity as a misallocation of resources under their control, corporate managers could
view it as desirable (Gruber, Harhoff, and Hoisl, 2013) for increasing their firm’s ambidexterity
capability (Zimmermann, Raisch, and Birkinshaw, 2015).
Despite this gradual relaxation of the corporate manager passivity assumption in the
literature, there has been a lack of multi-level innovation studies exploring how corporate
managers (i.e., at the organizational level) impact innovation processes occurring at lower
hierarchical levels (Anderson, Potočnik, and Zhou, 2014; Gupta, Tesluk, and Taylor, 2007). Thus,
the main aim of our study is to investigate processes if and through which corporate managers
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actively influence how innovation occurs within their firms (i.e., the CIF). Further, we associate
corporate processes with resources needed for their enactment. These corporate innovation
resources are both tangible (e.g., innovation funding, innovation spaces, corporate innovation
teams) and intangible (e.g., corporate innovation strategy, corporate involvement in ideation,
corporate endorsement of individual innovators) in nature.
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Given the inductive nature of our study, we
entered the field with openness to discovering innovation processes and relationships among these
processes so far underexplored in the literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). For presentation purposes, we
adopted the post-positivistic research convention (Suddaby, 2006) to present literature up front,
followed by a description of the methods, findings, and the discussion. Similar to Schotter and
Beamish (2011), this choice was made to provide clarity to the reader, rather than to reflect the
chronological uncovering of new insights and theory development. We thus first provide a
synthesis of the conceptual background on the variation, selection, and retention processes
operating within a multidivisional firm. Second, we outline our methodological approach,
including a description of the data. Third, we describe our findings with an emphasis on results
obtained through the inductive theory-building process. Fourth, we develop a typology of CIFs
and theorize about how their attributes affect a firm’s innovation output. We conclude by
discussing future research opportunities and the managerial relevance of this study.

4.2 BACKGROUND LITERATURE

4.2.1 VARIATION OF NOVEL IDEAS
Novel ideas emerge from the creativity of individual employees (Amabile, 1996;
Campbell, 1960), especially when their personal traits are conducive to innovation, when work is
challenging, and when supervision is relaxed (Oldham & Cummings, 1996). When internal
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generation of novel ideas (i.e., variation) involves a team effort, the likelihood of generating highquality novel ideas increases in cases where team variation is preceded by individual ideation effort
(Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2010). External idea sourcing further enhances the firm’s chances
of having access to high-quality novel ideas (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009; Chesbrough, 2006; von
Hippel, 1988; von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003).
The existence of multiple business units under one corporate umbrella increases the
complexity of innovation variation due to the compartmentalization of novel ideas within business
units (Tsai, 2001) and across geographies (Gerybadze & Reger, 1999). Innovation crossfertilization among business units (Carlile, 2004; Dougherty, 1992) is difficult to achieve, as novel
ideas are often largely tacit in nature, and their transfer requires prior articulation and codification
(Szulanski, 1996; Zollo & Winter, 2002). The potential of novel ideas for disrupting existing
organizational structures can generate intra-organizational opposition toward novel ideas (Garud,

Tuertscher, and Van de Ven, 2013). As a result, novel ideas can be denied initial organizational
support (Abernathy & Clark, 1985), decreasing the chances of their transformation into innovation
initiatives (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007).

4.2.2 SELECTION OF THE BEST IDEAS
A key feature of a multidivisional firm is a layer of middle managers (Kanter, 1981), which
acts as an interface between corporate managers and bottom-up innovation processes (Burgelman,
1983a, 1983b). This interface is prone to personal (Bower, 1970) and behavioral (Reitzig &
Maciejovsky, 2015) biases, which may hinder the organizational ability to recognize and select the
best novel ideas (Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2010). Middle managers can also disrupt
diffusion of awareness about available novel ideas among business units (Reitzig & Sorenson,
2013), further decreasing chances that the best novel ideas will be selected. Formalization of the
selection process by corporate managers decreases middle managers’ agency to (un)intentionally
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prevent the selection of the best novel ideas (Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007).

4.2.3 RETENTION OF SELECTED IDEAS
The transformation of selected ideas through the proof of concept and prototype stages
(Quinn, 1985; Thomke, 2003) into valuable innovation outcomes requires the commitment of
scarce organizational resources (Bower, 1970; Repenning, 2002). Even when resources are made
available, retention of selected ideas is a complex process marked by several challenges (Klein &
Knight, 2005), including (1) unreliability of technological solutions underpinning the innovation,
(2) need for cognitive effort by users of the innovation, (3) resistance by users of the innovation to
top-down directives, (4) reluctance by more senior users to collaborate with more junior innovation
users, (5) short-term negative effect on firm performance, and (6) stickiness of existing routines.
Intervention by corporate managers has the potential to mitigate some of these retention inhibitors
(Klein & Sorra, 1996).

4.3 METHODS
We deployed an inductive iterative research approach, similar to Basu, Phelps, and Kotha
(2016), in order to generate new theory from multiple cases and the extant literature (Eisenhardt,
1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Yin, 2013). An inductive research
design is well-suited for exploring how and through which mechanisms corporate managers get
involved in innovation processes at the business unit level, given the complexity of the interaction
between corporate and business unit levels (Burgelman, 2011). We draw on conceptual arguments
from the evolutionary view of intra-organizational processes (Burgelman, 1983a) in order to
develop new theory from empirical insights (Eisenhardt, 1989).

4.3.1 DESIGN AND SAMPLE
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4.3.1.1

Design

While the starting point of our inquiry is activity at the corporate level, in order to generate
deeper theoretical insights, we adopted a multi-level design incorporating corporate and business
unit levels in our analysis. The multi-case/multi-level design was employed in other recent
inductive studies concerning related topics such as integrated innovation management (Bernstein
& Singh, 2006) and external innovation sourcing by mature organizations (Basu at al., 2016). We
treated each case individually first, but then went back iteratively to individual cases with the
purpose of identifying common processes across all cases (Yin, 2013), as well as processes linked
to differing rationales for establishing the CIF. Further, we also isolated case-specific processes
throughout the theory development work and drew from them when they offered a new insight.
4.3.1.2

Sampling Approach

We purposely selected cases in which we could observe the process of corporate
involvement in innovation at both corporate and business unit levels of analysis (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). We sought established multidivisional firms with at least three decades of
operational history and three divisions to ensure that our sample firms have distinguishable
corporate and business unit levels, yet retained a high enough degree of across-case comparability.
The sampled companies showed variance in terms of industry, size, age, ownership structure, and
organizational complexity12 (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The heterogeneity of our sample along
these dimensions enabled us to observe the creation and deployment of the CIF in various settings.
This allowed us to draw meaningful comparisons across cases (Yin, 2013).
4.3.2 DATA SOURCES AND TRIANGULATION
Our main primary recorded data source are oral presentations and supporting PowerPoint
materials from ten summits of chief innovation officers organized by the Innovation Enterprise, a

12

We operationalized organizational complexity as the number of divisions under corporate control.
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private UK firm organizing summits on topics of concern to senior executives. These summits
took place between December 2013 and February 2016 in major global cities. Narrators were
senior innovation executives and consultants discussing corporate involvement in innovation. The
average presentation was 30 minutes in length. The supporting PowerPoint slides offered
additional levels of detail, and were also available for the majority of the presentations. Each
summit comprised on average 30 distinct presentations. The heterogeneity in hierarchical levels
among presenters enabled us to obtain diverse perspectives on corporate involvement in innovation
processes across different levels of analysis, as well as contrast internal versus external
perspectives. From the initial sample comprising over 200 distinct firms, we selected 20 firms that
fit our sampling criteria. Our sample did not suffer from impression management issues (Graebner
& Eisenhardt, 2007), as the presenters were not made aware of our specific research project at the
time of delivering their presentations.13 Table 1 provides an overview of our sample firms, with
information on key variables.

From an ethical standpoint, all presenters were made aware by the Innovation Enterprise that the content of their
verbal and written presentations could be used for research purposes.

13
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TABLE 1

Table 1: Corporate Innovation
Data Sample
DataFunction
Sample
Code name
Asteria
Atlas
Crius
Cronus
Dione
Eos
Eurybia
Hyperion
Lelantos
Metis
Oceanus
Ophion
Pallas
Perses
Phoebe
Prometheus
Rhea
Tethys
Thea
Themis

Core industry
Airlines
Asset Management
Asset Management
Insurance
Housewares & Accessories
Textile Apparel, Footwear & Accessories
Auto Manufacturers
Drug manufacturers
Food manufacturing
Department stores
Food manufacturing
Investment brokerage
Biotechnology
Drug manufacturers
Diversified machinery
Retail
Fashion, Glass
Confectioners
Wireless communications
Appliances
Max
Min
Mean
Median

Number of
divisions
7
9
11
7
4
5
15
3
5
3
5
5
4
5
9
6
6
3
4
13

Latest reported
revenues (USD m)
33,832
15,692
1,300
13,900
5,700
1,560
126,839
36,568
18,218
15,744
5,719
37,950
51,914
44,576
83,949
7,942
4,026
7,421
64,535
20,900

Age (Years)
100
230
80
130
100
40
90
300
90
130
60
80
120
40
170
60
120
120
40
100

# of employees
95,000
50,000
5,000
10,000
8,000
3,000
22,600
97,000
23,000
83,000
19,000
56,000
89,000
112,000
348,000
4,300
31,000
15,000
101,000
97,000

15
3
6
5

126,839
1,300
29,914
16,981

300
40
110
100

348,000
3,000
63,445
40,500
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Narrator
Vice President, Innovation
Managing Director, Strategic Growth Initiatives
Senior Vice President, Innovation
Vice President, Global Innovation
SVice President, Chief Innovation Officer
Vice President, Innovation
Head of Innovation
Senior Director of Consumer Health R&D
Vice President, Breakthrough Innovation
Head of Innovation & Quality
Vice President, Global Innovation
Lead, Global Innovation Program
Head of Central R&D Services, Innovation&IP
Director, Innovation
Head of Innovation
Head of Innovation
Director, Open Innovation Networks
Director of Innovation Center of Excellence
Head of Innovation
Director, Strategic Innovation

To triangulate our primary data (Yin, 2013), we collected additional data through the
review of firms’ web sites and annual reports published between 2006 and 2015. The focus of this
triangulation was to create longitudinal stories of the evolution of corporate involvement in
innovation in each firm, which significantly augmented our ability to interpret the narrative data.
4.3.3 DATA CODING AND ANALYSIS
To facilitate theory-building based on our research questions, we developed a protocol for
systematically capturing data relevant for our inquiry along 10 dimensions, including the rationale
for establishing the CIF, CIF attributes, CIF charters/mandates, CIF objectives, CIF relationships
with other corporate functions, the process of establishing the CIF, the process of deploying the
CIF, the nature and degree of CIF involvement in business unit-level innovation processes, CIF
results, and long-term evolution of the CIF. We followed a three-step analytical procedure for
coding and analyzing our data (Miles & Huberman, 1994), which we elaborate on below. In terms
of coding, we initially deployed atlas.ti software to aid the qualitative data analysis. Atlas.ti’s
benefits are its visual and spatial features and its flexibility in developing interlinkages. Further,
we did manual coding in Excel in a matrix form to remain close to the underlying data sources.
The combination of the aggregation power of atlas.ti and the granularity of manual coding in Excel
allowed a more comprehensive development of coherent theoretical ideas (Barry, 1998).
4.3.3.1

Step 1: Within-case Analysis of Processes Related to Corporate Involvement in

Innovation
We first recorded information about the innovation activities as they were described in our
data. Out of these activities, we formed our second-order processes (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). We
distinguished between processes occurring at corporate and business unit levels. We grouped these
processes into more abstract innovation processes constituting our first-order processes. Finally,
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we aggregated first-order processes into three main processes observed in our data related to the
generation of novel ideas, selection among these ideas, and retention of selected ideas. We ended
the single-case review process when we had reached theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss,
1967).
4.3.3.2

Step 2: Assessment of the Rationale for Corporate Involvement in Innovation for

Each Case
When conducting the within-case analysis, we uncovered important differences in
corporate managers’ motives for influencing innovation processes in their respective firms. In
some cases, robust innovation processes were already in place, and the objective of corporate
managers was to evolve organizational capability to innovate to a substantially higher level in
terms of the impact of innovation activities on the firm’s overall performance. The main issues
evoked by managers in these companies included lack of attention to innovation by the most senior
executives, insufficient exploitation of emerging technologies, and innovation activities being
conducted too close to the core activities of the firm. In other cases, the motive was a turnaround,
as the overall innovation process was broken and needed to be fixed. Common problems included
lack of high-quality ideas coming from the ideation programs, strong resistance to innovation
embedded in the formal organizational structure, organizational culture a priori hostile to
innovation activities, and lack of replicability of innovation processes within the firm. In some
intermediate cases, partial fixes were needed to an otherwise solid innovation capability
foundation. Accordingly, we classified organizations into turnaround, evolution, and improvement
cases. We identified seven eight evolution cases, seven turnaround cases, and five improvement
cases, as reported in Tables 2, 3, and 4 respectively.
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Table 2: Corporate Innovation Function Evolution Cases
Code name
Dione

Motivation
Evolution

Trigger for top-down involvement in innovation processes
- The 2009 crisis hit us hard and created the need for
reinvention. We needed to innovate beyond our core
products which began to shrink.

Issues with existing innovation processes
- We had solid innovation foundations (i.e.,
disciplined portfolio management, disciplined stagegate development, multi-disciplined teams,
technology brokerage), which we needed to evolve to
the next level.
- We aimed at increasing innovation value generation
- We recognized the need to move from a Research
potential and speed at which innovation occurs in an
Center to a Global Research & Innovation network
organization having a lot of divisions and operating globally. management.

Dimensions of new innovation processes
- The next level of innovation management incorporates more aggressive innovation goals, wider and deeper
innovation processes, a deeper innovation mindset, integrated structures supporting innovation.

- The growth of our organization has been based on
innovation. Yet continuous growth based on global
possibilities required changes to the current innovation
management system.

- Regional based innovation was marked by several
limitations: it required top skills in every region, it
resulted in making a lot of the same cakes, it tradedoff complexity for growth, it did not necessarily
generate ideas big enough for investment in
breakthroughs.
- We decided to develop a technologies division focusing
- Our innovation management system was focused on
innovation on customer needs, while keeping innovation
exploiting present opportunities and we strived to
consistent with our aim to be a pioneer in all our businesses develop a Corporate Innovation Process capable of
to secure the most competitive edge.
identifying and preparing our organizations for
opportunities which will convert into financial
results a decade or further ahead.
- Innovation has been embedded in CEO's vision since the
- Our organization has a long history of innovations. A
start of the company: "Every new era offers new possibilities continuous challenge has been how to leverage new
for action and development. Development never stands
technologies on both our B2C and B2B businesses.
still. Innovations in one field inevitably lead to innovations
in others. One must remain alert at all times, always ready
to make the very best use of what emerges."

- We established a global R&D function to tackle new opportunities that include big, different and breakthrough
ideas that wouldn't be achieved locally. The main goal was to introduce global innovation processes to remove
duplicity of projects in markets with similar key consumer attitudes and opportunities. The new challenge was to
link and sync throughout the organization the role of innovation, type of innovation and organizational design to
deliver this innovation.

- We decided to embed innovation in the corporate strategy and create a global innovation center of excellence to
consider technology Innovation, generate innovation foresight, consider innovation options beyond Product
portfolio and drive innovation excellence/ capabilities.

Eurybia

Evolution

Oceanus

Evolution

Phoebe

Evolution

Rhea

Evolution

Tethys

Evolution

- Not available

Thea

Evolution

- Not available

Themis

Evolution

- [We asked ourselves] how do we move from “us” making
- We lacked a global innovation governance and
all innovation decisions to an organization that is managing management structure enabling continuous
and delivering innovation goals in a sustainable basis?
innovation.

- The previous innovation system relied on innovation
teams embedded within business units. A different
approach was needed beyond core and beyond
product.
- Key challenge for our innovation system is the ability
to drive transformation globally to respond to
shifting customer expectations.
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- We decided to create a large network which includes: our divisions, suppliers, universities, public and private
center of competency as partners for innovation.

- We set several goals for Corporate Innovation Process (CIP): to ensure a timely identification of disruptive
commercialization challenges, to realize their strong potential business impact, to have astringent and holistic
capital allocation decision, to set-unclear operational ownership and a continuous process, to ensuretop
management attention. In general, CIP will push organic growth in support of organizational growth targets.

- We incorporated more of open innovation mindset into our innovation management systems to identify
disruptive technology innovations. We work closely with Global Foresight to identify and understand current and
future customer needs.

- We designed an innovation management system based on co-creation with continuous executive input and
support: discovery (innovation workshop, innovation forum, executive support), selection (co-creation workshops,
high level feasibility and impact, selection proposal to executive level), executive commitment (co-creation
agreement, steering committee, joint resources & funding, executive sponsorship), design & validation (business
impact validation, joint location & resources, user experience validation, design team, scalability plan, rapid
prototype creation), decision go-big/stop (transition/stop plan, steerco review, executive decision), result (transfer,
redesign, stop).
- We made innovation part of the enterprise business process starting with planning and goal setting and resulting
in innovation pipeline and innovation revenue.

Table 3: Corporate Innovation Function Improvement Cases
Code name
Asteria

Motivation
Improvement

Crius

Improvement

Metis

Improvement

Pallas

Improvement

Perses

Improvement

Trigger for top-down involvement in innovation processes
- We recognized that innovation landscape in our industry
changed through disruptive new business models, rapid
product/service innovations, innovations moving from
corporates to start-ups, open innovation.

Issues with existing innovation processes
- We had difficulty persuading the Board of Directors
about innovations that will not bear immediate fruit.
Further, after a recent merger two distinct innovation
cultures co-existed. Organizational silos hindered
innovation.
- Not available.
- We needed to create a structured approach to
innovation in a conservative organizational
environment.
- We realized that most employees became designers and
- We were a little like civil service: an old and rigid
merchandisers working with very short of timeframes
organization. Our organization was defined by
making the concept of innovation difficult for them to
ideation silos without opportunities to cross-fertilize
embrace. We needed an updated innovation management ideas. Yet during our 100+ year old history we had
system to allow innovation to co-exist with mindsets not
been aiming at achieving balance between
focused on innovation.
operational vs. innovation worlds. All the past
innovation ideas got recorded in company's archive.
- We needed an innovation management system supporting - We did not have a uniform understanding of what
our strategic pillars: delivering value for end users and
innovation represented for the organization. We also
testing efficiency for business customers.
lacked an integrated approach to innovation.

Dimensions of new innovation processes
- We focused on the following drivers of innovation success: innovation strategy and ownnership, innovation
friendly culture, balanced portfolio, internal and external collaboration, innovation execution: process and tools,
innovation competencies, central steering and support.

- Intrapreneurship is hard and we wanted to get better at it
recognizing that current innovation management system is
not enough to deliver our 10 year vision to be the most
innovative provider of our clients' health needs in our
geography.

- We needed to incorporate in our innovation management system new capabilities: lean start-up experience,
innovation process, broader understanding of the healthcare and industry (including start-ups), expertise in
building a health service and monetize it, data driven insights generation focused on customers and consumers,
deal conversion (i.e., licensing, M&A, partnering, financial).

- We had a standard stage-gate innovation process in
place supported by the following capabilities: project
delivery, innovative thinking, medical/scientific
expertise, strong cross-functional understanding of
our organization and opportunity identification.
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- We established two long-term goals: generate meaningful revenue from new businesses and build a stronger
culture of innovation.
- Our updated innovation management system consisted of agreement on what type of innovation is required,
acquisition of capabilities required to achieve desired innovation type, training of employees in innovation
thinking by surely changing the organizational culture, embracement of experimentation and failure increasing
wiliness for risk taking, assembly of diverse innovation teams allowing involved employees to assume distinct
innovation roles, creation of physical environment conducive to innovation.

- We invested in developing a holistic innovation and intellectual management system incorporating innovation
into strategy, organizational structure and culture. The innovation management processes included ideas, IP and
Portfolio management, product and process development, market preparation and launch. System is supported by
program and project management, awards and incentive systems, IT and knowledge management systems and
improvement processes. In the next phase we aim to develop a corporate venturing program.

Table 4: Corporate Innovation Function Turnaround Cases
Code name
Eos

Motivation
Turnaround

Trigger for top-down involvement in innovation processes Issues with existing innovation processes
- CEO wanted an innovation governance system mitigating
-Most people were empowered to say NO to
risks of personal negative outcomes for employees who
innovation across the organization. Further these
engage in innovation.
people were never held accountable for saying NO as
nobody got ever fired for saying NO to a great idea.
- Senior executives decided that “Consumer is at the heart
- Previous innovation system was characterized by
of everything we do”.
Limited to no consumer focus within R&D, Product
design and aesthetics not core to product
development, Link of R&D to commercial not
embedded and established, Technology pipeline not
necessarily linked to commercial ambition, No clear
pathway/process for product development, No
sensory/consumer science for product evaluation and
claims support
- After going public we realized that we needed to conduct - Our large organization got in the way of innovation
an innovation turnaround to drive innovation in our large resulting in inconsistent innovation processes, which
established multidivisional company.
were difficult to replicate and which did not lead to
sustained success.

Hyperion

Turnaround

Lelantos

Turnaround

Ophion

Turnaround

- Innovation was scattered throughout the organization,
made through passion without a coherent framework.

- We needed a global framework as nobody knew
what other people were doing. There was
disconnection among innovation activities and
duplication of ideas.

Prometheus

Turnaround

- Our innovation model generated a lot of bad ideas lacking
strategic alignment.

Atlas

Turnaround

- Not available.

Cronus

Turnaround

- We analyzed the database of 3000 ideas from 1000
employees on two dimensions: contributions per person
and quality of submitted ideas. We found that few people
submitted a lot of low quality ideas while a lot of people
submitted few but high quality ideas.

- We implemented management idea system which
again generated a lot of bad ideas, with the
responsibility to select among them a few good ones
delegated to business units, which again did not
work. It was discontinued after 1.5 years.
- Our conservative, process driven and siloed
organizational environment hindered innovation.
- Our top-down dictated innovation hyperactivity is
best described as "innovation carnival". We found
that innovation carnival leads to the generation of
very few good ideas whose implementation is further
hindered by rigid innovation processes resulting in
episodic innovation outcomes.
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Dimensions of new innovation processes
- Our main objective was to install an innovation governance system headed by a senior executive reporting to the
CEO and empowered to push through the organization good ideas, with an independent budget, freedom to fail and
mandate to source ideas externally.
- We aimed at adding a function to Consumer Health R&D that ensures consumer focused R&D efforts delivering
superior products that not only are science based but consumers also love to use them. A more concrete goal was to
develop a consumer focused innovation pipeline (5-10 years) by setting a stretching goal and a working hypothesis
that will provide a
distinctive, life-improving experience; identifying the target consumer’s ideal experience; defining the ideal
product, package or device benefits

- We first used workarounds using new venture team, breakthrough team, SWAT team, CEO-sponsored team and
front end teams. Main issue with these approaches was difficulty to establish a repeatable innovation capability. We
approached this issue by establishing a common "What" is innovation for our organization and "How" are we going
to achieve it. Our ultimate goal was to develop innovation capability that was repeatable across the organization,
led to consistency in introducing new products and resulted in high level financial performance.
- The new innovation management system mostly provided structure around the innovation activities: it got senior
managers involved in innovation, recognized that individuals contribute to the innovation process differently and
took that into account when assigning innovation roles, created a safe environment for experimentation by
changing the organizational culture, broke down organizational silos by providing a common innovation platform
- We introduced Corporate innovation Function responsible for supporting and accelerating the innovation process
at the business unit level by providing the right methods, tools and conditions so that everybody can innovate. This
new approach to innovation management is focused on creative problem solving with a more top-down approach.

- We needed to break internal barriers to innovation to start generating meaningful innovation revenue without
disrupting organizational DNA.
- We strived to change from centralized innovation management to the creation of decentralized business-unit level
innovation ecosystem which is always on and allows for exploration of ideas which would never get attention under
the top-down system you test them and possibly implement them.

To increase the confidence level in our case classification, we also coded data on triggers
for corporate involvement in innovation processes and included them in Table 2. We expected
triggers for the evolution cases to be more abstract and forward-looking compared to the
turnaround cases. For the eight evolution cases, six had triggers that concerned either the need to
extract more value from innovation or to incorporate into the innovation processes a capability to
identify and prepare ground for exploiting new opportunities. For two evolution cases, data on
triggers were not available. In contrast, seven out of eight turnaround cases had concrete triggers
concerning the need to refocus innovation activities on existing customer needs or to fix
fundamental issues with existing innovation processes.
4.3.3.3

Step 3: Cross-case Analysis Employing a Case-ordered Predictor-outcome Matrix

The final stage of our analysis was the creation of a case-ordered matrix (Miles &
Huberman, 1994; Table 5) to uncover processes specific to either the turnaround or evolution
rationale for establishing the CIF. We termed these as turnaround-specific processes or evolutionspecific processes.14 Further, the cross-case analysis allowed us to identify common processes
deployed in almost all firms, as well as contingent processes, manifested in some firms without a
clear distributional pattern across the sample, based on the rationale for establishing the CIF.

In Table 3 we also include improvement cases. We focused our analysis on evolution and turnaround cases given
that we identified only a lower number of improvement cases.

14
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TABLE 3
Table 5: Case-ordered Matrix Case-ordered
of Variation,
Selection,
Retention
Corporate
and Business Unit Level Processes
Matrix of Variation,
Selection andand
Retention
of Corporate andof
Business
Unit Level Processes

*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*

*

*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*

*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*

*
*

*
*
*

*

*
*
*

*

*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

*

*

*

*
*

*
*

119

*
*
*

*
*
*

*

*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*

*
*
*

*

*
*

*
*

*

*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*

*

*
*
*

*

*

*
*
*

Flexibilization of innovation
implementation resources

*

*

Recognition of innovation
performance

*

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Evaluation of innovation
performance

*
*

Inter-temporalization of
innovation implementation

*
*

Focus on innovation
sustainability

*

Mitigation of strategic
context influence

Dynamization of corporate
context

Verticalization of corporate
context

Increase in ideation
productivity

Channeling of risk taking

Decentralization of risk
taking

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

III. Retention processes
Corporate processes
Business unit processes
Centralization of innovation
responsibility

*
*
*
*
*

*

II. Selection processes
Corporate processes
Business unit processes

Creation of strategic
context alternatives

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

*

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*

Increase in ideation horizon

Increase in ideation diversity

Inclusion of innovation into
corporate strategy

Code name
Evolution
Dione
Eurybia
Oceanus
Phoebe
Rhea
Tethys
Thea
Themis
Improvement
Asteria
Crius
Metis
Pallas
Perses
Turnaround
Atlas
Cronus
Eos
Hyperion
Lelantos
Ophion
Prometheus

Uniformization of
innovation definition

I. Variation processes
Corporate processes
Business unit processes

*
*
*

*

*

*
*
*
*

*
*

*
*

*

*

*

*
*

*

*

*
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

4.4 FINDINGS
The main goal of our analysis was to uncover processes employed by corporate managers
to influence how innovation is done within multidivisional firms. Building on the evolutionary
view of intra-organizational innovation processes (Burgelman 1983a), we first mapped processes
we found on to the variation, selection, and retention (VSR) framework (see Figure 1). We paid
particular attention to distributing processes across the three levels of analysis (i.e., corporate
managers, middle managers, inventors) and process types (i.e., turnaround-specific, evolutionspecific, common, contingent processes). Subsequently, we discussed interdependencies within
and across the main processes of variation, selection, and retention.
FIGURE 1

Figure 1: TheThe
Corporate
Innovation
Function
Corporate Innovation
Function

Corporate processes
Second-order processes
First-order processes
1. Uniformization
of innovation
definition

Clarifying meaning of innovation
Updating organizational culture
Categorizing innovation as a key
growth enabler
Setting corporate level innovation
goals
Supporting beyond core / product
innovation

2. Elevation of
innovation into
corporate strategy

Promoting open innovation
Creating innovation venture teams
Forming alliances with start-ups
Scouting for ideas in unrelated
industries

3. Increase in
ideation diversity

Supporting exploration of far away
innovation landscapes
Opening of experimental ideation labs

4. Increase in
ideation horizon

Involving senior executives in early
stages of idea evaluation
Simplifying selection rules

5. Verticalization
of corporate
context

Evolving corporate context based on
changes in the opportunity landscape
Pitching ideas sponsored by corporate
level to business units
Designating a senior innovation
executive
Establishing corporate innovation team
Monitoring innovation pipeline mix
Co-committing corporate resources
alongside business unit resources

Evolutionspecific
process

10.
Decentralization
of risk taking

Supporting autonomous innovation
Offering explorative / mixed career
Paths
Providing physical experimentation
spaces

11. Channeling of
risk taking

Identifying high potential innovation
contributors

12. Increase in
ideation
productivity

Training employees in innovation
methods
Fostering rapid experimentation
Facilitating innovation across
organizational silos
Embracing failure

13. Mitigation of
strategic context
agency

Empowering of business unit level
innovation teams
Supporting lower level selection
processes

6. Dynamization
of corporate
context

14. Creation of
alternatives to
strategic context

Setting up social platforms for idea
diffusion and development
Creating informal innovation networks

7. Centralization
of innovation
responsibility

15. Evaluation of
innovation
performance

Setting up innovation KPIs
Setting up innovation dashboards

8. Focus on
innovation
sustainability

II. Selection

III. Retention

Corporate
innovation
capability

Top-down processes
Contingent
process

Business unit processes
First-order processes
Second-order processes

I. Variation

9. Intertemporalization of
innovation
implementation

Iterating ideas which need to be
developed further
Archiving non-implementable ideas

Universal
process

Main innovation processes

Turnaroundspecific
process
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16. Recognition of
innovation
performance

Celebrating innovation performance

17. Flexibilization
of innovation
implementation
resources

Providing discretionary implementation
resources

Bottom-up processes

4.4.1 VARIATION PROCESSES
4.4.1.1

Corporate-level Variation Processes

At the corporate level, we observed one common, one contingent, and two evolutionspecific processes related to variation. The common variation process is the increase in variation
diversity (3). Firms across the sample used open innovation (Chesbrough, 2006), consisting of
sourcing ideas directly from external providers, such as universities, other firms, or individual
inventors. Further firms invested into or partnered with start-ups with the objective to get access
to latest technologies (Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2006). Firms also actively scouted for ideas in
unrelated industries. Several firms established offices in Silicon Valley with the mandate to
discover and assess the exploitability of the latest technological innovations. Firms routinely
established a web interface through which outsiders could submit their innovation ideas. Firms
also frequently organized ideation campaigns among outside stakeholders (e.g., customers). The
senior director of consumer franchise innovation at Hyperion commented:
Open innovation is critical to fuel the short and long-term [innovation] pipeline. We use a
defined system within Hyperion asking for submissions to fuel our innovation pipeline. We
also actively work with other companies for product development, ingredient selection etc.
The contingent variation process is the uniformization of innovation definition (1). The
decision by corporate managers to play a more active role in the management of innovation
processes triggered a search for a firm-specific meaning of innovation. In several firms, this
process took the form of a company-wide consultation across hierarchical levels. The head of
central R&D services, innovation, and intellectual property at Pallas stated:
We asked lifecycle / worldwide committee in all the regions what is innovation for you. Name
the products launched in the last 10 years you consider as innovative. [Based on this
consultation] we derived innovation attributes: inspirational, game changing and money
making. This definition of innovation has been communicated over and over throughout the
company to make clear what innovation means. If employees have ideas fitting these criteria,
they are encouraged to share them.
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The uniformization of innovation definition also involves the promotion of aspects of the
existing organizational culture compatible with the clarified meaning of innovation. Making
significant changes to the organizational culture was considered counterproductive. In that sense,
the uniformization of innovation definition follows the extant organizational culture and not viceversa. The vice president of innovation at Asteria remarked:
Do not work against the company culture unless [your] company needs radical restructuring.
Work with the culture and [its] good elements.

The first evolution-specific process is the elevation of innovation into corporate strategy
(2). Across all evolution cases, innovation became a key element of corporate strategy. Corporate
managers formulated mid- to long-term goals linked specifically to innovation activities, outlined
strategy for achieving these goals, and defined metrics allowing them to track progress toward
achieving innovation goals. The innovation goals were clearly separated from goals associated
with existing businesses. The director of the Innovation Center of Excellence at Tethys
commented:
We made innovation part of corporate strategy to drive industry-leading growth, along growth
coming from expansion of our geographical footprint in focus areas and creation and expansion
of a consumer-centric portfolio across key geographies to drive best-in-class shareholder
return.
In contrast, executives in turnaround cases were mostly focused on getting extant
innovation processes corrected and updated, as opposed to considering innovation as a significant
growth engine at the same level of importance as growth from existing businesses. This dichotomy
points to a differential in the level of innovation ambition between evolution and turnaround firms.
Corporate managers in former firms established aggressive top-down innovation goals and were
subsequently changing their innovation processes to achieve these goals. Corporate managers in
the latter firms were concerned with ensuring that some level of innovation activity would occur
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in their organizations, which focused corporate managers’ attention to eliminating structural
obstacles to innovation.
The second evolution-specific process we observed is the increase in variation horizon (4).
It involves corporate support for the exploration of consumer trends and technologies whose
potential financial contributions will not materialize in the near future. This process enables firms
to reduce managerial myopism limiting opportunity searches to cognitively close landscapes
(Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000) and to develop beyond-the-horizon (i.e., future-oriented) absorptive
capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The head of innovation at Phoebe commented:
We focus on trendsetting technology portfolios per business to achieve leading position. We
aim to increase patents in trendsetting technologies through effective R&D spending. We do
so by fully leveraging our capabilities and assets to tap further potential.
4.4.1.2

Business unit-level Variation Processes

One common business unit-level variation process is the decentralization of risk-taking
(10), aimed at pushing risk-taking behavior into areas outside of traditional loci of innovation
activities, such as specialized R&D centers. Corporate managers encouraged autonomous bottomup innovation, provided physical experimentation spaces, and made it possible for individual
innovators to alternate between exploitative and explorative careers. In Eurybia’s innovation
documents, this process was described succinctly:
[The objective of the CIF is to] spread the culture of Innovation throughout all Eurybia Group
disciplines.
The second common business unit-level process is the increase in variation productivity
(12), focused on increasing the odds that variation activities result in higher-quality ideas. Secondorder processes included training programs improving individual innovators’ variation skills, rapid
experimentation allowing efficient testing of early-stage ideas, facilitation of horizontal
collaboration, and destigmatization of failure. Not all of these second-order processes were easy
to implement, as noted by the executive responsible for driving innovation globally at Ophion:
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Failure is an issue for everybody. If you fail, you may feel that you will get penalized.
[Organizational] culture must change to turn failure into an opportunity to learn. It is tough to
do in a regulated environment.
The contingent business unit-level variation process is related to the channeling of risk-taking (11).
It consists of the identification of individual innovators deemed as possessing the ability to
generate high quality ideas and of the solicitation of variation contributions from these individuals.
The contingency nature of this process hinged on the ability of the organization to recognize high
quality variation contributors. The vice president of global innovation at Cronus commented:
We ran innovation generation events and analyzed the database of 3000 ideas from 1000
employees on two dimensions including: contributions per person and quality of submitted
ideas. We noticed that few people submitted a lot of low quality idea and a lot of people
submitted few, but high quality ideas. We used social tools to get more ideas from these low
frequency contributors.
4.4.2 SELECTION PROCESSES
4.4.2.1

Corporate-level Selection Processes

The only common corporate-level selection process is the verticalization of corporate
context (5). This refers to corporate managers proactively influencing selection processes at lower
hierarchical levels. The involvement of corporate managers started in the early stages of the
development of novel ideas by individual inventors, as corporate managers directly participated in
ideation events. Further, corporate managers got involved in the selection of bottom-up ideas.
Corporate managers also simplified and added transparency to idea selection criteria and rules. For
instance, Thea’s innovation document describes a co-creation innovation methodology in which
the idea discovery phase directly involved corporate managers, who also actively participated in
the idea selection phase.
The evolution-specific corporate-level selection process is the dynamization of corporate
context (6). It involves continuous updating of assumptions underpinning the corporate context,
making it receptive to changes in the opportunity landscape. Another aspect of a more dynamic
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corporate context is that corporate managers actively pitch novel ideas that they considered as
promising to business units. The prominence of dynamization of the corporate context among
evolution cases is a key distinction vis-à-vis the original Bower-Burgelman model (Bower, 1970;
Burgelman 1983a, 1983b), in which the corporate context was assumed to be static in nature (Noda
& Bower, 1996). The following quote by the vice president of global innovation at Oceanus
illustrates the dynamic nature of corporate context among the evolution cases:
Tackling of new opportunities that include Big, Different and Breakthrough [projects], that
wouldn’t be achieved locally, requires knowing when it is time to change models again.
4.4.2.2

Business unit-level Selection Processes

We identified one common and one turnaround-specific process at the business unit level.
Both of these processes are aimed at lowering or eliminating the influence of the negative biases
of middle managers towards novel ideas. The common process is the creation of alternatives to
strategic context (14), which consisted of bypassing middle managers and connecting promising
ideas directly with resources located at the corporate level. To create these channel alternatives to
the strategic context, firms established social platforms for idea sharing and diffusion, and created
informal innovation networks. The vice president of innovation at Asteria stated:
There used to be just one person selecting ideas and a lot of good ideas got lost. Now we use
Ishare platform to connect idea generators with experts / other innovators. We also built
internal “innovators network”, as well as innovation networks for specific initiatives.
The turnaround-specific process, the mitigation of strategic context influence (13), aims at
lowering middle managers’ agency to dismiss novel ideas for reasons other than their potential to
create value. Corporate managers empowered innovation teams in evaluating novel ideas and deemphasized the role of formal hierarchy in the innovation activities. In doing so, corporate
managers increased the selection influence of actual inventors and their collaborators with close
knowledge of the novel idea, and decreased bureaucratic selection power arising from the
hierarchical position of the evaluator. In addition, corporate managers supported the selection
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processes at the inventor level, which lowered the hierarchical level at which the first selection of
ideas took place. It also increased the resilience of pre-screened novel ideas when they faced
scrutiny from middle managers (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007). The vice president of global
innovation at Cronus described their approach as follows:
We decentralized the innovation activity, [started to] use a light-touch management approach,
integrated innovation activity into business units and leveraged pair-wise scoring consisting of
comparing two randomly selected ideas.
The locus of this turnaround-specific selection process at the business unit level underlines
the embedded difficulty in making business unit-level organizational structures penetrable for
novel ideas. Resistance to innovation that turnaround firms had to overcome to ensure vertical
flows of novel ideas stemmed from both employees directly opposed to innovation activities and
employees suffering from innovation self-denial. The head of global innovation at Ophion noted:
[In the case of] aggressive resistors [to innovation], the challenge is how to manage them.
People may [also] resist when they think they have been innovating for years.
4.4.3 RETENTION PROCESSES
4.4.3.1

Corporate-level Retention Processes

The common process at the corporate level, the focus on innovation sustainability (8),
consists of sustaining the retention of selected ideas when their implementation runs into
unexpected challenges. This top-down involvement was especially impactful when the utility of
ideas transcended across multiple business units. The retention of such ideas might not have been
optimal from the perspective of middle managers running the individual business units, as it drew
on business unit-specific resources without offering short-term return potential at the business unit
level. Yet, corporate managers might still pursue the implementation of hard-to-implement
selected ideas, seeking long-term returns. To that effect, corporate managers established corporate
innovation teams with the agency to intervene across business units and report to corporate
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managers as opposed to middle managers. Further, corporate managers co-committed resources
alongside business units’ resources. Corporate managers also actively managed the innovation
pipeline mix to continuously include easy-to-execute projects, as well as more complex innovation
projects. Corporate managers’ ultimate goal was to routinize the retention of selected bottom-up
innovation activities originating at the business unit level so that implementation challenges would
not stop the selected novel ideas from being retained. The focus on innovation sustainability (8)
required an ongoing effort and attention from corporate managers. The director of strategic
innovation at Themis commented:
We have a [innovation] strategy, how do we move from “us” making all innovation decisions
to an organization that is managing and delivering innovation goals in a sustainable basis?
The first contingent corporate level retention process is the centralization of innovation
responsibility (7), manifested by the designation of a senior-level executive with the responsibility
for the retention of the innovation strategy. While the main responsibility of the innovation
executive was to transform innovation goals into measurable results, concrete agendas varied
depending on specific innovation objectives. A common denominator in the narratives was the
initially undefined nature of this position. Instead, innovation executives were defining their exact
roles and priorities through an iterative sense-making process that involved the perceptions of the
different internal stakeholders. The managing director of strategic growth initiatives at Atlas
described the evolving nature of his role as follows:
I was given the task to manage innovation top down, with no direction how to do it… I talked
to business unit managers and asked “what do you think, are we innovative?” [It made
managers’] head spinning, all heard of Google’s 20% of time working on whatever they like…
[But that would not work] not at Atlas. [I knew I] will not get it right the first time; it will be
an iterative process; [moreover] the [corporate] innovation program will have to survive the
strong culture.
The other contingent corporate retention process is the inter-temporalization of innovation
implementation (9). This process involves providing longer-term support to the retention of those
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ideas that needed to be developed further. Given that corporate managers can spread their bets on
more innovation projects than business unit managers can, corporate managers are less constrained
in how long they can support a high-potential idea whose retention progress is being slowed down
by innovation process-related obstacles (e.g., Klein & Knight, 2005). Further, corporate managers
can set up and maintain long-term organizational innovation memory by preserving blueprints for
ideas that prove to be unsuitable for implementation in the current temporal period. The intertemporalization of innovation implementation is contingent on corporate managers’ objectives
being focused on long-term results, as opposed to seeking maximization of short-term profits.
Another contingency is the provision of a discretionary innovation budget at the corporate level.
4.4.3.2

Business unit-level Retention Processes

All retention processes at the business unit level were classified as contingent. The process
of evaluation of innovation performance (15) results in the ability of the organization to measure
both innovation activity and outcomes. It involves the establishment of key innovation
performance indicators used to measure individual level innovation activity and the setting up of
an innovation dashboard to follow innovation progress on a more aggregated level. The
contingency nature of this process is linked to the difficulty in modifying existing metrics used to
assess performance of both middle managers and individual innovators. The managing director of
strategic growth initiatives at Atlas remarked:
[We] established financial target for each business unit linked to innovation, [managers] hated
that, but it focused the business units on generating innovation, and measured progress against
the innovation targets.
Recognition of innovation performance (16) institutes mechanisms for celebrating
innovation achievements, such as public commendations, opportunity to work on projects of
intrinsic interest to employees, or personal recognition and advice from senior executives.
However, this process is more complex than it might appear, since celebration of both innovation
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successes and failures is required. Rewarding failure was non-trivial, particularly in firms
operating in highly regulated environments (e.g., finance, aviation). In these type of environments,
which require high levels of operating reliability, failure was viewed as undesirable. One
contingency in this process was the willingness by senior managers to back their non-tangible
recognition of individual-level innovation efforts with tangible rewards. Previous literature
uncovered that non-tangible rewards and intrinsic motivation were the main motivating factors for
employees’ decision to engage in creative variation (Zhang & Bartol, 2010). Yet, we found that
maintaining employee motivation beyond the initial variation phase required increasing use of
extrinsic motivators. The managing director of strategic growth initiatives at Atlas stated:
[We] increased cash awards to implement innovation, [in addition] to rewarding innovation at
town hall [meetings]. [When an employee got commended for a novel idea], all the other
employees [claimed to have] had the same idea. [Only] once money gets involved, people
execute.
The process of flexibilization of innovation implementation resources (17) consists of
making retention resources available on a discretionary basis (Noda & Bower, 1996). This is
important since the implementation of innovation initiatives often runs into unexpected obstacles
(Klein & Sorra, 1996). Flexibilization of innovation implementation resources was contingent on
the amount of resource slack within the organization (Penrose, 1959), lowering the negative effect
on short-term performance of allocating resources to bottom-up innovation. Flexibilized resources
took both tangible and intangible form, as reflected by a comment from the senior vice president
at Crius:
What we [the CIF] offer: time, funding, feedback and idea refinement, a firm wide hub for
innovative ideas, people and projects.
4.4.4 INTERDEPENDENCIES WITHIN VARIATION, SELECTION, AND RETENTION PROCESSES
Above, we outlined the strongest links between first-order processes and variation,
selection, and retention processes (i.e., main processes). Below, we discuss secondary links
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comprising both vertical and horizontal interdependencies within and across the main processes.
4.4.4.1

Vertical and Horizontal Interdependencies in Variation.

We observed several vertical and horizontal interdependencies in the corporate
involvement in the variation process. One salient vertical interdependency involved the search for
the meaning of innovation. Corporate managers involved in the uniformization of innovation
definition (1) sought opinions across the hierarchical levels. In the case of Lelantos, consultations
about the meaning of innovation took place at regional, divisional, and team levels. Increases in
variation diversity (3) required regular interactions between corporate managers and middle
managers. For instance, at Atlas, investment professionals responsible for making venture capital
investments held consultations with business unit heads to get their inputs. Yet, it was an indirect
bottom-up influence since specific resource allocations remained firmly a corporate-run process.
In contrast, in the case of Perses, corporate managers formed direct intra-organizational
partnerships to drive variation diversity. In addition, we observed that the explicit inclusion of
innovation into corporate strategy triggered the need for business managers to incorporate in their
market strategies plans to generate growth from innovation, as the overall growth targets were
unachievable from exploiting existing activities only.
Horizontally, on the corporate level, the uniformization of innovation definition (1)
facilitated the inclusion of innovation into corporate strategy, as the organizational meaning of
innovation was clarified which facilitated its codification (Zollo, 1998). In addition, the increase
in ideation diversity (3) supported the increase in variation horizon (4), as corporate managers
gained awareness and knowledge about more distant trends and technologies. On the inventor
level, we observed that channeling of risk-taking reinforced the positive effect of the
decentralization of risk-taking on the increase in variation productivity. Without directing the
variation incentives to employees with high potential to innovate, the variation process tended to
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produce low-value ideas only.
4.4.4.2

Vertical and Horizontal Interdependencies in Selection

The main vertical interaction we observed within the selection process was between
corporate managers and individual innovators, more so than between corporate and middle
managers. Corporate managers assumed that increasing middle managers’ openness to
autonomous innovation is possible, but it will be a lengthy and complex process, as it involves
modification of elements of organizational culture. Instead, corporate managers focused their
efforts on directly empowering individual innovators. For instance, in the case of Eos, corporate
managers reduced the chances of negative consequences for individual innovators. Further, they
increased the cost in terms of performance evaluation for middle managers to block autonomous
innovation initiatives.
Horizontally, on the corporate selection level, the verticalization of the corporate context
(5) and resulting greater direct knowledge of bottom-up innovation initiatives allowed corporate
managers to enhance their capabilities to modify assumptions guiding their interventions into
innovation processes. At the business unit selection level, the mitigation of strategic context
agency (13) made it easier for individual inventors to bypass middle managers in their search for
resources and corporate-level endorsement of their innovation activities.
4.4.4.3

Vertical and Horizontal Interdependencies in Retention.

The first vertical interdependency in retention is between the centralization of innovation
responsibility (7) and the evaluation of innovation performance (15). Corporate managers, often
with the help of outside consultants, inserted measurable metrics used to evaluate the innovation
performance of middle managers. Innovation performance metrics were often contested by middle
managers, as innovation metrics conflicted with middle managers’ main focus of delivering
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exploitative results. The second vertical interdependency is between the focus on innovation
sustainability (8) and the flexibilization of innovation implementation resources (17). The
discretionary innovation budget controlled by corporate managers was not only used to support
corporate-level innovation processes, but was also deployed to provide ad hoc resources for
retention of selected innovation initiatives at the business unit level.
Horizontally, on the corporate retention level, centralization of the innovation
responsibility supported several of the second-order processes aimed at making innovation
sustainable. This was particularly the case for the establishment and resourcing of corporate
innovation teams and the acquisition of discretionary innovation budgets. On the business unit
level, the ability to evaluate innovation performance allowed for its recognition. The evaluation of
innovation performance also facilitated more efficient flexibilization of innovation
implementation resources.

4.4.5 INTERDEPENDENCIES ACROSS MAIN PROCESSES
Interdependencies across main processes were associated with the informational outputs
generated by first- and second-order sub-processes. In the case of variation (I) and retention (III)
processes, focus on innovation sustainability (8) influenced corporate efforts toward increasing
variation diversity (3), as corporate managers monitored the numbers and types of projects in the
innovation pipeline (i.e., innovation pipeline’s characteristics). Corporate managers proactively
addressed discrepancies between innovation pipeline characteristics and the corporate innovation
strategy (2) by influencing the variation diversity (3). Further, we observed that the ability of
corporate managers to evaluate (15) and recognize (16) innovation performance hinged on the
level of concreteness of the innovation definition (1). The innovation definitional fuzziness
decreased the ability of corporate managers to drive innovation retention.
In the case of the main selection (II) and main retention (III) processes, inter132

temporalization of innovation implementation (9), together with flexibilization of innovation
implementation resources (17), allowed for the iterative selection of ideas. The benefit of this was
that, instead of terminating ideas whose implementation ran into issues in the retention phase, ideas
were submitted for re-selection to assess their potential for further resource commitment.

4.5 TYPOLOGY OF CORPORATE INVOLVEMENT IN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT
Prior to discussing theoretical implications of our findings, we synthesize the level and
nature of involvement of corporate managers in innovation management (i.e., the CIF
configuration) by defining the collaborative, parallel-capability, and sponsorship CIF models.
These three CIF models were the dominant types emerging from observations across our cases.
For each CIF model, we explain the respective variation, selection, and retention mechanisms. We
conclude our typology discussion by positioning each CIF model on the innovation efficiency
frontier, defined as the efficient trade-off between type I and II innovation errors.

4.5.1 THE COLLABORATIVE CIF MODEL
In the collaborative CIF model, corporate managers proactively influence existing
innovation processes across the organization without developing a standalone corporate-level
innovation capability independent from innovation processes occurring within the business units.
Corporate managers act as facilitators focused on removing hindrances to innovation and
improving existing processes.
In the Collaborative CIF model, corporate managers seek to enrich the variation process
by matching previously underutilized external and internal variation with opportunities in the same
or other business units. To introduce external ideas, corporate managers create an organizational
climate conducive to what Chesbrough (2006) described as an open innovation environment. Main
mechanisms involve investments in external ventures (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005), the formation
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of alliances with start-ups (Rothaermel, 2001), and scouting for ideas in unrelated industries
(Hansen & Birkinshaw, 2007). Internally, corporate managers focus on empowering high-potential
innovators who might be reluctant to engage in the innovation process without receiving corporate
support. Main mechanisms involve encouragement of autonomous innovation through internal
venturing (Burgelman, 1983a), provision of safe experimental spaces (Dombrowski et al., 2007),
and removing hindrances to switching between exploitative and explorative career paths (Cohen,
McClure, and Yu, 2007). Further, corporate managers strive for variation efficiency through
training in ideation at the individual employee level (Roffe, 1999), support for rapid
experimentation (Thomke, 2003), and the creation of an organizational climate tolerant to failures
stemming from innovation pursuits (McKee, 1992).
In the collaborative CIF model, corporate managers lessen the influence of middle
managers in the selection process in three ways. First, corporate managers get directly involved in
early stages of the novel-ideas evaluation process before novel ideas face the scrutiny of middle
managers. This verticalization of corporate context enables corporate managers to detect novel
ideas that fit the corporate context and eliminate low-value ideas early on. The pre-selected ideas
are given resources for their development into more defensible innovation initiatives (Knudsen &
Levinthal, 2007). Second, corporate managers sponsor the development of social innovation
platforms and the formation of informal networks composed of middle managers and subject
matter experts supporting individual innovators (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). These two networking
mechanisms provide ways for individual innovators to present their novel ideas, get early feedback
on the merit of their novel ideas, and access resources for their further development. Third,
corporate managers seek to introduce selection mechanisms operating below the middle manager
level (e.g., pairwise scoring - comparison of relative merit of two randomly selected ideas).
In the collaborative CIF model, the retention of selected novel ideas remains at the level of
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business units, with corporate managers providing additional implementation resources in cases
when unforeseen implementation hurdles arise. Further, corporate managers fulfill two longerterm retention roles. First, corporate managers focus on innovation sustainability by proactively
monitoring the innovation pipeline in terms of the numbers, stages, and types of innovation
initiatives. Corporate managers proactively address deviances between the current state of the
innovation pipeline and the intent of the corporate context. Second, corporate managers act as a
memory for selected innovation initiatives that turn out to be non-implementable in the near future
by safeguarding their codified blueprints (Zollo, 1998) for potential future reactivation.

4.5.2 THE PARALLEL-CAPABILITY CIF MODEL
In the parallel-capability CIF model, corporate managers develop a completely separate
innovation capability from the innovation capability residing at the business unit level. As the
business unit level innovation capability follows the Bower-Burgelman model described above, in
the following sections we focus our discussion on variation, selection and retention processes
occurring at the corporate level.
Variation process at the corporate level is focused at the development of forward-looking
innovation sensory capability, orienting the firm’s absorptive capacity toward future opportunities
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This forward-looking sensory capability is gained through the
establishment of innovation teams responsible for identifying, understanding, and codifying
(Zollo, 1998) technologies developed within innovation clusters. A number of the sampled firms
established a presence in Silicon Valley, even though their core business was unrelated to Silicon
Valley’s technological landscape. Another mechanism for exploring distant opportunity
landscapes was the establishment of ideation labs, which allowed for experimentation with
radically new ideas through, for instance, creation of concept products potentially relevant to
customers only in a distant future.
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Marginson and McAulay (2008) argued that corporate managers are more inclined to shorttermism (i.e., preference for projects with more certain outcomes) than middle managers due to
capital market pressures. Yet they failed to find empirical support for their prediction suggesting
the need for further research on the relationship between risk-taking behavior and hierarchy. In
our observations related to the corporate selection process in the parallel-capability CIF model,
corporate managers pro-actively sought to allow high-value/high-risk innovation projects to get
selected. A key mechanism at the corporate level allowing for the selection of high-value/highrisk innovation projects was the dynamization of corporate context. Corporate managers proactively sought to understand distant opportunity landscapes, which allowed them to better assess
the risks associated with identified innovation opportunities and make an informed selection
decision. Thus, in contrast to the prediction made by Marginson and McAulay (2008), in the
parallel-capability CIF model corporate managers seek to select radical, as opposed to incremental,
innovation initiatives for retention.
Retention in the parallel-capability CIF model occurs at the corporate level until the desired
outcome is reached. Discretionary corporate innovation resources facilitate the overcoming of
unexpected retention hurdles. Once the desired outcome is obtained, corporate managers make a
top-down decision about which business units are given the responsibility for exploiting the
retained innovation initiative.

4.5.3 THE SPONSORSHIP CIF MODEL
In the sponsorship CIF model, corporate managers develop an incomplete innovation
capability for driving their own innovation agenda through variation and selection, yet remain
dependent on business units for the retention of innovation initiatives generated at the corporate
level. Parallel variation and selection capabilities coexist at both corporate and business unit levels,
while the retention capability exists uniquely within the business unit realm. Thus, corporate
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managers need to pitch their selected initiatives to business units for sponsorship and retention
through implementation.

4.5.4 THE INNOVATION EFFICIENCY FRONTIER
A critical question that remains is whether a firm, at the same time, can minimize both type
I and II innovation errors. Figure 2 synthesizes our arguments of how different configurations of
the CIF affect firm-level innovation performance, expressed as the incidence of type I and II
innovation errors. The collaborative CIF model is effective in aligning business unit innovation
effort with the corporate context, thus reducing type I innovation errors. In the collaborative CIF
model, the cognitive effort by corporate managers is directed at aligning business unit-level
innovation activities with the imperatives of the corporate context, which is backward-looking and
constrained by the limits of managerial cognition (Cyert & March, 1963). Thus, paradoxically, the
incidence of type II innovation errors is high given that autonomous innovation initiatives
deviating from the corporate context have fewer opportunities to develop into defensible projects
(Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007).
In contrast, in the parallel-capability CIF model, corporate managers proactively encourage
innovations deviant from the imperatives of current corporate context, which reduces the incidence
of type II innovation errors. In effect, corporate managers act as a buffer between high-potential
and high-risk innovation initiatives and the business unit-level selection pressures. Yet, as
corporate managers devote less attention to innovation initiatives at the business unit level, the
incidence of type I innovation error increases, as the selection decisions by middle managers face
less scrutiny from corporate managers.
In the sponsorship CIF, the incidence of type I innovation errors is even higher than in the
parallel-capability CIF model, as corporate managers are dependent on middle managers’
acceptance of top-down innovation initiatives. We expect this dependency to create leniency by
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corporate managers toward low-risk and low-return innovation selection choices made by middle
managers. On the contrary, we expect the incidence of type II innovation errors to be the lowest
among the three CIF models, as corporate managers do not lose connection to the autonomous
bottom-up high-risk/high-value innovation initiatives as is the case in the parallel-capability CIF
model. This cross-fertilization of top-down and bottom-up high-risk/high-return innovation
initiatives drives down the likelihood of type II innovation errors.
FIGURE 2

The Innovation Efficiency Frontier
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4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our investigation into corporate engagement in intra-organizational innovation processes
enabled us to construct a detailed account of how corporate managers develop and deploy the
capability to influence how innovation occurs in their firms. By disentangling corporate
engagement in the variation, selection, and retention of novel ideas at the corporate, middle
manager, and individual innovator levels of analysis, our findings shed light on mechanisms and
associated resources employed by corporate managers to build, sustain, and improve business unit
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innovation capabilities in multidivisional firms. In the following section, we outline the theoretical
and managerial implications of our findings.

4.6.1 EXTENDING THE COMPLEMENTARITY VIEW OF TOP-DOWN INNOVATION MANAGEMENT
Relatively little is known about the interaction among innovation processes operating at
different levels of analysis involving actors having varying degrees of agency in innovation
management (Garud et al., 2013), as “Both the generation of ideas purely at the level of the SMT
[senior management team] and the receipt and treatment of ideas by SMTs proposed upwards to
them have received scant attention in the innovation literatures to date despite the crucial position
held by senior managers to facilitate or stifle innovation” (Anderson et al., 2014, p. 1321). This
dominance in the extant innovation literatures of studies examining innovation processes operating
at lower organizational levels could be attributed to tacitness of the phenomenon of corporate
involvement in innovation, related to the general lack of understanding of what corporate managers
actually do (Collis, Young, and Goold, 2007). In our study, we address this gap in in the literature
and build on emerging research that suggests that top-down and bottom-up innovation processes
are complimentary (Birkinshaw et al., 2011). In our study, we unpack the relationship between the
top-down and bottom-up innovation processes and mechanisms used by corporate managers to
influence how variation, selection, and retention of novel ideas occurs at the individual innovator,
middle manager, and corporate levels of analysis.
During our investigation, we found that corporate managers were cognizant of the need not
to actively influence bottom-up innovation management, sometimes even by heavy-handed topdown micromanagement of business unit processes. Corporate managers sought to build on extant
innovation processes and design new ways for driving innovation capabilities, capacity, and
outcomes.
In cases where organizational culture at the business unit level was hostile to innovative
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behavior, corporate managers preferred workarounds to increase the overall firm innovation
performance, as changing organizational culture at the business unit level was considered
ineffective. Further, the nature of corporate engagement in innovation management was in most
cases ad-hoc and tactical, as opposed to planned and strategic. Corporate managers, assigned
responsibility to drive innovation, were typically given few pointers about how to build and then
deploy corporate innovation capabilities. Consequently, we did not observe that top-down
corporate involvement would substitute for bottom-up innovation processes. Instead, we generally
observed rather cautious top-down approaches aimed at augmenting the best elements of existing
bottom-up innovation processes and complementing them with top-down innovation processes.
The boundary condition for the complementarity relationship between the top-down and
bottom-up innovation processes manifested by our observation of the parallel-capability CIF
model. When corporate managers recognized that bottom-up innovation processes are unlikely to
result in higher-risk/higher-potential innovation initiatives, they built a separate corporate-level
innovation capability sheltered from business unit-level selection pressures.

4.6.2 THE EFFECT OF CIF ON THE INCIDENCE OF TYPE I AND TYPE II ERRORS
One of the reoccurring themes among the observed processes was the proactive effort by
corporate managers to influence how individual innovators, middle managers, and corporate
managers themselves engage in risk-taking behavior associated with innovation activities.
Further, corporate managers were influencing how these three levels of employees interacted with
relation to innovation-related activities. In the following paragraphs, we discuss how the observed
processes map into corporate managers’ efforts to promote risk-taking behavior across
hierarchical levels, filter risk-taking behavior, and ultimately transform risk-taking behavior into
the firm’s overall innovation performance (Figure 3).
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4.6.2.1

Promotion of Internal Risk-Taking Behavior

The wiliness of individual employees to engage in innovation activities declines with their
increasing embeddedness in formal organizational roles (Van de Ven, 1986). Current literature
emphasizes the importance of open innovation (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009; Chesbrough, 2006)
in enabling firms to remain innovative by leveraging external high-potential novel ideas. Our study
extends and enriches the open innovation literature by uncovering processes aimed at discovering
underutilized internal innovation talent and using it as a supplementary source of high-potential
novel ideas. We observed two approaches undertaken by corporate managers for achieving this
goal.
First, corporate managers focused on creating an intra-organizational environment tolerant
of the risks associated with innovation related behavior. The uniformization of innovation
definition (1), involving the interaction of corporate managers with employees across hierarchical
levels, enabled corporate managers to define what types of innovations and associated risks are
desirable. Elevation of innovation into corporate strategy (2) established innovation as an equal
source of growth alongside expansion of the core business, pursuit of M&A, or establishment of
alliances (Capron & Mitchell, 2013). All of these processes increased legitimization of employees’
risk-taking behaviors linked to the pursuit of innovation. Further, this legitimization effect was
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strengthened when corporate managers codified (Zollo, 1998) the elevation of innovation into the
corporate strategy by formulating a corporate innovation strategy setting out overall firm
performance targets related to innovation.
Second, corporate managers enacted processes aimed at discovering and utilizing
innovation slack already existing within the organization, complementing the open innovation
process. Decentralization of risk-taking (10) increased options for individual employees to engage
in innovation activities, lowering the threshold for justifying innovation activities, as well as risks
for individual careers in the case of failure. Corporate managers were cognizant that not every
employee in their organization has the option or capability to productively engage in innovation
activities. To address this limitation to the decentralization of risk-taking, corporate managers
engaged in channeling of risk-taking (11) to increase chances that employees with high potential
to innovate engage in autonomous innovation.
Promotion of internal risk-taking behavior increases the incidence of type I innovation
error, while it reduces the incidence of type II innovation error. Type I innovation error is increased
as legitimization of innovation-related risk-taking increases the generation of low-value innovation
proposals, reflecting consistent comments by our narrators that not every employee has the
aptitude to contribute to the innovation process. Further, several narrators reported that their firms
were trapped in the “innovation maximization fallacy” (Anderson et al., 2014, p. 1320) whereby
the top-down promotion of the risk-taking behavior resulted in abundant low- to negative-value
creativity. The incidence of type II innovation error is reduced as top-down guidance on desirable
innovation areas encourages innovation mental effort of talented employees who would otherwise
remain in their exploitative roles.
4.6.2.2

Filtering of Risk-taking Behavior

Within the VSR framework, processes regarding selection of novel ideas are the least
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understood (Reitzig & Sorenson, 2013). Previous research focused on factors inhibiting selection
of the highest-value ideas by middle managers, such as personal agendas (Bower, 1970), strategic
context (Burgelman, 1983a), and psychological biases (Reitzig & Maciejovsky, 2015). Our
observations resonate with the view that middle managers are not the ideal evaluators, from the
overall firm’s perspective, of high-value/high-risk novel ideas. Narrators consistently considered
that middle managers can block innovation just by doing their job, which provided them with the
formal authority to say no to high-value/high-risk novel ideas.
Our observations expand the discussion on the selection of novel ideas within a
multidivisional firm by uncovering top-down mechanisms lessening the negative effects of
corporate managers’ risk aversion for autonomous innovation. Verticalization of corporate context
(5) increased corporate managers’ involvement in early selection decisions concerning merits of
novel ideas that increased monitoring of middle managers’ selection decision-making. Mitigation
of strategic context agency (11) introduced selection mechanisms operating below middle
managers’ hierarchical levels, decreasing the number of low-value novel ideas and increasing the
viability of high-value novel ideas through early detection, endorsement, and development from
the embryotic stage into defensible innovation initiatives (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007). The rulesbased nature of these sub-middle manager selection processes increases their robustness vis-à-vis
behavioral and personal biases (Rietzig & Maciejovsky, 2015). Creation of alternatives to strategic
context (14) decreased opportunities for middle managers to dismiss these pre-selected high-value
ideas, as individual inventors had other means to access resources needed for further development
of their ideas. In particular, informal innovation networks set up by corporate managers served as
conduits for autonomous innovation, counterbalancing the skepticism toward high-value/high-risk
novel ideas within formal selection networks (Gulati & Puranam, 2009). By playing an active role
in the redesign of the overall process of novel idea evaluation, corporate managers got a deeper
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knowledge of the characteristics of the internal innovation pool, allowing them to continuously
update their mental models about the innovation opportunity landscape. This dynamization of
corporate context (6) process lessens corporate managers’ dependency on middle managers for
inputs needed for the reformulation of corporate strategy (Burgelman, 1994) and allows corporate
managers to maintain awareness of shifts in the opportunity landscape (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000).
Filtering of risk-taking behavior reduces the incidence of both type I and II innovation
errors. Top-down involvement in the selection process, as well as the introduction of rules-based
sub-middle manager selection, eliminates low-value projects from the onset. Further individual
innovators are less likely to continue in innovation activities when their proposals are consistently
dismissed. Thus, the incidence of type I innovation error is reduced. Our narrators commented that
the vast majority of employees produce mediocre novel ideas, while a few employees generate
consistently high-value novel ideas. Filtering of risk-taking enables corporate managers to identify
these innovation high performers and support their innovation efforts, thus reducing type II
innovation error.
4.6.2.3

Transformation of Risk-taking Behavior

Implementation of selected novel ideas is a complex process with many hurdles that
selected novel ideas must overcome (Klein & Sorra, 1996). Resonating with the work by Noda
and Bower (1996), our observations highlighted the importance of staggered resource allocation
in the process of transforming selected novel ideas into valuable outcomes for the firm. In several
of the sample firms, corporate managers established discretionary innovation resources under their
control (i.e., corporate innovation resources). The allocation of these corporate innovation
resources was flexible (17), as corporate managers were allocating them based on each project’s
unforeseen needs, and not based solely on a pre-determined plan. Top-down flexibilization of
innovation implementation resources (17) reflected the inherent uncertainty accompanying the
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transformation of highly risky innovation initiatives into desired outcomes.
Several structural changes initiated by corporate managers increased the likelihood that
selected novel ideas will be of value to the firm. Corporate managers redesigned evaluation
structures for middle managers to include innovation performance measures (15) linked to
accomplishing innovation targets. The establishment of a permanent corporate-level innovation
team (7) increased the likelihood that the corporate innovation strategy would be achieved. Further,
it also increased the chances that knowledge blueprints for selected novel ideas, which in the end
cannot be implemented, are archived for later reactivation and knowledge recombination (9).
The process of transformation of risk-taking behavior significantly reduces type I
innovation error, as the merits of each novel idea are further scrutinized during the flexible resource
allocation process. There is no significant effect on the incidence of type II innovation error, as no
new novel ideas are selected at this stage. However, there is an inter-temporal (9) reduction in type
II innovation error, as archived ideas may lead to breakthroughs over the long-term.

4.6.3 LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The importance of linking corporate actions to type I and II innovation errors stems from
the trade-off organizations face between aligning innovations with the current corporate strategy
and supporting innovations disrupting it (Garud et al., 2013). This research focused on the question
of how corporate managers exert influence on innovation processes occurring at lower hierarchical
levels in multidivisional firms. Based on an inductive multiple-case research design, we developed
a framework for a CIF, thus far unexplored in the literature. We explained the process of CIF
conceptualization, creation, and deployment, as well as its effects. By exploring the processes
through which the CIF is established, we were able to derive a theory of the effect of the CIF on
the innovation output.
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The inductive nature of our study, as well as our data, limits the generalization of the CIF
theory in several ways. First, we did not identify the actual triggers for the establishment of the
CIF. In our data, we identified mainly economic and founder influences on corporate realization
of the need to become more actively involved in the management of innovation. Future research
should investigate the origin of the corporate decision to innovate, as well as the determinants of
corporate innovation ambition. Second, we focused on structural elements of the CIF. More work
is needed to understand the behavioral underpinning of corporate involvement in innovation,
especially as corporate involvement in business-unit processes can potentially encounter strong
opposition grounded in emotional, rather than cognitive, responses. It could be that group-based
emotions may be significant determinants of corporate managers’ involvement in innovation
processes. Another limitation is a lack of observation in our data of CIF performance implications.
Our informants and archival data converge on implicating that innovation occurring at the
corporate level focuses on more radical and forward-looking innovation opportunities, while
innovation capability at the business unit level aims to develop innovations closer to the current
core products and services.
An additional limitation is that our sample is skewed toward firms that have established
the CIF, leaving out firms that may have considered establishing the CIF, but have instead decided
against it. Similarly, our data did not allow us to assess the degree of adoption of the CIF in the
organizational population. Future studies employing large sample approaches should investigate
whether the CIF constitutes a sustained competitive advantage.
Further, the establishment, deployment, and maintenance of the CIF requires allocation of
corporate-level resources needed for supporting the agenda of a corporate level innovation
executive, the staffing of a corporate innovation team, and the financing of a discretionary
corporate innovation fund. The allocation of some corporate level resources specifically to
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innovation may trigger tensions within the C-level team, given that these resources are likely to be
taken from other C-level functions. Thus future studies should explore the resource allocation
process at the corporate level to increase our understanding of decision making concerning
governance of corporate headquarters.

4.6.4 MANAGERIAL RELEVANCE
As a process study, this research generated new insights into how corporate managers
influence innovation processes at the business unit level. Yet, as the establishment and deployment
of the CIF involves changes and significant commitment across all organizational levels and is
highly context-dependent, we remain cautious in providing normative prescriptions. Further,
several lessons to be drawn from our study are as follows. First, in most of our sampled firms,
corporate involvement in innovation represented a significant departure from established practices.
As such, corporate involvement in innovation was often met with initial resistance, which suggests
that a gradual and consultative approach across all three main innovation processes is going to
increase the chances that corporate innovation objectives are attained. Second, the formal
introduction of the CIF requires adjustments to existing organizational culture. We suggest that,
rather than trying to significantly modify organizational culture, it will be beneficial to identify
which cultural characteristics are supportive of corporate involvement in innovation and then fully
leverage them. Finally, not all employees showed an equal motivation and ability to innovate.
Identifying those employees willing to support and contribute to corporate involvement in business
unit innovation and then deploying these individuals as boundary-spanning change agents is likely
to be more effective than enforcing a top-down hierarchical approach.
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CHAPTER 5

DYNAMIC CORPORATE INNOVATION CAPABILITY

5.1 INTRODUCTION
How do the actions of corporate managers in large multidivisional firms lead to the
establishment of innovation routines conducive to continuous discovery, evaluation, and
monetization of distant innovations (i.e., dynamic corporate innovation capability)? Distant
innovations encompass destructive (Schumpeter, 1940/1954), radical (Dewar and Dutton, 1986),
and architectural (Henderson and Clark, 1990) innovations which are novel to the firm and markets
in which the firm operates (Katz and Allen, 1982). Some large multidivisional firms develop
dynamic corporate innovation capability (Lawson and Samson, 2001), while many once dominant
multidivisional firms fail to adapt to rivals taking advantage of technological innovations
(Christensen, 1997), business model innovations (Markides, 2006), or shifts in consumer
preferences (Henderson, 2006). To continuously adapt to disturbances to market equilibrium—
caused by either established rivals or new entrants (D’Aveni, 1999)—multidivisional firms need
to develop innovation routines conducive to the generation of distant innovations (Martins and
Terblanche, 2003).
Studying how managerial actions lead to the development of dynamic corporate innovation
capability is important as it allows firms to counterbalance biases towards exploitation that
permeate large organizations (March, 1991) and pursue both exploitation and exploration
concurrently (Greve, 2007). Through the continuous generation of distant innovations, firms gain
the agency to shape the industries in which they operate (Teece, 2007), endogenously impacting
their own profitability (McGahan and Porter, 1999). The recent rapid decline of wireless email
pioneer BlackBerry provides an illustration of just how suddenly a former innovation champion
can fail when an innovative rival transforms an entire industry. Would BlackBerry’s failure to
effectively respond to the emergence of Apple’s iPhone have been reversed if BlackBerry’s
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corporate managers had been more proactive in developing dynamic corporate innovation
capability? Similarly, have traditional automakers such as Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors
established a dynamic corporate innovation capability allowing them to keep pace with automotive
industry disruptors Google, Tesla, and Uber? And most recently, have traditional food retailers
established the capability to quickly level the innovation playing field with Amazon after its
sudden and disruptive entry into their arena?
The above examples highlight that a firm’s innovation capability is principally an
adaptation process (Gupta, Tesluk, and Taylor, 2007) through which a firm attempts to maintain
its environmental fitness (Helfat et al., 2007). A firm maintains its environmental fitness by
continuously identifying and taking advantage of new opportunities (Teece, 2007) and preempting
disruptive moves by competitors (D’Aveni, 1999). Ultimately, a firm’s innovation capability
allows for sequential and/or parallel pursuit of incremental, radical, and architectural innovation
types (Tushman, 1997; Shilling, 2008) alongside the exploitation of extant core businesses (March,
1991).
Previous research has paid little attention to the role of corporate managers in the
development of innovation capability, in contrast to the rich body of scholarship exploring bottomup innovation processes (see Anderson, Potocnik, and Zhou, 2014 and Garud, Tuertscher, and Van
de Ven, 2013 for recent reviews). Corporate managers were assumed to be passive influencers of
innovation capability through the definition of missions and goals guiding bottom-up innovation
activities (Amabile, 1988; Damanpour, 1991). Relatedly, corporate managers were thought to be
mainly engaged in resource allocation decision making detached from product-/market-facing
activities (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983). Overall, the idea that corporate managers can play a
more active role in building a firm’s innovation capability got lost in innovation scholarship
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predominantly focused on bottom-up innovation processes (Birkinshaw, Bouquet, and Barsoux,
2011).
I address this bias in the extant literature towards bottom-up explanations of how
innovation occurs in large multidivisional firms by leveraging a hand-collected dataset to study
how the work of senior innovation managers results in a multidivisional firm’s dynamic corporate
innovation capability. I find that senior innovation managers support local innovation by
connecting past innovation successes with present innovation opportunities related to core
businesses. To encourage generation of distant innovation, senior innovation managers champion
processes facilitating localization and absorption of knowledge unrelated to a firm’s core
businesses. Senior innovation managers’ actions mitigating innovation risk at the individual
inventor, middle manager, and organizational levels augment a firm’s capacity to continuously
generate distant innovations and regulate the resource allocation between local and distant
innovation projects.
By proposing the concept of dynamic corporate innovation capability, I make three
theoretical contributions. First, in contrast with the notion of a rational senior executive leading in
a top-down directive manner (Porter, 1980), I find that the role of a senior innovation manager is
subjected to political headwinds undermining its legitimacy at both the corporate and business unit
levels (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Further, I uncover that most senior innovation managers
lack a clear blueprint for accomplishing their main mission of generating more growth from
innovation and their actions, resulting in reliance on trial-and-error approaches.
Second, the results of my study contribute to the scholarly discussion on the sourcing of
novel knowledge by large multidivisional firms. My findings confirm that the use of external
knowledge (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough and Crowther 2006) is an important element of
multidivisional firms’ approach for generating distant innovations. Yet, I also find that the use of
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open innovation is hindered by its costs and long investment-benefit conversion cycles. As a result,
senior innovation managers initially rely on leveraging internal bottom-up sources of knowledge,
using open innovation as a weak complement, rather than a strong substitute, to sourcing novel
knowledge internally. Over time, as actions of senior innovation managers increase the internal
capability to absorb external knowledge, the use of open innovation increases, often pushed
through a top-down impetus to overcome sources of internal resistance to external knowledge.
Third, I show how senior innovation managers’ top-down interventions weaken intraorganizational hindrances to self-organized, bottom-up, grassroots innovation initiatives with the
potential to generate distant innovations. This result complements innovation scholarship studying
the effects of innovation centralization (Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios,
2014) as this study shows that the decoupling of innovation activities from the needs of core
businesses can be induced at the business unit level, reducing the need for innovation centralization
in order to generate distant innovations.

5.2 INNOVATION MANAGEMENT IN MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRMS

5.2.1 CONDITIONS FOR INNOVATION IN MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRMS
Large multidivisional firms are directed by corporate managers who possess agency over
several business units operating in distinct markets (Rumelt, 1974). In each business unit, day-today activities are carried out by product-/market-facing employees (Burgelman, 1983), who are
overseen by middle managers (Huy, 2001). Several characteristics of the multidivisional
organizational form have caused scholars to argue that large multidivisional firms would excel at
innovation. These attributes include rich resource bases (Schumpeter, 1940/1954), organizational
slack (Penrose, 1959/1995), protections against the full effects of market selection forces
(Levinthal, 1992), and implementation capability (Shilling, 2008).
155

However, despite the possession of these attributes, the survival odds of large
multidivisional firms have been steadily deteriorating (Credit Swiss, 2017). Scholars have argued
that one of the main reasons for this decay is a multidivisional firm’s tendency to channel resources
towards the exploitation of core businesses (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Tushman and Anderson, 1986) at the expense of exploration (March, 1991). Internal biases
towards exploitation stem from managerial “short-termism” (Laverty, 1996; Marginson and
McAulay, 2008), managerial cognitive myopia (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), application of an
exploitation mindset to exploration (Gilbert, 2006), structural suffocation of exploration (Puranam,
Singh, and Zollo, 2006), insufficient incubation periods for novel ideas (Knudsen and Levinthal,
2007), and collective fear (Vuori and Huy, 2016). These internal biases towards exploitation are
exacerbated by external pressures related to corporate raiders threatening inefficient management
teams (Walsh and Kosnik, 1993), core business lock-in due to the demands of existing customers
(Christensen, 1997), and the investor community’s dictates for consistency in financial results
(DesJardine and Bansal, 2014).
5.2.2 INNOVATION AS A DYNAMIC CAPABILITY
Firms can counterbalance exploitative biases by developing dynamic capabilities (Teece,
Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). Dynamic capabilities are “specific strategic and organizational
processes like product development, alliancing, and strategic decision making that create value for
firms within dynamic markets by manipulating resources into new value-creating strategies”
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000: 1106). The dynamic capabilities construct builds upon the resourcebased argument that “firms need to find those resources which can sustain a resource position
barrier, but in which no one currently has one, and where they have a good chance of being among
the few who succeed in building one” (Wernerfelt, 1984: 175). Acquisition of such resources,
which have concurrently valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable characteristics
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(i.e., VRIN resources), enables the development of a firm’s value, creating sustained competitive
advantage which present and future competitors cannot replicate (Barney, 1991).
A sustained competitive advantage requires not only the accumulation of VRIN resources,
but also their management through recombination (Henderson and Clark, 1990) and redeployment
(Teece et al., 1997). Further, the maintenance of a sustained competitive advantage is contingent
on a firm’s ability to identify and exploit new profitable ventures ahead of competitors (Teece,
2007). This forward-looking innovation-sensing capability necessitates that corporate managers
develop an internal capability to tap into external sources of knowledge (Chesborough, 2003) and
combine them with internal sources of knowledge at the level of business units (Bowman and
Ambrosini, 2003). Thus, a multidivisional firm’s ability to continuously scout for both internal
and external knowledge and transform it into valuable outcomes leveraging, reconfiguring, and
maintaining VRIN resources constitutes the essence of dynamic corporate innovation capability.

5.2.3 DYNAMIC CORPORATE INNOVATION CAPABILITY: THE ROLE OF A SENIOR MANAGER
The dual imperative for the firm to reach out into the unknown and continuously convert
identified opportunities into value for the firm indicates the need for the appointment of corporate
executives having the qualities of strategic leaders who “utilize and interchange tacit and explicit
knowledge on both the individual and organizational levels, and [who] use both linear and
nonlinear thinking patterns.” (Rowe, 2001: 87). Increasingly, some of the most prominent Fortune
500 firms have been creating a strategic leadership role in innovation at the corporate level (Forbes,
2017).
For instance, in 2017, the Coca-Cola Company announced that it was “appointing a Chief
Innovation Officer to elevate Global Research & Development into a standalone innovation
function reporting directly to the CEO. This represents the increased importance of innovation to
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the company’s growth plans.”15 Despite this rise in the appointments of senior innovation
managers, extant scholarship offers limited insight into their role (Collis, Young, and Goold,
2007). Intriguingly, McGahan and Silverman refute the stylized fact of a negative relationship
between a firm’s maturity and its declining innovation activity and call for “theory characterizing
how transitions out of maturity occur.” (2001: 1143). Understanding what the goals of senior
innovation managers are and how they achieve them may contribute to the elaboration of such
theory.
As Coca-Cola’s announcement suggests, the main mission of a senior innovation manager
is to generate additional growth beyond what is possible with and/or at the expense of growth
through organic, M&A, and alliance options (Capron and Mitchell, 2012). Firm-level resource
constraints (Penrose, 1959/1995) give rise to a resource allocation trade-off between noninnovation- and innovation-based growth (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 1990). This trade-off is
exacerbated by a firm’s tendency to “diversify into a business as its technical strength applicable
to that business increases” (Silverman, 1999: 1115). Given these resource allocation tensions, a
senior innovation manager is likely to engage in multilevel resource allocation negotiations (Arrlet
et al., 2015). In addition, to decrease their dependency on the outcome of these negotiations, senior
innovation managers are likely to exert effort to identify and utilize existing organizational slack
for innovation (Adner and Helfat, 2003; Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003; Penrose, 1959/1995).
Another cue from the Coca-Cola announcement is the centralization of innovation-related
decision making at the corporate level, which resonates with the portrayal of innovation as
disrupting extant businesses (Schumpeter, 1940/1954). As business unit managers are unlikely to
disrupt their core competencies, top-down involvement may be necessary to support the
identification, development, and implementation of Schumpeterian disruptive innovations. Recent

http://www.coca-colacompany.com/press-center/press-releases/the-coca-cola-company-announces-seniorleadership-appointments, accessed June 18, 2017
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empirical findings support this view that centralization of innovation results in innovation
outcomes that are more distant from a firm’s core businesses, in contrast to innovations supported
at the business unit level (Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014).
Similarly, Chesbrough and Crowther (2006) argue that top-down involvement in innovation is
necessary for sourcing high-potential novel ideas from outside of organizational boundaries.

5.3 METHODS
This study draws on an in-depth exploration of the role of a senior innovation manager
working in the context of a multidivisional firm. Over a period of four years, I embedded myself
as an observer in the milieu of conferences serving as a platform for senior innovation managers
to present and discuss their work.
5.3.1 RESEARCH SETTING
Large multidivisional firms provide a suitable research context for studying how dynamic
corporate innovation capability is developed through managerial actions, given the inherent
complexity of managing various innovation maturity models across multiple markets embedded
in different environments (McGahan and Silverman, 2001; Utterback, 1971). This innovation
complexity increases the need for corporate managers to devise innovation routines (Nelson and
Winter, 1982), which guide innovation activities at lower hierarchical levels but can also be
adapted to changing environmental conditions (Feldman and Pentland, 2003).
5.3.2 THEORETICAL SAMPLE
To reconcile these contrasting views of the role of corporate managers in innovation
management, I sought narratives containing rich descriptions of the work of senior innovation
managers in large multidivisional firms over a period of several years. In total, I developed 14
narratives. The search for additional narratives was stopped after additional narratives did not yield
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significant new insights (Yin, 2014). To triangulate findings from the narrative dataset, I gained
interview access to three large multidivisional firms and conducted semi-structured interviews
with employees involved in innovation management across hierarchical levels.
While it was not possible to name the industries and countries of domiciliation, in order to
keep firms anonymous (Strike and Rerup, 2016), findings were largely replicated across the
narrative sample and were strongly supported by the interview data. Firms were anonymized using
the names of U.S. national parks for the narrative dataset and Canadian national parks for the
interview dataset. Table 6 provides a descriptive overview of both the narrative and interview
datasets.
Table 6: Dynamic Corporate Innovation Capability: Overview of Case Studies
Code name
Acadia
Arches
Biscayne
Canyonlands
Denali
Everglades
Glacier
Haleakalā
Katmai
Olympic
Redwood
Sequoia
Voyageurs
Yellowstone
Yosemite
Zion
Banff
Jasper
Jasper
Jasper
Jasper
Yoho
Yoho
Yoho

Data
Firm type Firm age (years)
Narrative Public
50-100
Narrative Private
50-100
Narrative Public
100-150
Narrative Private
<50
Narrative Public
50-100
Narrative Public
100-150
Narrative Public
50-100
Narrative Public
100-150
Narrative Public
100-150
Narrative Public
<50
Narrative Public
>150
Narrative Public
100-150
Narrative Public
<50
Narrative Public
50-100
Narrative Public
50-100
Narrative Public
>150
Interview Public
50-100
Interview Public
100-150
Interview Public
100-150
Interview Public
100-150
Interview Public
100-150
Interview Public
>150
Interview Public
>150
Interview Public
>150
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Employees
50,000-100,000
10,000-50,000
50,000-100,000
10,000-50,000
50,000-100,000
50,000-100,000
10,000-50,000
10,000-50,000
10,000-50,000
1,000-10,000
50,000-100,000
10,000-50,000
>100,000
>100,000
10,000-50,000
50,000-100,000
>100,000
50,000-100,000
50,000-100,000
50,000-100,000
50,000-100,000
>100,000
>100,000
>100,000

# of Divisions
5-10
<5
5-10
<5
10-15
10-15
10-15
5-10
<5
<5
5-10
<5
<5
<5
5-10
5-10
<5
5-10
5-10
5-10
5-10
5-10
5-10
5-10

Employee level
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Corporate manager
Middle manager
Corporate manager
Senior innovator
Senior innovator
Junior innovator
Corporate manager
Middle manager
Middle manager

5.3.3 DATA COLLECTION
I obtained the granular data required for this study by attending electronically 17 chief
innovation officer summits from 2013 until 2017. The summits were organized by Innovation
Enterprise, a firm which organizes summits on topics relevant to senior managers. At each summit,
between 15 and 25 senior innovation professionals working for private firms, public organizations,
and consulting firms gave oral presentations about their work. Often, these presentations ended
with a Q&A session and were supported by PowerPoint documents offering an additional level of
detail.
In total, I collected over 200 hours of recorded narratives and produced over 600 pages of
high-fidelity transcripts. From this initial dataset, I constructed my theoretical sample discussed
above. For a narrative to be included in the dataset used for this study, it had to fulfil the following
requirements: (1) the narrator was a senior innovation manager; (2) the narrator worked in a forprofit multidivisional firm; (3) the narrator provided an overview of his or her work over the period
of several years; and (4) the narrative did not suffer from any of the biases discussed in Table 7.
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Table 7: Narrative Data Biases and Mitigating Measures
Potential Data Biases/Issues
Mitigating Measures
Narrator exaggerated the impact of corporate The focus of the study was on the process;
involvement in innovation.
reported quantified results were not coded
and were not part of the analysis.
Narrator was biased towards description of Only narratives providing a multilevel
actions applying to the corporate level only.
overview of the involvement of corporate
managers in innovation management were
included in the dataset.
Narrator was aware of the purpose of the study While all narrators agreed to their
and engaged in self-censoring, resulting in the presentations and supplemental materials
loss of comprehensiveness of the account.
being used for general research purposes,
they were unaware of this specific study.
Narrator was influenced by researcher’s leading No contact was made with any of the
questions.
narrators.
Narrator’s firm used a consulting firm to guide Narratives which contained signs of being
the corporate involvement in innovation.
influenced by a consulting firm were not
included in the dataset.
Narrator withheld key information due to Narrative data was triangulated through
confidentiality/competitive reasons and/or alternative sources. Given that these
provided false information.
narratives are available on a fee basis, it is
unlikely that provided information was
untrue given potential legal ramifications.
To ensure proper data triangulation, the interview data was collected only after the collection
and initial analysis of the narrative data. In addition, firms included in the interview data sample
did not form part of the narrative data sample. In total, 10 interviews were conducted from October
2017 to January 2018.

5.3.4 ANALYTICAL APPROACH
I combined inductive data analysis (Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2013) with analytical
methods used to study narratives (Pentland, 1999). The inductive data analysis was used to derive
initial codes, second-order concepts, and ultimately, aggregate themes. The narrative analytical
methodology served to get beyond the surface and code aspects of narratives relevant to the
development of dynamic corporate innovation capability.
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To ensure analytical rigour, I conducted the narrative analysis in stages. First, I captured
each story in a write-up (including the transcript of the oral presentation, the information contained
in the accompanying PowerPoint document, the narrator’s work history details) and triangulated
this data using information from the company’s website as well as the firm’s public disclosures
(Yin, 2014). Second, I constructed a detailed history of the role of each individual senior
innovation manager, paying close attention to actants interacting in the story (Latour, 2005),
sequences of events, plots, and relationships (Pentland, 1999). Third, I generated a prototypical
role of a senior innovation manager by capturing underlying first-order codes, formulating
emerging second-order concepts, and conceptualizing aggregate constructs (Strauss and Corbin,
1998). Fourth, based on my understanding of the role of corporate innovation managers uncovered
in the second and third stages, I constructed a full emergent process model of dynamic corporate
innovation capability.
Interview data used for triangulation was initially analyzed using an approach similar to
the first analytical stage described above. After this first stage was completed, I systematically
compared and contrasted narrative and interview data segments (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). While
no major differences were identified, this iterative process enabled me to uncover nuances in the
narrative data and ultimately elaborate the nature and effects of senior innovation managers’
actions.

5.4 AN ACCOUNT OF THE ROLE OF A SENIOR INNOVATION MANAGER
To help the reader become acquainted with the data in a way that is as easy and authentic
as possible, below I present an excerpt from the account of the work of a senior innovation manager
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working in a large multidivisional firm. This account combines information from this narrator’s
biography, her oral presentation, the Q&A session, and the supporting PowerPoint document.

5.4.1 ONE STORY
I have been working at my company for close to two decades in several different roles. In
my current role as a senior manager for innovation and quality, I am responsible for providing
customers with innovative solutions for meeting their needs and ensuring that our company is
always in the leading position in the technological developments concerning our products. I enjoy
the complex relationship between process and culture which enables innovation to take place in
large organizations. I am an engineer by profession and prior to my employment with this firm, I
worked as a scientist in various new product development roles.
My dual role as an innovation and quality executive may be seen as a dichotomy at first,
but it gives me the opportunity to drive both perfection and motivation for improvements. Some
people are better at each of the ends of the spectrum. My job is to ensure the right balance. My
company has done this for over 100 years. […] Our job is to make the innovation function feed
better products to the marketplace, yet most of our resources are focused on operations. Most of
our employees work within very short timeframes; thus, the concept of innovation and the type of
required timeframes are very difficult for them to understand.
We have other issues. Our firm is a little like civil service—an old and rigid organization.
Our structure is that of a big complex organization. Yet, innovation does not like organizational
silos. These silos are great for generating new ideas, but you need to mix them with ideas coming
from other silos. My job is mainly about breaking down these barriers and implementing processes
enabling cross-fertilization of ideas across silos to create better products.
Different types of innovations coexist in my firm: incremental, step-change, process, and
business model innovations. Our innovation strategy is to put together and manage a portfolio of
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projects that are operating across these spectrums. We have to make sure we have a constant flow
of innovations in the organization. We have a 10% success rate of innovations: from 50 ideas, we
get 10 projects, and 2 successful products. Yet, [the company’s leaders] say, “We want only
successful innovation and more innovation.” They do not realize it does not work like that. You
need to work through the ideas, kill the low-prospect ideas, and focus on a selected high-potential
idea group. […]
I started by establishing the agreement on what type of innovation is required (incremental
versus step change versus process versus business model), what it looks like, and how it is going
to be achieved. Innovation leaders need to get this right first before going into businesses. […]
Design cross-functional innovation training; a lot of people associate innovation with ideation, but
no, you need to understand all of the innovation process! Employees from different functional
areas attended this course. They did not participate as a business unit, but as a collective cutting
across businesses. We clarified what their role was to enable a bit of risk taking; their typical
mindset is that their role is about mitigating risk, not embracing it. […]
You need to set long-term goals and design platforms to provide structure, information
flow, and the possibility of measuring success. We conduct formal reviews of the innovation
processes. Senior visibility is also critical. […]
Most of our innovations come through partnerships, but more radical innovations are
sourced internally. In today’s world, it is not about product innovation, process innovation, or
system innovation, it is about all of them put together. We operate in a more disruptive space than
previously. It is both the best and worst time to be an innovation officer. It is difficult to be a senior
innovation manager as there is no book to read, no process to follow for large organizations to
innovate fast enough in the world we live in today. The real question is how do we get all parts of
the organization to innovate at the same speed? And how do we instil innovation culture
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throughout the organization? It is a [challenge] to get innovation perpetuated in the organization,
and it is even more difficult to do this during an economic downturn.

5.5 THE PROTOTYPICAL ROLE OF A SENIOR INNOVATION MANAGER
I used individual narratives to construct a more generic description of a prototypical role
of a senior innovation manager. As depicted in Figure 4, the main elements of the role of a senior
innovation manager which emerged from this analysis were the establishment of senior innovation
manager legitimacy, the generation of corporate innovation ambition, the design of corporate
innovation processes, and the development of corporate innovation routines supporting both local
and distant innovation activities.
Figure 4: Dynamic Corporate Innovation Capability Data Structure
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Figure 1: Data structure

5.5.1 SENIOR INNOVATION MANAGER LEGITIMACY
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Aggregate Constructs
Senior Innovation Manager
Legitimacy

Corporate Innovation Ambition

Corporate Innovation Processes

Corporate Innovation Routines

5.5.1.1

Respected Innovation Leadership

Most of the senior innovation managers had an insider background, having worked for their
organizations for years prior to assuming an innovation leadership role. The career of the senior
innovation manager of Biscayne, who had held increasingly senior marketing positions across
several divisions and countries, was representative of the career journeys of other senior innovation
managers in the sample. Long organizational tenure provided them with intimate knowledge of
both formal and informal organizational structures. Broad access across organizational layers and
structures enabled senior innovation managers to transcend intra-organizational boundaries in their
quest to instil dynamic corporate innovation capability within their organizations.
Long intra-organizational tenure accorded some level of authority to the senior innovation
manager herself, but the senior innovation manager role was initially in a weak position vis-à-vis
other formal organizational roles. First, senior innovation managers had to position themselves in
relation to their peers, who would often consider innovation as being within their sphere of
influence. Second, senior innovation managers were dependent on powerful heads of business
units for innovation resources and execution. These middle managers would often consider
innovation as their responsibility, yet they were primarily focused on the exploitation of core
businesses. Given the political power held by these counterparts embedded in the formal
organizational structure, senior innovation managers had to engage in role maneuvering, as
opposed to claiming innovation leadership by solely relying on their title. The senior innovation
manager at Acadia explained:
I needed to establish objectives for the innovation function to define how it will operate among
well running divisions […]. The way to position the innovation function was to tell divisional
unit heads that while they are busy running their businesses and fulfilling annual plans,
somebody needs to have time to think [about] and conceptualize that next big opportunity on
the horizon as divisional heads cannot compete in terms of innovation with challengers coming
from outside of the core business.
5.5.1.2

Top-Down Support
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The need for continuous top-down endorsement of the role of senior innovation managers
was universal across the sample. Top-down support for the role was necessary given that senior
innovation managers acted as change agents by disrupting established routines and behaviours,
putting these managers in conflict situations with intra-organizational actors who preferred the
status quo. Yet, continuous top-down support for innovation was not automatic and had to be
enacted by senior innovation managers. A common mechanism employed by senior innovation
managers for eliciting support was the identification and communication to the most senior leaders
within the organization of environmental shifts with potential to render extant core businesses
obsolete. The senior innovation manager of Denali commented:
We need to look ahead. 10 years ahead. It energizes the organization and shows you care about
the future. I showed 10-20 megatrends to the board of directors. The storyline needs to keep
the board of directors awake at night in a positive way, but it also needs to feel like if you do
not act today, it will hurt. You need to follow up as it is difficult to persuade the board of
directors about innovation that will not bear immediate fruit.
Resourcing of the senior innovation manager role occurred in a staggered manner. Most
senior innovation managers reported initial resource scarcity to support their role, which required
their resource acquisition creativity. They were asked to generate growth from innovation without
diverting resources from other sources of growth. Thus, senior innovation managers initially used
small supporting teams which could be scaled as needed. As high-impact innovation projects were
identified, senior innovation managers borrowed resources from business units to work full time
on specific innovation projects, yet with the understanding that once the project was completed,
resources would be returned to business units.
Another common approach was to create and leverage networks of resources by locating
and connecting innovation assets scattered across the organization. The creation of focused
innovation resources was a reaction to the discovery of the ineffectiveness of large-scale top-down
innovation events, which generated mostly low-potential ideas, wasting organizational resources.
By first identifying innovation projects that mattered to the organization, resources could be
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deployed more efficiently compared to the “boiling the ocean” approach of unfocused, large-scale
innovation events. While focused innovation resources led to the identification and
conceptualization of high-potential innovation projects within the senior innovation manager
realm, the implementation was often delegated back to business units. The senior innovation
manager of Biscayne elaborated:
We created the “Innovation Centre” which allowed us to consolidate all innovation resources
under a common team. […] Focused resources can move projects faster. We reduced the
previous time from concept to launch from 10-15 years to less. We generated more
breakthrough innovations. People were using the same language; no more misunderstandings
that the true focus is consumer innovation and nothing else. […] You need to put together the
right skills mix for the specific problem to move the innovation project further. Brands are
separate from the innovation teams; they act as sponsors.
5.5.2 CORPORATE INNOVATION AMBITION
5.5.2.1

Goal Setting

Innovation was not new to the sampled firms. All of the firms had well-resourced R&D
programs that represented a significant percentage of annual revenues. Thus, the goals of the senior
innovation manager role had to be clarified vis-à-vis these traditional R&D programs by following
annual planning cycles and focusing on the needs of core businesses. Without such goal
determination, organizational actors supporting the allocation of more funds to the traditional R&D
effort could undermine the need for the senior innovation manager role. The PowerPoint document
accompanying the narrative of Zion’s senior innovation manager contained the following
description:
The corporate innovation unit addresses the challenges and opportunities for innovation at our
firm. Our mission in the corporate innovation unit is to transform existing sectors or even build
new sectors, unlock a culture of innovation within our firm, and build global reputation for our
innovation. Our sectors annually drive several billions worth of routine innovation through
efficient, risk-controlled R&D; the corporate innovation unit focuses on disruptive, radical, and
architectural innovation. It builds on the overall expertise at our firm to drive cross-sectoral
and beyond-sector innovation.
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In most sampled firms, quantitative high-level performance targets were set at the inception
of the senior innovation manager role. These were meant to be stretch goals that could not be
achieved by simply increasing innovation activity around core businesses. Quantitative
performance goals were set as well, and were related to the generation of incremental revenue at a
minimum profitability within a set period. Performance goals were largely agnostic to whether
innovations should be the product or the process type; yet, they were largely skewed towards
disruptive, radical, and architectural types of innovation. In contrast, the end goals of the senior
innovation manager role were mostly abstract and related to the routinization of the innovation
processes associated with the senior innovation manager role in terms of their replicability,
reliability, and sustainability over time. The PowerPoint document accompanying the narrative of
Arches’ senior innovation manager stated,
Our current innovation issues are inconsistency, repeatability, and lack of sustained success.
The end goal is to create a repeatable capability across the organization, producing consistent
winners and high-level performance.
5.5.3 CORPORATE INNOVATION PROCESSES
5.5.3.1

Connecting Past to Present

One asset that all sampled firms possessed was a history of prior innovations which led to
the success of current core businesses. In some cases, firms’ founders were prominent innovators.
Accounts of the innovation history existed in the form of stories, archival documents, preserved
blueprints, and employees’ memories. Senior innovation managers used innovation history to get
clues about what made their firm innovative in the past in order to inform current and future
innovation efforts. The senior innovation manager of Everglades reflected:
It is so easy to constrain yourself to your core business. We are looking around to learn from
other industries and bringing [that learning] to our own business. We are also looking
backwards to build on experiences and lessons learned in the past, especially in older
businesses; the way they did stuff in the old days without all the fancy tools, how somebody
50 years ago managed innovation. To do so, we consult a large archive of past ideas located in
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the city where the business started. In fact, innovation is largely about timing. Customers are
often not ready. When that happens, we archive the idea so that it can be potentially revisited
in the future.
Senior innovation managers codified innovation history by transforming it into stories of
past innovation achievements. Innovation storytelling provided a connection between past
innovation success and present innovation opportunities, and served as a strong motivational tool.
It also legitimized innovation in that if it was permissible to innovate in the past, this signalled
innovation’s permissibility in the present. Storytelling was also used to maintain momentum in
innovation projects in which partial achievements were made, but the overall success was still
distant. The senior innovation manager of Olympic remarked, “To overcome resistance in the
organization, you must tell stories. Whenever you have successes, these need to be shared to create
the myth of success, which often comes ahead of the actual success.”
5.5.3.2

Managing Innovation Risk

The issue of failure management was a sensitive topic across all cases and hierarchical
levels. It was understood that the pursuit of innovation, especially high-value innovation, leads to
a high degree of failed outcomes. Yet, organizational DNA in most sampled firms was not set up
to absorb a continuous stream of failures. Consequently, senior innovation managers had to
introduce mechanisms to manage failure at the individual inventor, middle manager, and corporate
manager levels. On the individual inventor level, senior innovation managers engaged in changing
the narrative surrounding failure through failure rhetoric. Failure outcomes were narrated as
“learning opportunities,” which could be celebrated and valued to the same degree as innovation
successes.
The objective of failure rhetoric was to entice employees to overcome their fear of failure
and formulate and put forward their ideas. To achieve actual mitigation of failure consequences
on an individual level, senior innovation managers “borrowed” employees from business unit
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heads to work on specific innovation projects. This mechanism dissociated the consequences of
failure from employees’ formal roles, distributed failure consequences among several employees
pulled to together to work on a specific innovation project, and redirected the potential failure
blame towards senior innovation manager. The senior innovation manager of Everglades
commented, “I explain the importance of risk taking (i.e., trying out a lot of new ideas) and that
the consequences of failure are not that bad. Failure is called a ‘non-expected outcome.’”
Prior to the establishment of the senior innovation manager role, most heads of business
units were focused on exploitation and incremental innovation around the core business (Argyres
and Silverman, 2004). Dedicating their attention and business unit’s resources to breakthrough
innovation (the results of which may not be directly attributable back to their business units) went
against middle managers’ own interests. Yet, as innovation gained legitimacy through the actions
of senior innovation managers, it became harder and politically costly for middle managers to
oppose innovation activities using their formal authority. The innovation empowerment of
product-/market-facing employees, the emergence of self-organizing innovation communities, the
deployment of social platforms bypassing middle managers, and a top-down push for more open
innovation were common factors that reduced middle managers’ formal authority to say no to
innovation without objective justification. The senior innovation manager of Canyonlands offered
the following account:
Overcoming risk aversion is a journey, but it is difficult as you have established people saying
“I have been here for 20 years and I just do not believe in the idea.” Sometimes, people reject
“outside” ideas which are at the same time in their responsibility domain, as it creates a tension
for them. Should they take the idea into their own department using their own budget, or should
they allow somebody else outside their control and influence [to develop the idea]? We have a
standardized process to evaluate the merit of ideas consulting experts and the patent
department. If it is a good idea, the corporate innovation department helps innovators to get
some budget and buy-in. Despite my approach being a largely bottom-up one, here I would use
a top-down approach to force businesses to take in ideas from the outside to change the way
established people think, in order to generate some percentage of open innovation.
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With their large multidivisional firms possessing established brands and reputations for the
reliability of their products, senior managers at sampled firms were concerned about innovation
failures negatively impacting core businesses. Senior innovation managers established two
structural mechanisms to manage innovation risk at the organizational level. The fail-fast approach
enabled by rapid prototyping (Von Hippel, 1994) and early rule-based selection increased the
number of ideas that could be considered and decreased the likelihood of resources being used
inefficiently on low-value ideas and/or premature ideas. Selected high-risk/high-value innovation
projects were then often pursued within a separate innovation department to contain spillover
effects in the case of failure.
5.5.3.3

Connecting Future to Present

The timeframes for local and distant innovation projects differed considerably. Local
innovation projects, which were centred around core businesses, took months to a few years to
become cash flow positive. The invention-to-cash flow duration of incremental projects was
shortened by the pre-existence of the underlying knowledge which enabled invention. This
knowledge often already existed within the firm. The relatively small time span differential
between local innovation projects and exploitation projects led to frequent embedment of local
innovation projects within business units. Distant innovation projects required significantly
longer time spans for the innovation investments to start generating positive cash flows. The
long duration of distant innovation projects stemmed from the need to first undertake
fundamental research to generate knowledge, which could eventually be turned into invention.
Interestingly, the use of open innovation did not guarantee considerable shortening of the
timeframe needed for distant innovation projects, as is reflected in the comment made by the
senior innovation manager of Haleakalā:
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Developing disruptive innovation requires an innovation horizon that is at least 10 years long.
[…] We separated the corporate innovation centre from business groups. In the innovation
centre the time horizon is five years longer than that of the heads of business units. […] We
need open innovation to tap into the global knowhow and acquire complementary capabilities.
When using open innovation, it took us 10 years from investment to being cash flow positive.
We also encountered another killer of open innovation: we are open, but in reality, doors are
closed.
Recognizing the need to allow both top-down and bottom-up innovation projects to happen
concurrently within the firm, senior innovation managers created different innovation paths
customized to the origin of the innovation projects. Top-down innovation projects were marked
by problem-driven initiation, centralization of decision making, positioning within formal
organizational structures, and attempts at replicability. In contrast, the environment for grassroots
innovation projects was solution driven, energized by the intrinsic interests of individual
employees, and largely self-governed, with only limited rules provided by senior innovation
managers. The senior innovation manager of Katmai described the bifurcation of top-down and
bottom-up innovation paths as follows:
The best ideas do not come from corner offices, but from people who touch the customer,
deliver the product. […] Product-/market-facing employees may not be the best ones to identify
the problem, but they are the best at identifying solutions. […] In our experience, only one out
of every four good ideas come from planned processes. Innovation is unstructured and spread
throughout the organization. […] We provided a social innovation platform; employees had to
decide how they would use the platform. There was no top-down direction on how they should
use the platform. Within about two years after launch, 600 communities were formed across
the organization. Employees create their own work groups and can selectively bring in thirdparty people without giving them access to internal intellectual property. […] In contrast, our
open innovation platform was business/unit organizationally driven, [and] adopted a
centralized approach to technology and processes with decentralized delivery and execution,
to establish a fast and replicable model across global enterprise. […] We view top-down and
bottom-up approaches to innovation as complementary and necessary.
“Future” was defined broadly by senior innovation managers as either yet-to-be-fullyunderstood environmental shifts with the potential to transform many industries at once, and/or
already existing environmental conditions that shaped unrelated industries and that could disrupt
industries in which their firm operated.
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In terms of the environment, senior innovation managers were mostly concerned with
disruptions due to technological progress and changes in customer needs and/or preferences. A
key challenge for senior innovation managers was the sourcing of knowledge, allowing their firms
to start understanding how environmental changes could be converted into innovations for their
firms’ adaptation. Open innovation was recognized as an important source of such knowledge, but
it came at a price and was often seen as too slow as product introduction cycles shortened.
Thus, most of the sampled senior innovation managers gradually developed several internal
capabilities for environmental knowledge acquisition used in conjunction with and/or
complementing the use of open innovation: corporate venturing combined with start-up alliance
programs, frontier technology scouting combined with rapid prototyping (Von Hippel, 1994),
alternative realities simulation, extant knowledge recombination, and high-potential grassroots
innovation activities facilitation. In the case of Yellowstone, the start-up process was combined
with open innovation:
We integrated start-up processes in our enterprise and decisions are done by experiment, not
by bureaucracy, PowerPoint, persuasion, position, or power. We run these experiments quickly
and fail fast and celebrate. We embraced the minimal viable product approach: we focus on
features, no gold plating, no perfection. For partnerships and open innovation, we run
experiments with existing operational partners to test new processes and new technologies. We
also explore other industries, engage in virtual innovation, partner with universities and design
schools, and seek inspiration by meeting with other successful innovators in their workplaces,
labs, and studios in diverse creative fields and industries.
5.5.4 CORPORATE INNOVATION ROUTINES
5.5.4.1

Local Innovation Projects

Senior innovation managers recognized the importance of incremental innovation centred
around the core business as a building block for potentially generating breakthrough innovations
(Clark and Henderson, 1990). Surprisingly, narrators mentioned that what was often missing in
their firms’ innovation focus was the link between innovations around the core businesses and
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customer needs. Frequently, innovation was done for the sake of innovation without broader
relevance and applicability. Equally puzzling was the mental entrapment of employees in their
technological comfort zones without considering the employment of knowledge readily available
in closely related fields. Therefore, often, the first step taken by senior innovation managers was
to make employees’ minds more receptive to customer needs and innovation opportunities existing
in the outside environment. The senior innovation manager of Voyageurs commented:
The challenge was accepting technologies from the outside, from other industries. The
company’s CEO decided to create my position as a new role reporting directly to him—it did
not exist before. Prior to [creating the role], we had risk and technology functions, but this was
not enough to instil a dynamic corporate innovation capability. My main mission was not to
create technological innovation, but to create a culture/mindset of innovation throughout the
company to make sure we are more open and agile to accept technologies coming from the
outside. What was lacking previously was the understanding of the needs of customers to
develop the best products for the market.
5.5.4.2

Countermeasures against Exploitative Forces

Over time, strong tendencies towards exploitation fuelled by systemic risk aversion
developed in most sampled firms. For instance, the senior innovation managers of both
Canyonlands and Everglades reported that their firms started to operate like civil service entities.
To counter exploitative tendencies, senior innovation managers’ efforts led to the emergence of a
comprehensive system of incentives utilizing both extrinsic and intrinsic motivators. Extrinsic
motivators included the introduction of performance metrics related to innovation into middle
managers’ evaluation. Intrinsic motivators included linking initial innovation effort with the
appreciation of senior managers, awarding innovation rewards for ideas which made it to the
product stage, and celebrating innovation effort regardless of outcomes. The senior innovation
manager of Voyageurs remarked that “the real reward for innovators is when their idea makes it
into the final product.”
The emergence of informal innovation networks permanently lowered the ability of formal
structures to prevent novel ideas from being expressed, receiving seed funding, being developed,
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and being evaluated using an objective set of criteria. The behind-the-scenes functioning of these
networks made it difficult for innovation opponents to disrupt them or shut them down entirely.
The senior innovation manager of Canyonlands commented:
We started a guerilla initiative: spreading innovation guerilla style through the network of
innovation-minded employees who incentivize people to generate great new ideas that are hard
for other people to immediately put down; this is a reaction to the finding that middle managers
may not be that receptive to spreading innovation. Thus, we created this network of guerilla
innovators to explain what type of innovation is sought and what kind of rewards are given.
People became very receptive.
Reducing the formal authority and empowerment of product-/market-facing employees led
to the emergence of self-organizing teams. These teams were created organically from the bottom
up around an idea, and their membership was fluid as the idea developed and members left or
joined. Social innovation platforms provided innovation tools, but also allowed these teams to
transcend organizational silos and geographical distances. Informal networks connected these
teams with objective/impartial sources of evaluation and seed resources. The PowerPoint
document accompanying the narrative of Yosemite’s senior innovation manager stated, “If we
don’t disrupt ourselves, somebody else will! We moved to lean governance and rapid product
development. We empowered “self-organizing teams,” removing the hierarchical decision-making
process to allow decision making at the lowest possible level.”
5.5.4.3

Distant Innovation Projects

The idea of using Google’s approach to allocate unstructured time to employees for
exploration resonated among senior innovation managers. However, most of the sampled firms
operated in regulated industries over many decades and developed strongly hierarchical
approaches to both exploitation and exploration activities. Consequently, their employees were not
accustomed to diverting their effort outside of their formal roles. Corporate innovation processes
put in place by senior innovation managers encouraged and enabled autonomous experimentation
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at lower hierarchical levels. Further, some employees were offered experimentation-focused career
paths, especially when entrepreneurial ventures were acquired. The senior innovation manager of
Canyonlands commented:
When we asked people to identify the biggest innovation successes over the past 10 years, the
examples given often started as small grassroots projects with one to two people working on
them, as opposed to coming from a big top-down initiative. Thus, we identified as the main
hurdle to grassroots innovation people’s fear or inability to dedicate a little bit of their time to
experimentation to try out new ideas. […] We just acquired a small company and its founder
obviously has a lot of new ideas. It was a challenge for us to exploit these ideas as the founder
was not used to working in an environment with a boss and in a structured organization. We
needed to give him a role which was still innovative. We instituted a new scientific (expert)
career path so that certain employees can climb the organizational hierarchy without having
responsibility for 100-200 people. These employees have the freedom to pursue their ideas and
seek external collaboration. [This arrangement] created a cultural clash as internal R&D people
do not like to have people with such freedom around; it is a challenge.
5.6 NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ACTIONS BY SENIOR INNOVATION MANAGER
I further analyzed actions by senior innovation managers in terms of their execution nature
and effects on formal structures. I found that corporate innovation processes varied along two
spectrums. The former spectrum was anchored by mechanistic and experimental extrema. The
latter spectrum was anchored by augmenting and disrupting extrema. The mix of nature of
execution and effects on formal structures varied across cases, reflecting the heterogeneity of
sampled firms’ external and internal situations, as well as differences in the maturity cycle of their
innovation systems across markets in which the sampled firms operated.

5.6.1 NATURE OF CORPORATE INNOVATION PROCESSES
5.6.1.1

Mechanistic Corporate Innovation Processes

Mechanistic corporate innovation processes were marked by their rule-based nature and
wide acceptance of their utility, which facilitated their adoption and diffusion within the
organization. These processes were necessary for generating innovation, yet insufficient in
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themselves, bestowing on them a “hygienic” characteristic. Often, they were already introduced
prior to the establishment of the senior innovation manager role, and the senior innovation
manager’s influence was directed towards making them more efficient and more widely adopted
throughout the organization. When mechanistic corporate innovation processes were seen as an
end in themselves, they consumed considerable resources without generating corresponding value.
For instance, several senior innovation managers reported that large-scale ideation jams (Bjelland
and Wood, 2008) produced many low-value ideas, overwhelming the innovation system.
5.6.1.2

Autocratic Corporate Innovation Processes

Autocratic corporate innovation processes were marked by their top-down nonconsultative nature. For example, in some cases, the use of open innovation had to be mandated
by senior innovation managers due to internal resistance to outside ideas (Katz and Allen, 1982).
Another example was the establishment of a corporate innovation centre operating outside of the
realm of business units, which was often also separated from formal R&D structures. Considering
the scholarly debate about the benefits and costs of proximity in innovation (Boschma, 2005),
another interesting example was the top-down decision to lower the geographical distance between
centres of innovation and product-/market-level activities.
5.6.1.3

Resource Scaling Corporate Innovation Processes

Resource scaling corporate innovation processes were characterized by resource bricolage
(Baker and Nelson, 2005), as senior innovation managers often had to work with few available
resources. Resource constraints kept corporate innovation teams small. Over time, senior
innovation managers developed mechanisms for scaling their corporate innovation teams on a
temporary basis. For instance, senior innovation executives borrowed employees for specific
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innovation projects from business units and guaranteed their return into their formal roles within
a pre-agreed timeframe.
Other mechanisms for scaling up innovation resources included non-equity partnerships
with start-ups that involved trading a firm’s marketing and distribution capabilities in exchange
for a start-up’s frontier knowledge. Such non-equity partnerships limited the monetary cost to the
firm for acquiring external knowledge and, at the same time, did not result in a long-term
commitment for the firm, increasing its future partnership options. The trading nature of nonequity partnerships, whereby both partners gained a valuable resource, increased the chances of
the partnership being formed relative to corporate venturing (Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009).
Further, the fact that the non-equity partnership did not involve deep organizational integration
reduced the risk of structural suffocation of exploration (Puranam, Singh, and Zollo, 2006).
5.6.1.4

Experimental Corporate Innovation Processes

Experimental corporate innovation processes were marked by their trial-and-error nature,
which enabled the search for the right approach when the path to follow was unknown. On the
level of novel ideas, senior innovation managers encouraged as much product/market
experimentation as possible to efficiently assess an idea’s potential value. In terms of selecting
novel ideas, senior innovation managers introduced pairwise scoring, which pitted two randomly
selected ideas against each other to determine relative value. On the level of implementation,
senior innovation managers preferred rapid prototyping (Von Hippel, 1994) over striving for
perfection to assess a novel idea’s real value. At the corporate level, several senior innovation
managers engaged in trial-and-error approaches, in contrast to the notion of a rational senior
executive leading in a top-down directive manner (Porter, 1980).

5.6.2 EFFECTS ON FORMAL STRUCTURES
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5.6.2.1

Augmenting Corporate Innovation Processes

Augmenting corporate innovation processes drew upon formal structures embedded in the
organizational culture. Very early in the process of establishing the senior innovation manager
role, senior innovation managers recognized that they could not go head-on against elements of
established organizational culture. Thus, these managers tried to identify and leverage elements of
corporate culture conducive to their mission of fostering distant innovations.
Eventually, senior innovation managers were able to use elements of the organizational
culture which underpinned its stability, such as “imagination, vicarious experiences, stories, [and]
simulations” (Weick, 1987: 113), to induce higher organizational tolerance for uncertainty and
change related to the pursuit of innovation activities. Another related effect was the decrease of
ease with which the political power rooted in formal structures could be used by organizational
insiders to undermine the legitimacy of the work done by senior innovation managers.
5.6.2.2

Parallel Corporate Innovation Processes

Parallel corporate innovation processes bypassed formal structures. When senior
innovation managers identified elements of corporate culture which were critical for senior
innovation managers’ mission, but which could not be changed to be more receptive to innovation,
they created parallel alternatives. One example was the introduction of selection mechanisms that
could be self-administered by individual innovators, which kept them outside of the influence of
middle managers (e.g., pairwise scoring, rapid prototyping). Another example was the creation of
staggered innovation resource pools outside of the formal R&D budgeting process. These resource
pools could be flexibly deployed to support ad hoc and accidental innovation initiatives (Austin,
Devin, and Sullivan, 2012) without the need to engage in a formal process of resource solicitation.
5.6.2.3

Disrupting Corporate Innovation Processes

181

One particularly interesting aspect of the corporate innovation managers’ actions observed in the
data was the use of informal organizational structures (Gulati and Puranam, 2009) to mitigate the
influence of elements of organizational culture that were programmatically hostile to innovation.
One such informal organizational structure established by senior innovation managers was the
innovation network whose members often employed guerilla-type approaches to circumvent
formal opposition to innovation. Over time, these informal innovation networks often established
direct links to the highest managerial echelons, including the CEO and the board of directors.
Senior innovation managers’ support for self-organization at the lowest possible hierarchical level
also challenged formal structures and authority flows.

5.7 AN EMERGENT PROCESS MODEL OF DYNAMIC CORPORATE INNOVATION CAPABILITY
The findings reveal the difficulty for senior innovation managers to generate more growth from
innovation without making changes to organizational structures and behaviours of employees
operating at different hierarchical levels. At the same time, the senior innovation managers
recognized that mandating these changes through top-down directive decision making would
amplify resistance to innovation embedded within multidivisional firms programmed and
pressured towards efficient exploitation of core businesses. As a result, senior innovation managers
had to pace and sequence their interventions.
In this way, senior innovation managers were coordinating three interdependent and
concurrent phases of the development of dynamic corporate innovation capability: (1) connecting
past to present; (2) managing innovation risk; and (3) connecting future to present. Based on my
findings, I elaborate a grounded process theory of the development of dynamic corporate
innovation capability in large multidivisional firms. To capture interdependencies among phases,
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I employed the system dynamics approach used to study complex organizational processes (e.g.,
Rudolph, Morrison, and Carroll, 2009; Strike and Rerup, 2016).
Figure 5 depicts the establishment of the senior innovation manager role. “Senior
innovation manager legitimacy” is a stock variable which establishes the ability of the senior
innovation manager to influence intra-organizational innovation processes. It positively influences
another stock variable, “corporate innovation ambition.” “Innovation risk mitigators space”
represents a reservoir of options for reducing risks associated with the pursuit of innovation. The
valve depicted as “T” regulates the flow from the innovation risk mitigators space into
“countermeasures against exploitative forces,” which is a stock variable. The flow is increased by
“managing innovation risks at the individual inventor, middle manager, and corporate levels,”
which is an ongoing process variable, in turn negatively impacted by the “time needed to manage
innovation risks” variable, representing the complex nature of innovation risk management. An
increase in the stock of countermeasures against exploitative forces increases the “senior
innovation manager legitimacy” stock, creating a “reinforcing innovation acceptance loop (A),”
as the respect and support for the senior innovation manager role increases.
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Figure 5: Innovation Acceptance Loop
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Figure 2: Innovation acceptance loop
Figure 6 depicts the senior innovation manager role’s influence on both local and distant

innovation. “Local innovation projects” as a stock variable. “Local” refers to the proximity of
innovation projects to core businesses caused by a combination of external pressures on short-term
results, cognitive limitations of middle managers, and incentive systems geared towards
exploitation of core businesses. “Innovation space close to core businesses” is a stock variable
representing innovation opportunities related to core businesses. The innovation space around core
businesses is assumed to be objective in nature, reflecting the fact that most innovations are derived
from extant knowledge. The valve depicted as “T” regulates the flow from the innovation space
close to core businesses into the local innovation projects stock. “Connecting past to present” is
an ongoing process variable through which senior innovation managers increase the flow by
connecting past innovation achievements with present innovation opportunities. The rate of
connecting past innovation achievements with present innovation opportunities decreases with the
parameter “time needed to make the connection,” which captures the complexity of backward

184

innovation sensemaking. “Growth from local innovation” represents quantifiable contributions to
revenue growth from commercialization of local innovation projects. The increase of revenue
growth from commercialization of local innovation projects creates a “reinforcing local innovation
loop (L),” which increases the flow of resources to local innovation projects as growth from local
innovation increases.
“Distant innovation projects” is equally a stock variable. “Distant” refers to the structural,
cognitive, and temporal separation between the knowledge stock of the focal firm and sources of
knowledge required to pursue distant innovation. “Innovation space distant to core businesses” is
a stock variable representing innovation opportunities distant to core businesses. Like the
innovation space close to core businesses, innovation space distant to core businesses is assumed
to be objective in nature.
The valve depicted as “T” regulates the flow from the innovation space distant to core
business into the distant innovation projects stock. “Connecting future to present” is an ongoing
process variable through which senior innovation managers increase the flow by lowering the
distance between the firm and distant knowledge. The rate of connecting future to present
decreases with the parameter “time needed to make the connection,” which captures the
complexity of forward innovation sensemaking. “Growth from distant innovation” represents
quantifiable contributions to revenue growth from commercialization of distant innovation
projects. The increase of revenue growth from commercialization of distant innovation projects
creates a “reinforcing distant innovation loop (D),” which increases the flow of resources to distant
innovation projects as growth from distant innovation increases.
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Figure 6: Local and Distant Innovation Loop
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Figure 3: Local and distant innovation loop
Figure 7 represents the full emergent process model of dynamic corporate innovation

capability. As the countermeasures against exploitative forces stock grows, it increases the flow
from the innovation space close to core businesses into the local innovation projects stock. The
dotted line represents a weaker link, reflecting the finding that relatively little resistance existed to
innovation projects close to core businesses, as all sampled firms had routinized R&D programs.
Similarly, growth in countermeasures against exploitative forces increases the flow from the
innovation space distant to core businesses into the distant innovation projects stock. Growth from
both local and distant innovations increases the stock of corporate innovation ambition, which
reinforces the innovation acceptance loop.
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Under the assumption of resource constraints to exploration at the firm level, growth from
distant innovation decreases the flow from the innovation space close to core businesses into the
local innovation projects stock, and vice versa. Dotted lines represent the weak agency of senior
innovation managers to obtain additional exploration resources during a given period, reducing
this local-distant innovation substitution effect. On the other hand, a senior innovation manager
also has the agency to both balance the local-distant innovation ratio and/or reduce the need for
exploration resources by regulating the three valves depicted in the model.
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Figure 7: Full Emergent Process Model of Dynamic Corporate Innovation Capability
Time Needed to
Make the
Connection

Connecting
Past to Present

+

+

Innovation
Space
Related to
Core
Businesses

L
Reinforcing
Local Innovation
Loop

Local Innovation Projects

Senior Innovation
Manager Legitimacy

+
+

Growth from Local
Innovation

+

Corporate Innovation
Ambition

+
+
-

-

+
Innovation
Space
Distant to
Core
Businesses

Reinforcing Distant
Innovation
Loop

Growth from Distant
Innovation

+

-

+

Time Needed to
Manage Innovation
Risks

+

+

Figure 4: Full emergent process model of dynamic innovation capability
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5.8 DISCUSSION
This study contributes to innovation management scholarship by elaborating on an
empirical phenomenon, the dynamic corporate innovation capability, which has been
underexplored in prior literature. The concept of dynamic corporate innovation capability explains
how corporate managers support local innovation and use innovation risk management across
hierarchical levels to induce distant innovation. Prior research has uncovered that “the process for
moving from a firm’s reservoir of technical knowledge to the initiation of a project with potentially
game-changing opportunity appears to be almost capricious” (O’Conner and Rice, 2001: 109).
More recent studies have hinted at the possibility that corporate managers can reduce this ad hoc
nature of distant innovation generation in large multidivisional firms by integrating bottom-up and
top-down innovation processes (Birkinshaw, Bouquet, and Barsoux, 2011). Relatedly, other
innovation management scholars have noted that “new structures must be created to support these
breakthrough ideas. The issues surrounding such transformational processes deserve more
inquiry” (Garud, Tuertscher, and Van de Ven, 2013: 802).
I argue that the senior innovation manager role is one such structure, and make a theoretical
contribution by unpacking the senior innovation manager role and showing how various corporate
innovation processes enacted by senior innovation managers influence continuous generation of
distant innovations. I also explain that senior innovation managers are not a simple addition to the
corporate team who can drive distant innovation by relying on their formal authority only. Instead,
senior innovation managers engage in a highly political process, augmenting, bypassing, and
disrupting elements of formal organizational structures using mechanistic, autocratic, resource
scaling, and experimental approaches to managing innovation. Overall, this study shows that the
influence of senior innovation managers unfolds over time as a multilevel process marked by
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interdependencies and contingencies, as opposed to being a top-down, one-time structural
adjustment to how innovation is managed within large multidivisional firms.

5.8.1 THE ROLE OF A SENIOR INNOVATION MANAGER
This research project started with only a limited understanding of the role of a senior
innovation manager. Findings in this study revealed that the senior innovation manager role is
marked by several specific challenges, which, taken together, paint an image of a boundedly
rational corporate executive (Cyert and March, 1963) operating through often unconventional
methods, in contrast with the portrayal of a corporate manager acting based on analytical foresight
(Porter, 1980).
First, generation of more growth from innovation required an increase in the
exploration/exploitation ratio (March, 1991). Yet, the existence in large multidivisional firms of
“the system of constraints [which] forces managers to choose policies within a narrow range of
profit opportunities compatible with stockholders or creditor interests” (Herman, 1981: 20)
required senior innovation managers to employ untraditional ways for increasing exploration,
without significantly reducing ongoing exploitation and related profitability. To achieve this goal,
senior innovation managers engaged in resource scaling and bricolage (Baker and Nelson, 2005),
as well as in resource slack scouting (Penrose 1959/1995). Further, resource flexibility gained
through these non-traditional means increased senior innovation managers’ flexibility in
responding to unpredictable creativity (Austin, Devin, and Sullivan, 2012).
Second, responsibility to generate growth from innovation often already formed part of the
job of other senior managers and/or was delegated to business unit managers. As such, senior
innovation managers had to engage in political maneuvering to get accepted by their peers
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Moreover, often, business unit-level managers were

190

subordinated to senior innovation managers implicitly rather than explicitly, which required
additional political maneuvering by senior innovation managers.
Third, concrete blueprints for senior innovation roles rarely existed, in contrast to
established corporate functions related to finance, information technology, or M&A. This factor
required senior innovation managers to engage in trial-and-error approaches and experiments, and
to be highly entrepreneurial in general in their roles. Senior innovation managers also relied
heavily on informal networks to counter the biases towards exploitation embedded in formal
organizational structures.

5.8.2 EXTERNAL VERSUS INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE SOURCING
The concept of open innovation of leveraging external knowledge to augment intra-firm
innovation effort (Chesbrough, 2003) has gained significant scholarly and managerial interest over
the last two decades. The argument that open innovation enables firms to pursue distant
innovations is frequently made by scholars. Interestingly, the CEO of 3M, a consistently highly
innovative firm, has remarked that 3M has always used relatively little open innovation, yet is now
considering increasing its usage in the future (Berger et al., 2009). Similarly, this study uncovered
that while open innovation was an important element of the sampled firms’ overall innovation
management systems, the costs and long investment-benefit conversion cycles associated with
open innovation meant that senior innovation managers initially focused their effort on leveraging
internal sources of knowledge, using open innovation as a weak complement to—rather than a
strong substitute for—sourcing novel knowledge internally.
The leveraging of internal resources for generating distant innovation is directly related to
the link between organizational slack and a firm’s growth introduced by Penrose (1959/1995).
Penrose conceptualizes the firm as a portfolio of resources functioning within an administrative
framework, arguing that a firm’s growth is related to managers’ desire to “do something” using
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human and other resources controlled by the firm. My study builds on this seminal insight in the
context of innovation management: initially, senior innovation managers develop mechanisms
facilitating the temporal, cross-silo, cross-business unit, cross-geography recombination of
knowledge which is under administrative control of the firm, while encouraging the augmentation
of the internal knowledge sourcing with open innovation. As the senior innovation manager role
matures, sub-capabilities developed within the dynamic corporate innovation capability
framework (e.g., extraction of knowledge from early stage start-ups, future sensing) decrease the
cost and time intensity differentials between external and internal knowledge sourcing.
At the same time, maturation of the senior innovation manager role likely results in internal
knowledge reservoir depletion, which may also lead to the increased use of external knowledge
sourcing. In sum, firms must have a well-developed internal innovation management capability to
leverage and fully exploit innovation opportunities sourced through open innovation.

5.8.3 INDUCED BOTTOM-UP DISTANT INNOVATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CENTRALIZATION OF
INNOVATION
The centralization of innovation activities within a multidivisional firm has also received
significant scholarly attention. Sorenson and Stuart (2000) show the tendency of large firms to
innovate using internal resources. Building on this research, Argyres and Silverman (2004) and
Arora, Belenzon, and Rios (2014) demonstrate that centralization of innovation activities results
in more distant innovations, in contrast to when innovation activities are contained at the business
unit level. Consistent with these results, most senior innovation managers in the sampled firms
created a dedicated corporate innovation unit to generate distant innovations.
Yet, findings in this study offer a more nuanced view of innovation centralization as they
show how senior innovation managers use innovation resources located at both centralized and
decentralized locations within the firm to generate distant innovations. Initially, senior innovation
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managers borrow resources embedded in business units and insert them into a more centralized
innovation domain on a temporary basis. Over time, these managers decrease firms’ reliance on
centralized innovation alone to generate distant innovations by introducing mechanisms allowing
individual innovators operating with the realm of business units to self-organize on an ad hoc basis
and access centralized innovation resources remotely on a demand basis.
Further, as stocks of senior innovation managers’ legitimacy and countermeasures to
exploitation grow, senior innovation managers’ ability to use more directive top-down approaches
to generate distant innovation within business units increases. In sum, this study’s findings show
that distant innovation gradually occurs through both top-down and bottom-up corporate
innovation processes.

5.8.4 BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
Large multidivisional firms are typically mature organizations focused on exploitation at
the expense of exploration, and as such, they represent a subset of organizational structures. It is
likely that firms with less mature innovation cycles experience less severe internal biases towards
exploitation, and therefore have a lower need for developing dynamic corporate innovation
capability. As I employed a cross-industry sample, the presented findings represent a coherent
account of the role of senior innovation managers in innovation management in large
multidivisional firms, as opposed to explaining inter-industry differences in the development of
dynamic corporate innovation capability.

5.8.5 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
5.8.5.1

Effects of Dynamic Corporate Innovation Capability on Innovation Performance
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This study focused on the process of developing dynamic corporate innovation capability,
and not on the outcomes of this process. Further research should explore the impact that dynamic
corporate innovation capability has on firm-level innovation output.
5.8.5.2

Automation of Dynamic Corporate Innovation Capability

The study confirmed the importance of traditional approaches to innovation, such as the
Stage Gate process. As the data collection progressed over the span of five years, the relevance of
more advanced innovation-supporting systems that leverage machine learning and artificial
intelligence increasingly entered the discourse at the chief innovation summits. Advances in these
areas are likely to both accelerate the pace of technological change and offer new ways for firms
to sense opportunities and take advantage of them.
5.8.5.3

Early Selection versus Incubation

The introduction of selection mechanisms very early on in the innovation’s incubation
stage was problematic, as many high-potential innovations required significant time to crystalize
into defensible projects. How to reconcile the need to deselect low-value projects early on with the
need to let projects develop before being subjected to the selection environment remains an
unsolved riddle.
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CHAPTER 6

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

6.1 THE EXPLOITATION VERSUS EXPLORATION TENSION IN A MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRM
I introduced my dissertation with a quote by March (1994: 47) about the existence of some
possibilities available to managers to optimize the ratio between exploitation and exploration
activities coexisting within a firm’s boundaries. It is my hope that my research has contributed
towards the knowledge about the nature of some of these possibilities.
In Chapter 2, I show that, contrary to the dominant view in the literature, top-down
interventions in innovation management are not merely passive, but are often purposeful actions
instigated by corporate managers to influence how innovation occurs at the corporate manager,
middle managers, team, and individual inventor hierarchical levels across variation, selection, and
retention of knowledge. In addition, I demonstrate that a specific action instigated by corporate
managers often operates across levels of analysis and evolutionary phases of the innovation
process. Specifically, I synthesize extant knowledge on top-down interventions in intraorganizational innovation processes (i.e., corporate innovation activism (CIA)) into structuring,
nudging, and routinizing categories. By identifying important gaps and unresolved tensions in the
extant knowledge on CIA, I set the stage for both theoretical and empirical exploration of CIA’s
rationale, genesis, and evolution.
In Chapter 3, I deductively establish the rationale for the existence of CIA within a
multidivisional firm. I show that a careful reconsideration of foundational corporate strategy
literature allows for the relaxation of the assumption of corporate managers’ passivity in the
management of innovation. Building on the knowledge base built in Chapter 2, together with the
insights derived from the reconsideration of the foundational literature, I argue that CIA can
manifest itself through efficiency gains in innovation processes and/or value added above and
beyond what is achievable when the management of innovation is confined to business units alone.
While corporate innovation synergy and corporate innovation value added are deductive
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theoretical constructs, by elaborating on them, I establish the possibility that CIA is present across
the universe of existing multidivisional firms.
In Chapter 4, I proceed to empirically examine the genesis of CIA. Using a proprietary
dataset on corporate interventions in the management of innovation in large multidivisional firms,
I confirm the existence of CIA by uncovering 17 CIA processes operating across hierarchical levels
and evolutionary phases. To bring my findings closer to the realities of real-world multidivisional
firms, I synthesize 17 CIA processes into three configurations, reflecting several options for the
distribution of elements of CIA between the corporate centre and business units. Mapping these
three configurations onto the innovation efficiency frontier allows me to link the CIA to the tradeoff that corporate managers face as they attempt to optimize the ratio between low-risk/low-return
innovation projects and high-risk/high-potential innovation options.
In Chapter 5, I make another empirical examination focused on linking CIA’s managerial
aspects to the transformation of discrete top-down interventions into an organizational capability
to continuously discover, evaluate, and monetize distant innovations (i.e., dynamic corporate
innovation capability (DCIC)). For this purpose, I assemble another proprietary dataset by
longitudinally mapping the work of senior innovation managers in large multidivisional firms. I
uncover a process giving rise to DCIC that is comprised of legitimacy building for the role of a
senior innovation manager, the establishment of corporate innovation ambition, and the
transformation of corporate innovation processes into corporate innovation routines. To generate
understanding about how these sub-processes dynamically interact as corporate managers attempt
to optimize the balance between exploitation and exploration, I use system dynamics modelling to
create an emergent model of DCIC. In the model, I conceptualize innovation acceptance, local
innovation, and distant innovation self-reinforcing loops, and propose several regulating
mechanisms that corporate managers can use to manage the ongoing tension between exploitation
and exploration on the organizational level.
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6.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
In addition to contributing to the scholarly discussion about the role of corporate managers in
co-managing exploration and exploitation activities within a multidivisional firm, I make several
other original theoretical contributions in my dissertation that are worth highlighting.
6.2.1 INNOVATION AS A CORPORATE FUNCTION
The dominant view in the literature has been that innovation in a multidivisional firm occurs
through bottom-up processes which should be disrupted by top-down interventions (Amabile,
1983; Damanpour, 1991). Relatedly, Bower (1970) argues that corporate managers play a passive
role in innovation management as providers of funds to innovation projects, rubber-stamping
recommendations by trusted middle managers. Burgelman (1983a, 1983b) builds upon Bower’s
(1970) work and posits that corporate managers retroactively rationalize innovation successes as
being the result of corporate actions, while in fact, they result from actions taken by middle
managers. Hence, Burgelman (1983a, 1983b) retains the view of corporate managers as being
inherently passive in innovation management.
Across the four papers in this dissertation, I consistently find that the passivity assumption
surrounding the involvement of corporate managers in innovation management does not hold from
multiple perspectives. My finding resonates with several recent calls in the literature to unpack the
role of corporate managers in the management of innovation (e.g., Anderson, Potočnik, and Zhou,
2014). Through a literature review and deductive theorizing, I argue in Chapters 2 and 3 for the
possibility of innovation being a core corporate function in a multidivisional firm. In both Chapters
4 and 5, I find strong empirical support for my assertion.
In this way, I demonstrate that the innovation literature’s affinity towards the bottom-up
view on how innovation occurs within a multidivisional firm is incomplete without considering
how it is shaped by purposeful top-down managerial interventions. Unlike Birkinshaw, Bouquet,
and Barsoux (2011), I find that the relationship between top-down and bottom-up innovation
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processes is not solely complementary in nature, but orthogonal and parallel as well. My empirical
findings in Chapters 4 and 5 show how managers deploy top-down interventions to augment,
rectify, or circumvent bottom-up innovation processes to optimize innovation flows on the system
level.
The important insight my findings generate is that the management of innovation in a large
and complex multidivisional organization is not only about minimizing bureaucratic interference
in bottom-up innovation processes (Amabile, 1983), but rather, about understanding the limitations
of these processes and addressing these limitations through purposeful top-down managerial
interventions. Through my empirical work, I disentangle these top-down managerial interventions
along several dimensions. In Chapter 4, I outline possibilities available to corporate managers in
terms of structuring their interventions to allow corporate managers agency to match
organizational design factors to desired interactions between bottom-up and top-down innovation
processes. In Chapter 5, I delve deeper into how managers adapt the nature of their interventions
to pursued innovation goals. Overall, my findings open up a promising avenue for future research
that focuses on increasing our understanding of how the modulation of top-down interventions in
the management of innovation shape bottom-up innovation processes.
6.2.2 MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY IN A MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRM
A key theme resonating across my four papers is the complex nature of the management of
uncertainty generated by intra-organizational innovation activities. In the introduction to my
dissertation, I highlight some of the revolutionary research that has been recently conducted in
relation to this topic, including research on centralization of innovation activities (Argyres and
Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, and Rios, 2014), the relationship between cost retrenchment
and innovation capability (Lim, Celly, Morse, and Rowe, 2013), accidental innovation (Austin,
Devin, and Sullivan, 2012), unofficial research (Criscuolo, Salter, and Ter Wal (2014), and
vicarious learning from failures (Maslach, Branzei, Rerup, and Zbaracki, 2018). Building on
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these pioneering research streams, as well as on the foundational literature, I make several
original contributions to the knowledge on the management of uncertainty.
First, in Chapter 2, based on careful synthesis of extant knowledge, I argue that corporate
managers’ focus is not simply on mitigating uncertainty, but also on containing its negative
aspects while harnessing its potential. In Chapter 3, I deductively argue that corporate managers
can rearrange the loci of risk-taking behaviour to prevent innovation-associated risk from
stopping and/or distorting innovation activities. In Chapter 4, I show how corporate managers
modulate risk-taking behaviours to transform risk into valuable outcomes. Then, in Chapter 5, I
develop a system-level model of top-down risk management at the organizational level.
Second, much research focuses on how managers promote failure in their organizations.
While I touched on this theme in my literature review in Chapter 2, through my empirical work
in Chapters 4 and 5, I find that failure is an outcome that individual employees strongly prefer
not to experience. Thus, paradoxically, while experiencing occasional failure is wholly
manageable and desirable at the organizational level, I find strong resistance to failure at the
individual employee level. The question then becomes, how can an organization encourage
individual-level behaviour with a high probability of failure to uncover truly high-potential
innovations, while reassuring individual employees that innovation-related failure will not
negatively impact their future prospects within the organization? Based on my findings in
Chapters 4 and 5, I propose several possibilities for addressing this dilemma (e.g., failure rhetoric,
celebration of failure, codified learning from failure, and flexible career switching). As recent
publications on the topic of failure within large organizations demonstrate (e.g., Maslach, 2016;
Maslach, Branzei, Rerup, and Zbaracki, 2018), this research stream offers many fruitful research
opportunities.
Third, another strong theme resonating across and beyond my four papers is the effort of
corporate managers to create an organizational climate conducive to experimentation (Thomke,
2001; Thomke 2003). This sub-stream of the literature has been gaining increasing scholarly
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attention due to the idea that in order for a multidivisional firm to remain competitive across
multiple industries, it needs to internally maintain areas with start-up-like organizational
environments (Ries, 2011). My overall findings show that the coexistence of start-up-like and
more mature organizational environments is not frictionless, and requires top-down interventions.
In Chapter 4, I uncover several mechanisms deployed by corporate managers to enable
experimentation to occur within the constraints of established formal organizational structures
(i.e., top-down support for autonomous innovation, availability of explorative/mixed career paths,
provision of physical experimentation spaces, and fostering rapid experimentation). In Chapter
5, I propose that the continuous management of risks at the individual inventor, middle manager,
and corporate levels counterweights organizational gravitation towards exploitation and, as a
result, supports the continuous pursuit of experimentation across organizational hierarchical
levels. Overall, my findings point to the need for purposeful and continuous top-down support
for experimentation in the organizational environment of a multidivisional firm marked by a
persistent tendency to pursue short-term certainty.

6.3 PRACTITIONER CONTRIBUTIONS

6.3.1 OVERVIEW OF EXTANT INNOVATION MECHANISMS
One practitioner-related outcome of my dissertation is the overview of main innovation
mechanisms available to managers organized along hierarchical levels and innovation projects’
typical stages. Managers can use my overview as a reference guide to consider which top-down
interventions in innovation management are likely to be relevant for their respective firms.
Further, my dissertation offers managers insights about differences, yet also about
interrelatedness among various uncovered innovation mechanisms. For instance, unstructured
innovation worktime, hackathons, and skunk works projects can be purposefully leveraged by
managers both in sequence and in parallel to optimize the use of scarce innovation resources. Ideas
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continuously generated through employees’ unstructured innovation times can be developed
further within the purposefully built innovation team environment of a hackathon, to then be
passed on to a skunk works team working largely independently from the rest of the organization.
Ultimately, my synthesis of uncovered innovation mechanisms allows managers to consider
nuances of innovation management related to the need for a senior innovation manager to combine
top-down structuring of innovation processes, psychological interventions in innovation processes,
and routinization of some aspects of top-down and bottom-up innovation processes.
6.3.2 THE ROLE OF A SENIOR INNOVATION MANAGER IN A MULTIDIVISIONAL FIRM
Most of my informants commented on the non-linearity of the path of a senior innovation
manager, as the role eludes easy, “how-to” prescriptive recommendations. Yet, several common
themes resonate across my dissertation findings. These themes may be relevant for newly
appointed senior innovation managers as they decide how to proceed in their roles.
First, despite the oft-stated importance of innovation for an organization, the meaning of
innovation for a specific organization is often poorly defined. Thus, I found across my cases that
newly appointed senior innovation managers first engaged in a company-wide consultation to
more clearly define the organization-specific meaning of innovation.
Second, the corporate innovation function is marked by its novelty vis-à-vis other more
established corporate functions, even with respect to more recent areas of corporate attention
(e.g., the transition into the digital world and taking advantage of big data analytics). Therefore,
senior innovation managers had to work hard to justify their very existence at the corporate level
and delineate their role against other corporate-level functions. This process was complicated by
the fact that managers in charge of more established corporate areas, such as marketing and/or IT
management, often considered the management of innovation to be within their respective realms.
Another frequently complication was the business unit-level opposition to the cross-business unit
authority of the corporate innovation function, as business unit managers often consider

206

innovation efforts to be within their domain. I found that senior innovation managers were
addressing these political issues and maneuvering through careful diplomacy and a measured
approach based on mutual respect, as opposed to imposing their will through heavy-handed
tactics rooted in the formal authority stemming from their function.
Third, the corporate innovation function was often poorly resourced. Frequently, the
directive from the CEO was to significantly increase the percentage of revenue directly linked to
the corporate innovation effort, yet without committing to providing substantial resources from
the onset of the creation of the corporate innovation function. Thus, most of the senior innovation
managers included in my database had to improvise and find creative ways to resource their
function along the way. Some mechanisms for this on-the-fly resourcing of the corporate
innovation function uncovered through my research include assembling (initially very small)
corporate innovation teams, temporarily borrowing resources from other organizational areas,
and creating the perception with the CEO of a burning platform situation through skillful
presentation of significant innovation trends and challenges which could be effectively addressed
by increasing the funding for the corporate innovation function.
Fourth, tangible results of the corporate innovation function would often come only after
many years from its establishment. I found that senior innovation managers addressed this issue
in two ways. First, they created the perception of a more abstract time dimension related to their
work in contrast to a more mechanical time dimension associated with other activities within their
firms. This perception of a more abstract time dimension allowed senior innovation managers
some flexibility in terms of negotiation of milestones and deliverables. Second, the sampled
senior innovation managers identified more easily achievable tasks and focused on delivering
those to create the perception of some level of outputs.
6.3.3 DESIGNING A CORPORATE INNOVATION PROGRAM
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While the role of a senior innovation manager is marked by its non-linearity, the establishment
of a comprehensive and sustainable corporate innovation program is an even more complex
undertaking. In my dissertation, I open up the black box of several corporate innovation programs
and deconstruct them into their underlying components. The uncovering of these components of a
prototypical corporate innovation program allows CEOs and other senior executives who
contemplate the introduction of such a program in their firms to gain awareness about the
modularity of the process and make the right decisions suited for their specific organizational and
environmental contexts.

6.3.4 EMPLOYEE INNOVATION RISK MANAGEMENT
In most large and complex multidivisional firms, a number of employees are intrinsically
motivated to work on innovation projects (Amabile, 1988). Yet, employees may be hesitant to
pursue their intrinsic motivations due to the inherent riskiness of innovation projects. My research
reveals several mechanisms that can mitigate innovation -generated risk at the employee level.
Organizations can offer guarantees to their employees that failure related to innovation
pursuits will not negatively affect their careers. These guarantees can take form of an explicit
contractual agreement between the firm and the concerned employee, stipulating that in case of
a project’s failure, the employee will be able to reassume his or her formal position without a loss
of seniority.
In addition, organizations can structure innovation projects in a way that makes them
transparent for employees in terms of the stage of a specific project, project’s history, project’s
resourcing, project’s expected duration, and/or project’s expected outcomes. Such innovation
project transparency can significantly decrease the information asymmetry between the
organization and its employees, and increase employees’ ability to evaluate the riskiness of an
innovation project for their own careers.
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Further, organizations can offer their employees innovation-specific career paths which
reduce the managerial burden on the employee, yet still offer growth in seniority contingent on
innovation-related performance. Such career options increase the chances of employees’ success
in innovation pursuits by allowing employees to fully focus on innovation-related activities.
6.3.5 DEBIASING INNOVATION DECISION MAKING
Pioneering work on decision making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman, Lovallo,
and Sibony, 2011) has uncovered several key biases distorting organizational decision making.
Similarly, early scholars of intra-organizational innovation processes note the existence of several
innovation-related decision-making biases (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983a, 1983b). In my
dissertation, I confirm the presence of biases, and uncover several mechanisms used by corporate
managers to mitigate these biases. These mechanisms may be of importance to senior innovation
managers who aim to debias their intra-organizational innovation processes.
I find that corporate managers are acutely aware of biases operating at the middle manager
level. Consequently, they may design several bypassing mechanisms to lessen the influence of
middle managers on the evaluation of novel ideas. Once such mechanism concerns the creation of
alternative lines of communication between individual inventors and corporate managers in cases
when novel ideas were rejected by their superiors. Another mechanism is the establishment of an
informal network of innovation-friendly employees, who, at the same time, retain formal power
though their rank in the organizational hierarchy. The existence of this informal innovation
network makes it harder for middle managers to reject a novel idea based on their personal opinions
and/or personal agenda. The inclusion of innovation metrics into middle managers’ KPIs is another
debiasing mechanism employed by corporate managers.
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